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Abstract
Essays in Network Economics
Jian Xin Heng
2021
Chapter 1 explores possibilities for non-parametrically identifying peer effects. In my model,
outcomes associated with individuals are an unknown function of expected peer outcomes and
other individual-specific attributes. Unobserved heterogeneity in outcomes across individuals
is captured by an additively separable individual-specific error. The error is mean dependent
on peer group, rendering expected peer outcome an endogenous covariate. Exogenous peer
attributes are absent from the individuals’ remaining covariates.
When the data is cross-sectional, I propose imposing a stringent but intuitive assumption
on how individual outcomes depend on expected peer outcomes and remaining individual-
specific attributes. Specifically, I assume one of the individual-specific characteristics indexes
how strongly an individual interacts with his peers. If the index is zero, the individual is not
directly affected by peer outcomes. Under this assumption, the model is identified, up to a
normalization. When panel data is available, the assumption is unrequired, and the model is
identified via a more traditional IV-based approach. The cross-sectional result leads to tests
for whether peer effects estimates reflect forces associated with social interactions or not.
Chapter 2 studies how economies of scale and product differentiation affect manufacturer-
supplier relationships. A model consisting of two manufacturers, each with pre-existing re-
lationships to two separate suppliers, is analyzed. At the start, an unrelated manufacturer-
supplier pair decides whether to invest in a new relationship. Based on the resulting network
of manufacturer-supplier relationships, a manufacturer’s input price is determined by Nash
bargaining if it’s related to one supplier, and a first-price auction if otherwise. When manufac-
turers are horizontally differentiated, hold-up of investment by neighbor manufacturers causes
manufacturer-supplier network connectivity to be too low. On the other hand, overinvestment
in outside option relationships causes network connectivity to be inefficiently high. Shocks to in-
dividual manufacturers or suppliers have disproportionately large (small) welfare consequences
vis-a-vis ex-ante market shares when the network is under (overly) connected compared to the
socially optimal network.
Chapter 2 also estimates a micro-founded model of firm-to-firm relationship formation, us-
ing prices, quantities and product-supplier-level network data for 2008-16 U.S. automobiles.
The model incorporates the theoretical model’s key elements - supplier-level economies of scale,
downstream market product differentiation and relationship network contingent input pricing.
To identify the model, I assume manufacturers Nash bargain with suppliers inherited from pre-
vious periods. I then exploit variation in these suppliers’ quantities to identify how production
costs vary with rival product output. I find, on average, main suppliers of chassis, exterior
and combined inputs experience significant economies of scale. Ex-post and on average, man-
ufacturers do not benefit from forming their chosen relationships, absent rents from outside
option relationship overinvestment or compensation from other firms. In comparison, hold-up
of relationship investment is less significant in affecting incentives to form relationships.
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A Dissertation
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Chapter 1
Non-parametrically Identifying Peer Effects
when Correlated Effects are Present but
Exogenous Effects are Absent
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, social interactions within non-overlapping peer groups imply each individual’s
outcome is an unknown function of expected peer outcome, and other characteristics. Unob-
served heterogeneity across individuals is captured by an individual-specific additively separable
error. The challenge is to characterize assumptions on the data generating process that ensure
the function is non-parametrically identified.
The primary motivation behind this paper is econometrical. Linear social effects models
have been estimated in a wide variety of contexts1. Papers such as Bramoulle et al. (2009) un-
derstandably study identification of peer effects in similar settings. Quite often, sign restrictions
on the regressors’ coefficients are needed to identify linear social effects models, by implying
1. The surveys by Carney (2013) and dePaula (2015) review how the econometric and applied literatures in
this field have evolved since Manski (1993), and significantly affected my understanding of the field.
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a bijection between reduced form coefficients and the original model’s structural parameters2.
Whether peer effects are identified absent these restrictions or functional form assumptions is
of interest.
The secondary motivation behind this paper is theoretical. Armengol et al. (2009) and
Blume et al. (2015) explain how empirical social effects models can stem from best responses
of simultaneous-moves games. However, payoff functions in these games are typically lin-
ear quadratic, in contrast to a range of studies documenting non-linear peer effects3. Non-
parametric relationships between outcomes and characteristics in the empirical model allow for
more general payoff functional forms in the implicit game underlying the model. This bridges
the gap between theory and evidence.
Aside from its non-parametric formulation, several features of this paper’s model should be
noted. First, peer groups partition individual observations in the model, and thus don’t over-
lap. As explained by Bramoulle et al. (2009), the shift towards overlapping peer group effects
was partially motivated by the need to overcome Manski’s (1993) identification problem. Yet
historically, social effects have been estimated for non-overlapping peer groups such as schools
or neighborhoods4, in addition to more general social networks. I see this paper’s results as
stepping stones towards both non-parametric estimation of peer effects in appropriate contexts,
and non-parametric identification of peer effects from more general network data.
2. For example, Bramoulle et al. (2009) requires the size of the peer effects coefficient to be strictly less than
one.
3. See (Bayer & Ross (2009), Sund (2009), Alcalde (2013), Burke & Sass (2013), Kiss (2013), Tincani (2015)
and Agostinelli (2018)). These papers stem from a formal literature survey on three well-known databases,
using “non-linear” or “non-parametric”, (with and without the hyphen) and “peer effects” as keywords. The
first 100-125 hits in each database were extracted and pruned. The majority of papers studying peer effects
non-linearly find evidence of peer effects operating non-linearly. I acknowledge Leila Bengali’s efforts in this
task.
4. See Gaviria & Raphael (2001) or Carrell et al. (2008) for schools. See Sacerdote (2001) for college dormitory
roommates. See Bertrand et al. (2003) or Bobonis & Finan (2009) for neighborhoods.
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Second, this paper’s asymptotic results implicitly require each peer group to contain in-
finitely many individuals. The model is hence more applicable to situations where peer groups
contain hundreds of people, as opposed to less. Typically, empirically studied peer groups fea-
ture fewer than 50 observations5. A justification behind this focus is that individuals in smaller
social units interact more frequently6. Yet, it is also conceivable for individuals to be influenced
by broader subsets of society, since their payoffs can depend on actions of people they do not
personally know. In support of this view, Carrell et al. (2008) document peer effects in cheating,
within peer groups containing more than 100 military academy graduates.
Finally, individual outcomes do not depend on peer characteristics. Hence, exogenous ef-
fects are formally absent. This is disappointing since one often conceives of social effects as an
individual’s choices being influenced by the chosen outcomes of his peers (the so called peer
effect) and their characteristics (more commonly known as exogenous effects). Manski (1993)
proves empirically separating peer and exogenous effects in the linear social effects model is
impossible. However, identifying the combined effect of peer outcomes and attributes is still
achievable, under appropriate restrictions. Such possibilities are explored in this paper, by
extending the base model to encompass exogenous effects.
I analyze the model when available data is cross-sectional, and an appropriately modified
model when the researcher observes panel data. Identification of peer effects is non-trivial be-
cause peer outcomes are endogenous regressors. A traditional remedy has been to use peer
5. For example, see Sacerdote (2001) for peer groups constructed from dormitory roommates, Pinto (2010)
and Tincani (2015) for peer groups constructed from classmates, and Duflo & Saez (2003) and Dahl et al. (2014)
for peer groups constructed from office colleagues.
6. Dahl et al. (2014) state this as their rationale for studying peer effects within small and medium sized firms.
Duflo & Saez (2003) state individuals are more likely to know their peers under tighter peer group definitions,
while suggesting attenuation bias may arise if social units are larger.
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characteristics to instrument for peer outcomes7. This approach does not extend immediately
to the studied context, since no reduced-form relationship between expected peer characteristics
and expected peer outcome emerges naturally from the model. When the data is cross-sectional,
I propose imposing a stringent but intuitive assumption on the relationship between an individ-
ual’s outcome, characteristics, and expected peer outcome. The assumption posits the existence
of a characteristic among the model’s covariates, that indexes how strongly an individual inter-
acts with his peers. Transmission of peer effects shuts down when the index equals zero. Under
this assumption, peer effects are identified.
When the data tracks observations across time periods, peer effects are identified under
more orthodox assumptions. Cross-period data variation means lagged peer outcomes can be
used to instrument for peer outcomes. The interaction index restriction can thus be dispensed
with.
These results contrast with less optimistic messages on peer effects identification from two
other papers. Consider the non-parametric set-up in Manski (1993) that was shown to be
unidentified. I find Manski’s non-parametric model is unidentified because it essentially as-
sumes random assignment of individuals to peer groups. When his model is generalized to
allow for endogenous peer group formation, then identification is possible, and actually at-
tained under the interaction index assumption. In addition, the paper’s model suggests how
to empirically discriminate between peer effects caused by individuals responding to peer influ-
ence, and effects reflecting generic correlation between individual and group average outcomes.
As explained in Angrist (2014), the latter possibility threatens causal interpretations of peer
effects estimates. This possibility is ruled out precisely by the interaction index assumption,
which is testable from the data’s distribution.
7. See the methodology collectively developed by Case & Katz (1991), Gaviria & Raphael (2001) and Carell
et al. (2008).
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Finally, to complement the identification results, I provide a consistent and asymptotically
normal estimator for the cross-sectional model, and demonstrate how the model’s structural
relationships are interpretable as best responses of an infinite-player bayesian game. In par-
ticular, it is hoped that formally micro-founding the model aids interpretation of peer effects,
while rationalizing some of the model’s more novel or troublesome features.
This paper is mainly related to the peer effects identification literature. In response to
the aforementioned identification problem elaborated upon in Manski (1993), various attempts
have been made to identify peer effects under alternative assumptions8. Many of these studies
suggest the researcher observes a large number of finite, potentially overlapping peer groups.
Morover, these studies are typically conducted in parametric frameworks. One exception is
Brock & Durlauf (2007), who study social effects in a semi-parametric setting. However, they
assume outcomes are binary, and focus on exogenous rather than peer effects. More recently,
Graham et al. (2010), Pinto (2010), Manski (2013) and Tincani (2015) analyze social effects
non or semi-parametrically, in more specific or applied contexts. However none of these pa-
pers’ empirical specifications incorporate endogenous peer effects too. Finally, a more general
non-parametric identification literature exists. Papers written in this area include Newey et al.
(1999), Chesher (2003), Imbens & Newey (2009), Matzkin (1992, 2008) and others. Typically,
non-parametric models are identified up to constants or scaling factors. This literature is also
not focused on peer effects.
In sum, this paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it suggests ways of
identifying and interpreting peer effects without relying on parametric assumptions. Second,
its results apply when peer groups are large and non-overlapping, such as schools. In what
8. See Moffitt (2001), Lee (2007), Brock & Durlauf (2007), Bramoulle et al. (2009), Blume et al. (2015) and
Agostinelli (2018) for more details.
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follows, the models for cross sectional and panel data are described and analyzed in sections 1.2
and 1.3. Microfoundations for Section 1.2’s model are established in Section 1.4. Uninstructive
proofs are located in the appendix.
1.2 Identification from Cross-Sectional Data
There are I individuals and S possible peer groups. For each individual i ≤ I, a researcher
observes (yi,xi, si) ∈ RK+1 × N. As in the peer effects literature, yi denotes the individual’s
endogenous outcome of interest that is susceptible to peer effects, xi is a vector of observable
characteristics for the individual while si denotes his peer group. The data facing the researcher
is hence {yi,xi, si}i≤I .
Example 1.2.1. [Educational Achievement] Let yi be a measure of individual i’s academic
performance, such as his test score on a nationwide exam. Let xi and si be i’s characteris-
tics and school of choice respectively. The characteristics might include his family income or
neighbourhood.
1.2.1 Model
The data generating process is modeled as follows. For each individual i, (yi,xi, si), together
with an individual specific error εi is drawn from a joint distribution F : RK+2×N→ [0, 1]. The
draws are i.i.d. over individuals. The errors reflect unobserved heterogeneity across individuals
that contribute to variation in outcomes.
F is a primitive of the model. Model identification corresponds to identifying F . Identifica-
tion is non-trivial because only the marginal distribution of the data variables Fy,x,s, is known
to the researcher. Hence, additional restrictions must be imposed. Within the context of pure
6
peer effects, F implies each draw (yi,xi, si, εi) satisfies the following relationship:
yi = m (E [y|si] ,xi) + εi ∀i ≤ I. (1.1)
Here, m : RK+1 → R is measurable and unknown to the researcher9. Expected peer outcome
E[y|si] for individual i is pinned down uniquely by F , and also known to the researcher from
Fy,x,s. The challenge facing the researcher is thus to identify m under the weakest possible
set of assumptions. This enables one to extract εi from each observation (yi,xi, si), and thus
identify Fε|y,x,s too.
Notice yi is unaffected by expected peer characteristics E[x|si]. The focus will thus be on
identifying peer effects as opposed to exogenous effects. Also, peer effects operate through
expected peer outcomes E[y|s] rather than its sample analogue ys. Each individual is thus
influenced by each of his peers in the population, rather than only his sampled peers.
The following assumptions aid identification of m. First,
Assumption 1.2.1. [Mean Independence] Residual outcomes ε are mean independent of in-
dividual characteristics x, given peer group s: E[ε|x, s] = E[ε|s] ≡ µ(s), where µ : N → R is
unknown.
The first equality in Assumption 1.2.1 is the peer effects counterpart to the usual exclu-
sion restriction needed to identify non-parametric models with additive errors. In its absence,
prospects for non-parametric identification of peer effects are severe. In practice, the exclusion
restriction is unlikely hold. For example, if one of the characteristics in x is school attendance
in Example 1.2.1, than this variable is likely to correlate with unobserved academic ability
incorporated in ε. However, from a technical standpoint, harnessing instrumental variables
9. The sigma-field associated with measurability of m is σ(y,x, s, ε) where (y,x, s, ε) is a random vector with
distribution F .
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in a non-parametric setting is no longer an issue. Moreover, from an application standpoint,
the issue of finding valid instruments to control for endogenous characteristics is a first order
concern that practitioners have already expended much energy resolving. Hence, this paper
focuses on endogeneity stemming from an alternative source.
The second equality introduces a new function µ : N → R. The dependence of µ(s) on s
renders expected peer outcome E[y|s] endogenous. This dependence is called correlated effects
in the literature. Notice that when µ(s) = 0 for all s ∈ N, the model collapses to the non-
parametric framework discussed in Manski (1993). Manski argues changes in outcomes caused
by peer effects are difficult to identify in such a model. Hence, I study a more general frame-
work where mean error E[ε|s] depends on peer group s instead. Also, observe peer group s does
not directly enter as an argument of m(e,x). Hence, given the model and Assumption 1.2.1,
the effects of peer group selection based on unobservable individual attributes on outcomes,
are captured by E[ε|s]. Absent the next assumption, the effects of unobserved peer group at-
tributes are also captured by E[ε|s]. It is thus even more pertinent to allow µ(s) to depend on s.
Now, one approach in dealing with peer outcome endogeneity in linear social effects models
uses peer characteristics as instruments. In particular, if m in equation (1.1) were linear:
yi = αE[y|s] + xiβ + εi,







This motivates the use of average peer characteristics xs as instruments for average peer outcome
ys when estimating the linear model. Two points are apparent with this approach. First, it
requires that α 6= 1. Second, no straightforward relationship between E[y|s] and E[x|s] emerges
8
when (1.1) is non-linear. Instead,
E[y|s] =
∫
m (E[y|s],x) dFx|s + µ(s).
Expected peer outcomes hence depends in a complicated way, on the entire distribution of peer
characteristics Fx|s, rather than any particular moment of x|s. Additional assumptions are
required for expected peer characteristics to serve as instruments.
This paper proposes an alternative approach to deal with peer outcome endogeneity.
Assumption 1.2.2. [Interaction Index] There exists j ≤ K and xj ∈ ∩s′∈supp(s)supp(xj|s = s′)
known to the researcher such that
m(e,x−j, xj) = m(e′,x−j, xj) ∀ (e,x−j), (e′,x−j) ∈ supp(E[y|s],x−j|xj = xj).
Assumption 1.2.2 posits the existence of a regressor xj, which shuts down transmission of
peer effects when its value equals a known number xj. The variable xji should be interpreted
as indexing how strongly individual i interacts with his peers. In the context of Example 1.2.1,
xji could be the number of days i attends school while x
j = 0. Since a student who never
attends school is unlikely to be susceptible to peer effects, Assumption 1.2.2 is plausible. More
generally, xji might be an aggregated measure of how frequently i contacts his peers. To use
another example, the widely studied Add Health survey queries how frequently respondents
contact their five best friends for homework help, recreation or other topics. Appropriately
aggregating each respondent’s answers to these questions produces another candidate for xj.
Now when Assumption 1.2.2 is imposed, E[ε|s] fails to capture the effects of unobserved
school attributes on academic outcomes in the education example, as it did under just Assump-
tion 1.2.1. This is because students who don’t attend school are unlikely to benefit from the
school’s attributes. More generally, the combination of both assumptions allows for endogenous
9
peer group selection, but require the characteristics xi to be sufficiently broad so as to explain
the total effect of individual i’s attributes, including his peer group, on his outcome. To reuse
Example 1.2.1, if xi contains i’s past test score improvement, the issue of unobserved school
attributes is potentially mitigated.
Assumption 1.2.3. [Rank] There exists a sequence of characteristics and peer groups {xn, sn}n∈N
satisfying
(xn, sn) ∈ supp(x, s), (xn, sn+1) ∈ supp(x, s), xjn = xj
for each n ∈ N, and
∪x′∈supp(x){s′ : (x′, s′) ∈ supp(x, s)} ⊆ ∪n∈N{s′ : (x−jn , xj, s′) ∈ supp(x, s)}.
Assumption 1.2.3 is a restriction on the set of possible peer groups. Each peer group s under
this restriction lies in one of a countable number of overlapping subsets. Each subset consists of
peer groups for zero interaction individuals, whose other covariates belong to another sequence
of attributes {x−jn }n∈N. A special case of Assumption 1.2.3 occurs when
supp(s|x) = supp(s),
a.s. on the support of x. Hence, individuals of all types belong to each peer group in the
population. Assumption 1.2.3 also holds when the population of peer groups is a finite, ordered
set, s1 < s2 < ... < sN , with adjacent peer groups containing zero interaction individuals of
similar type:
supp(x−j|s = sn, xj = xj) ∩ supp(x−j|s = sn+1, xj = xj) 6= ∅ ∀n ≤ N.
If in addition, the support of attributes x−j for zero interaction individuals xj = xj from each
peer group s is convex, then the support of attributes and peer groups for zero interaction in-
dividuals graphed in RK−1×N, consists of a connected stack of overlapping blocks of x−j over s.
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Assumption 1.2.3 fails to hold if at least one peer group contains no zero interaction in-
dividuals, whose xj equals xj. Assumption 1.2.3 also fails if one peer group s′ is sufficiently
distinctive from the rest, so that none of its zero interaction individuals share the same charac-
teristics as zero interaction individuals from any other group. The latter situation could occur
in the context of Example 1.2.1, if say, one of the covariates in x equals entry test scores, and
one school in population features an exceedingly high entry score cut-off. A solution to this
situation would be to drop the unique school from the sample, and identify peer effects for the
remaining population of students.
Regardless, it turns out that assumptions 1.2.1 to 1.2.3 are sufficient to identify m(e,x) and
µ(s), up to constants summing to zero. Assumption 1.2.2 enables one to identify the correlated
effect µ(s) of an individual’s peer group s on his outcome y, independently from endogenous
peer outcomes E[y|s]. This is achieved by comparing outcomes for individuals who don’t in-
teract with their peers (xj = xj) but with otherwise similar characteristics, across peer groups.
Having identified this correlated effect, the portion of the overall effect of peers on outcomes
attributed to E[y|s] can be identified by partialling out the correlated effect from the overall
effect on outcomes. The latter step is done by comparing outcomes for individuals with similar
characteristics but different peer groups, and subtracting the difference in outcomes caused by
correlated effects.
Consistent estimation of the model is facilitated by additional assumptions. First,
Assumption 1.2.4. [Normalization] There exists a known vector x−j in ∩s′∈supp(s)supp(x−j|xj =
xj, s = s
′) such that m(e,x−j, xj) = 0 when (e,x−j, xj) ∈ supp(E[y|s],x).
Hence, the supports of zero interaction attributes x−j across different peer groups, must
have a common point x−j. Moreover, expected outcomes for zero interaction individuals whose
remaining covariates are x−j, equal zero. Because m(e,x) and µ(s) are only identified up to
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constants, the latter requirement should be interpreted as a normalization pinning down their
values to specific numbers for estimation.
To cater to datasets typically used to empirically analyze peer effects,
Assumption 1.2.5. [Absolute Continuity] The regressors in (x, s) can be partitioned into C
continuously distributed random variables c, and D discretely distributed variables d. For all
d ∈ supp(d), c|d is absolutely continuous on RC .
Assumption 1.2.5 enables multiple choice survey responses to be analyzed non-parametrically,
alongside continuously distributed variables. It also implies s ∈ d ⊆ (x, s).
Because the proposed estimation method is kernel based,
Assumption 1.2.6. [Kernel] Let K : RC → R be an integrable function that is spherically







Assumption 1.2.7. [Continuity and Dominance] The conditional density fc|d(c|d) is contin-
uous in c, and satisfies
sup
c
∣∣∣∣∫ yfy,c|d(y, c|d)dy∣∣∣∣ <∞, sup
c
V[y|x, s] <∞, sup
c
∣∣fy,c|d(y, c|d)∣∣ <∞
for all d in its support10.
These assumptions generalize from standard assumptions that ensure consistency of kernel-
based estimation methods. Assumption 1.2.6 posits the existence of a well-behaved kernel that
can be used to approximate marginal densities of various data variables, while the inequalities
10. Note that first and final inequalities imply supc
∣∣E[y2|x, s]∣∣ ≤ supc V[y|x, s] + supc |E[y|x, s]| <∞.
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in Assumption 1.2.7 enable one to interchange limits with integrals in the proof of consistency.
Finally, asymptotic normality of the estimator requires making a final set of additional
assumptions. First and second,
Assumption 1.2.8. [Smoothness] The density fx,s(x, s) ≡ fc|d(c|d)fd(d), and the conditional
expectation E[y|x, s] ≡ E[y|c,d] are thrice continuously differentiable in c, on RC and supp(x, s)
respectively.
Assumption 1.2.9. [Bandwidth] The bandwidth used for estimating the model b converges
to zero sufficiently quickly so that b2
√
IbC → 0 as IbC →∞ and b→ 0.
Assumptions 1.2.8 and 1.2.9 ensure that the estimator converges in distribution at the usual
rate
√
Ibc for kernel estimators. More specifically, Assumption 1.2.8 enables one to take Taylor
expansions of fx,s(x, s) and E[y|x, s], a crucial step found in many proofs of asymptotic normal-
ity for econometric objects. Moreover, Assumption 1.2.9 ensures the estimator’s finite sample
bias vanishes at a rate faster than
√
Ibc, the rate at which confidence intervals for the estimator
collapses. Of course, the assumption is implied if b is less than proportional to I−
1
C+4 , the usual
condition ensuring asymptotic normality of kernel-based estimators.
Because establishing asymptotic normality requires use of Lyapunov’s central limit theorem,
Assumption 1.2.10. [Dominance II] The kernel K(c) and the the random variable η defined






for all d in its support, and δ > 0.
Assumption 1.2.10 introduces new notation by defining the random variable η, and proposes
inequalities that are stronger versions of inequalities already imposed by the previous assump-
tions. In particular, the first inequality in Assumption 1.2.10 generalizes a similar condition
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on the kernel K(u) found in Assumption 1.2.6 for values of δ not equal to 2. Similar algebra
reveals that the second inequality in Assumption 1.2.10 strengthens the analogous restriction
on E[y2|c,d] implied by Assumption 1.2.711. The assumption also generalizes from conditions
sufficient for many kernel-based estimators to be asymptotically normal.
Finally, to conserve on notation,
Assumption 1.2.11. [Normalization II] The vector of individual characteristics values (x−j, xj)
equals 0.
Because the units by which each variable in x is measured is determined by the researcher,
Assumption 1.2.11 can always be met by appropriately scaling and translating the data.
1.2.2 Cross-Sectional Identification
Proposition 1.2.1. Under assumptions 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.3, the functions m : RK+1 → R
and µ : N→ R are identified on supp(E[y|s],x, s), up to constants a and b satisfying a+ b = 0.
Proof. By Assumption 1.2.2, one can let n(x−j) = m(e,x−j, xj) for all (e,x−j) ∈ supp(E[y|s],x−j|xj =
xj). So n(x−j) = m(e,x−j, xj) whenever (e,x−j, xj) ∈ supp(E[y|s],x−j, xj) too.
Assume the claim is false. Then there exists m′ : RK+1 → R and µ′ : N→ R satisfying:
m (E[y|s],x) + µ(s) = E[y|x, s] = m′ (E[y|s],x) + µ′(s) (1.2)










11. See the previous footnote for this analogous restriction.
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a.s. on supp(E[y|s],xj|xj = xj). Since s is discrete, the above is true on a.s. on supp(E[y|s],xj, s|xj =














a.s. on supp(E[y|s],x−j, s|xj = xj). The implication of (1.3) hence holds a.s. on supp(x−j, s|xj =
xj) too. It follows (µ′−µ)(s̃) = (n−n′) (x̃−j) whenever (x̃−j, xj, s̃) ∈ supp(x, s). In particular,
since (x−j1 , xj, s1) ∈ supp(x, s),




= (µ′ − µ)(s1),
for all s′′ satisfying (x−j1 , x
j, s′′) ∈ supp(x, s), where the second equality holds by Assumption
1.2.3. So (µ′ − µ)(s′′) is constant in s′′ on ∪n≤1{s′ : (x−jn , xj, s′) ∈ supp(x, s)}.
Now suppose for some N ∈ N,
(µ′ − µ)(s′′) = (µ′ − µ)(sN) = (µ′ − µ)(sN−1) = ... = (µ′ − µ)(s1)
for all s′′ ∈ ∪n≤N{s′ : (x−jn , xj, s′) ∈ supp(x, s)}. Then Assumption 1.2.3 combined with (1.3)
implies
(µ′ − µ)(sN+1) = (n− n′)(x−jN ) = (µ
′ − µ)(sN) = ... = (µ′ − µ)(s1),
Moreover, for each s′′ satisfying (s′′,x−jN+1, x
j) ∈ supp(s,x), then
(µ′ − µ)(s′′) = (n− n′)(x−jN+1) = (µ
′ − µ)(sN+1),
where the second equality holds by Assumption 1.2.3. It follows (µ′ − µ)(s′′) is constant in s′′
over ∪n≤N+1{s′ : (x−jn , xj, s′) ∈ supp(x, s)} too.
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By induction, one obtains (µ − µ′)(s) as being constant in s over ∪n∈N{s′ : (x−jn , xj, s′) ∈
supp(x, s)}. Let its common value equal b. From (1.2),
(m−m′) (E[y|s],x) = (µ′ − µ)(s) = −b (1.4)
a.s. on supp(E[y|s],x, s). It follows we can set a = −b, and the proof is completed.
The proof exploits the non-linearity of the relationship between individual outcomes, charac-
teristics and expected peer outcome. Intuitively, because peer effects are captured by expected
peer outcome E[y|s] rather than its finite sample analogue ys, the issue of simultaneity bias tra-
ditionally impeding peer effects identification is no longer present. Instead, endogeneity stems
from correlated effects E[ε|s] confounding estimates of peer effects. Fortunately, Assumption
1.2.2 implies that when individuals are observed not to interact with their peers xj = xj, trans-
mission of peer effects shuts down. The correlated effect term is thus identified from cross peer
group outcome variation for zero interaction individuals. But once correlated effects have been
identified, they can then be partialled out from variation in cross peer group outcomes, for the
entire population. The remaining variation is the peer effect.
As previously alluded to, contrasts such as m(e,x) − m(e′,x) are unidentified, absent as-
sumptions such as 1.2.2 and 1.2.3, and restrictions on the data’s support. Consider the following
counter-example. Suppose individuals were randomly assigned to peer groups so that x and ε
are statistically independent to s. The model implies
E [y|s] =
∫
m (E [y|s] ,u) dFX(u) ∀s ∈ supp(s). (1.5)
When the above pins down E [y|s] to a constant value for all s, then m(e,x) is only identified
on a lower dimensional set in RK+1, whose width for the dimension associated with e is zero. It
follows that meaningful variation in outcomes caused by changes in peer outcomes, m(e′,x)−
m(e,x), cannot be inferred from the distribution of (y,x, s) unless e′ = e. This argument proves
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Manski’s (1993) result, restated below for completeness.
Proposition 1.2.2. Assume µ(s) = 0, individual characteristics x are statistically independent
to peer group s, and equation (1.5) has a unique solution e∗(s) ∈ R for E[y|s]. Then e∗(s) does
not depend on s, and m : RK+1 → R is unidentified on points (e,x) ∈ RK+1 where e 6= e∗.
Contrasts of the form m(e′,x)−m(e,x) where e′ 6= e are thus unidentified.
The result implies random assignment of individuals to peer groups may be unhelpful for
identifying peer effects. If peer effects are thought to operate within large peer groups, then
the law of large numbers implies average peer outcome converges to expected peer outcome,
which is constant by Proposition 1.2.2. Variation in average peer outcome needed to identify
any effect it has on individual outcomes thus vanishes when peer groups are infinitely large.
Also, observe the relationship
yi = E[y|si] + εi, E[εi|si] = 0, (1.6)
or more generally,
yi = E[y|si] + n(xi) + εi, E[n(xi)|si] = E[εi|xi, si] = 0 (1.7)
perilously satisfy the model’s main equation yi = m(E[y|si],xi) + εi. As explained in Angrist
(2014), these relationships are trivial since they imply within peer group variation in outcomes
are completely explained by chance. The second equation (1.7) corresponds to the situation
where within peer group variation in individual outcomes are partially explained by individual
characteristics. Again, this is a relationship that would be expected to hold in a variety of
contexts where peer effects are not at play.
Fortunately, the prospect of (1.6) or (1.7) generating the data is ruled out by Assumption
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1.2.2. When there is no interaction xji = x
j, outcome yi no longer depends on expected peer
outcome E[y|si], as it does in (1.6) or (1.7). Moreover, Assumption 1.2.2 is testable. If 1.2.2 is
true, then average improvement in outcomes for zero interaction individuals due to changes in
x−j do not depend on s.
Proposition 1.2.3. Assume (1.1) holds for all (yi,xi, si) ∈ supp(y,x, s), and Assumption 1.2.1
holds.
1. Suppose Assumption 1.2.2 hold under the null hypothesis, but does not hold under the al-
ternate. Under the null, cross characteristics differences in outcomes for zero interaction
individuals do not depend on peer group:
(E[y|xj,x−j1 , s1]− E[y|xj,x
−j
2 , s1])− (E[y|xj,x
−j
1 , s2]− E[y|xj,x
−j
2 , s2]) = 0
when (x−j1 , s1), (x
−j
2 , s1), (x
−j
1 , s2), (x
−j
2 , s2) ∈ supp(x−j, s|xj = xj).
2. Let (1.7) denote the null hypothesis, and suppose (1.7) does not hold in the alternate. Under
the null, cross-peer group differences in outcomes do not depend on individual characteristics:
(E[y|x1, s1]− E[y|x1, s2])− (E[y|x2, s1]− E[y|x2, s2]) = 0
for all (x1, s1), (x1, s2), (x2, s1), (x2, s2) ∈ supp(x, s).
Two points should be clarified in relation to Proposition 1.2.3. First, that (1.6) and (1.7) are
tautological is not the cause for concern. Observe y = m(x)+ ε where E[ε|x] = 0 is tautological
and nested by (1.1) too. Rather, the issue is that were (1.6) or (1.7) to generate the data,
one would hesitate attributing cross-peer correlations in outcomes to social interactions, since
(1.6) and (1.7) are too trivial to capture theoretical hypotheses explaining why social effects
exist12. Second, the possibility of ruling out trivial peer effects interpretations is not cause for
12. These hypotheses are that individuals respond to social norms, information externalities, or strategic
complementaries in their payoffs when exhibiting peer effects through chosen actions (See the introductions of
Duflo & Saez (2003), Bobonis & Finan (2009) and Dahl et al. (2014)).
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estimating peer effects non-parametrically. Interacting attendance with average peer outcomes
in the linear peer effects model, and estimating its coefficient, serves the same purpose13. The
point being made is that absent apriori restrictions on the linear model’s coefficients14, correctly
interpreting peer effects requires at least a non-linear formulation of social interactions.
Finally, observe the proof of identification continues to hold if E[y|s] is replaced by V[y|s],
or any known function g(.) of s:
yi = m (g(si),xi) + εi ∀i ≤ I. (1.8)
Moreover, even if g(s) were vector valued, (such as g(s) = (E[y|s],E[x|s])), m is still identified
on the support of g(s) and x, under an appropriately modified Assumption 1.2.2. This opens
up the possibility of studying social effects non-parametrically.
The issue is that if the entries of g(s) are functionally dependent as functions of s, then
the support on which m rests upon might be lower dimensional. For example, say g(s) =
(E[y|s],E[x|s]) but the family of distributions {Fy,x|s : s ≤ S} implies a one-to-one relationship
between E[y|s] and E[x|s]. The model is thus
yi = m (E[y|si],E[x|si],xi) + εi ∀i ≤ I.
This is a full social effects model incorporating exogenous effects. However contrasts of the
13. Bertrand et al. (2000) document peer effects by estimating a similar model, where one’s peers consists
of same language speakers (living in the same area). In their model, individual welfare usage is linear in peer
welfare usage interacted with the density of same language speakers per location. Bobonis & Finan (2009) also
document how households with similar incomes to households rewarded for enrolling their children in school,
mimic the rewarded households more strongly than households with different incomes. They attribute greater
interaction levels between similar income households as a possible reason for the differential peer effect.
14. See Proposition 2 in Manski (1993), requiring β 6= 1 or Section 2 of Bramoulle et al. (2009), assuming
|β| < 1, for examples of such restrictions on peer effects. Blume et al. (2015) model peer effects as stemming from






remain unidentified. Absent a full-rank condition on (E[y|s],E[x|s]), Manski’s non-identification
result rears its head - peer effects and exogenous effects confound each other, and cannot be
separated empirically.
However, the aggregate social effect, m(E[y|s],E[x|s],x)−m(E[y|s′],E[x|s′],x), is still iden-
tifiable on the support of s and x.
Proposition 1.2.4. Suppose there exists g : N → RG, and xj ∈ ∩s′∈supp(s)supp(xj|s = s′)
known to the researcher, such that m(g,x−j, xj) = m(g′,x−j, xj) for all (g,x−j), (g′,x−j) ∈
supp(g(s),x−j|xj = xj). Then if the main equation is given by (1.8) and Assumption 1.2.1
holds, the composition mg : N≤S × RK → R defined by
mg(s,x) ≡ m(g(s),x)
and µ(s) are identified on the support of (s,x). Contrasts of the form m(E[y|s],E[x|s],x) −
m(E[y|s′],E[x|s′],x) are thus identified from mg(s,x)−mg(s′,x) on the same support.
The proof simply extends from the identification proof of the original model. When inter-
preted in Example 1.2.1’s context, Proposition 1.2.4 implies the total social effect experienced
by a student when his school is counterfactually changed is identified, inspite of school choice
being endogenous15.
15. This discussion stems from a question by Soonwoo Kwon at the Yale Prospectus Lunch on 25-09-2017.
Also, notice that one possible critique of the model are that in the context of the education example, students
who don’t attend school should not be transmitting peer effects. This point is addressed if one sets g(s) =
E[y|s, xj > 0] in place of E[y|s] and recognizes that the model continues to be identified.
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1.2.3 Cross-Sectional Estimation
As aforementioned, the identification strategy naturally leads to a simple procedure for esti-
mating m(E[y|s],x) and µ(s), as functions (x, s) and s respectively.































Step 3: Estimate unobserved heterogeneity for all i ≤ I via
ε̂i = yi − ĥ(xi, si)
and estimate Fε|y,x,s using standard kernel-based methods.
It turns out that Assumptions 1.2.1 to 1.2.7 plus Assumption 1.2.11, implies the above
procedure produces consistent estimates for the non-parametric relationship between outcomes,
peer groups and observable characteristics.
Proposition 1.2.5. If assumptions 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.7, and 1.2.11 hold,
then ĥ(x, s) and µ̂(s) are pointwise consistent for m(E[y|s],x) and µ(s):
ĥ(x, s) p−→ m(E[y|s],x)
µ̂(s) p−→ µ(s)
as I →∞, b→ 0 for each (x, s) ∈ supp(x, s).
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Moreover, standard errors for the estimators can be obtained under Assumptions 1.2.1 to
1.2.11.
Proposition 1.2.6. If assumptions 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.7, 1.2.8, 1.2.9, 1.2.10





























as IbC →∞, b→ 0 for each for each (x, s) ∈ supp(x, s), where c(x, s) is a C3 function on the
support of (x, s), and
RK ≡
∫
K(c)2dc σ2(x, s) ≡ E[η2|x, s].
I estimate h(s,x) = m(E[y|s],x) and µ(s) using a kernel-based approach instead of more so-
phisticated methods. Asymptotic properties for kernel based estimators are easier to establish.
The proof of propositions 1.2.5 and 1.2.6 are adapted from the standard asymptotic arguments
for Nadaraya-Watson estimation. The conceptual difficulties in the proofs lie in allowing for
discretely-distributed regressors, and controlling for correlated effects that confound the effect
of peer outcomes on individual outcomes. The first problem is basically dealt with by assuming
the discretely-distributed regressors have finite support (as in Assumption 1.2.5), and condi-
tioning out discretely-distributed regressors when establishing mean squared convergence of
estimators. The second problem is overcome by using the interaction index to estimate µ(s)
first, before estimating the non-parametric function h(x, s) in a second stage. The two-stage
estimation approach works due to errors being additive in the model, thereby allowing µ to be
estimated separately from h16.
16. Also, observe that the model’s separate treatment of discrete and continuously distributed random vari-




IbK , since C and K are the dimensions of
c and x respectively. There is an (unreviewed) literature on discrete random variable kernels that might help a
researcher interested in further improving estimation along these lines.
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The estimation method appears to circumvent Angrist’s critique of peer effects estimates
reflecting meaningless differences between IV and OLS estimands. In particular, the method
is non-parametric while eschewing use of instruments for expected peer outcomes. Mechanical
relationships between linear model estimands and weak instruments for average peer outcomes
are thus non-issues. Also, observe Assumption 1.2.5 implies the expected number of individuals
per peer group s ∈ supp(s) tends to infinity as I →∞. The asymptotic situation thus features
infinitely large peer groups. This should be contrasted with Proposition 1 in Bramoulle et
al. (2009), where the asymptotic variable seems to be the number of networks or peer groups
instead.
An attractive avenue for further research would be to understand the asymptotic behavior
of ĥ(s,x) and µ̂(s) when the model is mis-specified and the true model incorporates both peer
and exogenous effects:
yi = m(E[y|si],E[x|si],xi) + εi.
In light of Proposition 1.2.4, it is natural to believe ĥ(x, s) is still consistent for the true model
m(E[y|s],E[x|s],x). However, this statement still needs to be proved.
My main concern with the overall identification and estimation strategy is the lack of obser-
vations i ≤ I featuring (xji , si) = (xj, s) in step 1. A small number of such observations leads to
large standard errors for µ̂(s) in the first stage, implying imprecise second stage estimators. If
the interaction index xj is continuously distributed (i.e. xj ∈ c), then the estimation procedure
partially circumvents the problem. Intuitively, because E[y|x, s] is continuous in c under As-
sumption 1.2.8, so observations of (c−ji , x
j
i ) close to (c
−j
i , x
j) can be used to approximate µ(s) or
equivalently, E[y|x, s] in stage one. Within the context of Example 1.2.1, the random variable
xj can be modeled as being continuously distributed if say xji was individual i’s attendance
rate in school. However, if the interaction index is discrete, then the possibility of having no
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observations of (xji , si) = (x
j, s) to estimate µ(s) in stage one rears its head.
1.3 Identification from Panel Data
Now, consider the situation where the unit of observation varies over individuals and time.
There are still I individuals and S possible peer groups. However, outcomes and characteris-
tics associated with each individual are observed over T periods. More specifically, for each
individual i ≤ I and period t ≤ T , a researcher observes (yi,t,xi,t, si) ∈ RK+1×N≤S, where the
notation in this section corresponds to the notation introduced in the previous section. The
dataset is hence {yi,t,xi,t, si}(i,t)≤(I,T ). Notice the individual’s peer group si is assumed to be
carefully defined by the researcher so as to be time invariant. Hence, in context of the education
example introduced in Section 1.2, this would mean students never drop out from or enter into
schools.
In what follows, I will write yti to denote individual i’s truncated private history of outcomes
{yi,τ}t−l≤τ≤t, ys,t to denote peer group s’s contemporaneous outcomes {yi,t}t,i∈s, yts to denote
peer group s’s (truncated) historical outcomes {yti}t,i∈s, and yt to denote the entire popula-
tion’s historical outcomes. Analogous notation is used for individual characteristics xi,t and
peer group si.
Example 1.3.1. [Network Externalities] I counties are partioned into S states in a global
market for a word processing software, or any other good featuring network externalities. A
software purchased in period t is compatible with softwares purchased from periods t − l to
t + l. Let yi,t be the amount of software purchased in county i in period t. This depends on
the expected number of future software users
∑
l+t≥τ≥t E[yi,τ |si,yt−1s ,xts] and past number of
buyers
∑
t−l≤τ<t ys,τ . xi,t contains demand shifters such as county i’s demographic information,
and cost shifters such as the distance from county i to the nearest software distribution center.
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1.3.1 Model
In the initial period, a vector of individual outcomes y−1, characteristics x0 and peer groups
s is predetermined. In any arbitrary period t ≥ 1 onwards, individual characteristics for peer
group s, xs,t are jointly drawn from Fxs,t|ys,t−1,xs,t−1,...,ys,−1,xs,0,s, while outcomes and private
heterogeneity are drawn i.i.d. from Fyi,t,εi,t|ys,t−1,xs,t,...,ys,−1,xs,0,s across individuals in a given peer
group. For each (i, s) ≤ (I, S), assume
Fxs,t|ys,t−1,xs,t−1,...,ys,−1,xs,0,s(x|ys,t−1,xs,t−1, . . . ,ys,−1,xs,0, s) = D(x|yt−1s ,xt−1s , s)
Fyi,t,εi,t|ys,t−1,xs,t,...,ys,−1,xs,0,s(y, ε|ys,t−1,xs,t, . . . ,ys,−1,xs,0, s) = G(y, ε|yt−1s ,xts, s).
So the distributions of xs,t, yi,t and εi,t conditional on the entire history of past information,
only depend on information from the past l periods. The stochastic process governing each
individual’s outcome, error and peer characteristics can thus be said to be “lth-order markov”.
Moreover, the conditional distributions depends on past peer outcomes and characteristics via
the same functions D and G, for all individuals and periods. Also, assume these distributions
have full supports over sets that are independent of the conditioning variables. This enables the
researcher to learn D(x|yt−1s ,xt−1s , s) and
∫
G(y, ε|yt−1s ,xts, s)dε from an infinitely long panel of
observations.




















when s = si, for all i ≤ I and t = 1, . . . , T .
So an individual’s outcome is a non-parametric function of the average peer outcome over
2l + 1 periods, rather than merely the contemporaneous average peer outcome. Moreover, ob-
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serve that the conditional expectations inside the function m(e,x) depends on the truncated
history of past peer outcomes and characteristics (yt−1s ,x
t
s). Since the conditioning set consists
of peer-group specific variables, so as in the previous section’s set-up, peer effects stem from all
peers in the individual’s peer group, rather than only those with similar characteristics to his.
In the context of Example 1.3.1, (1.9) captures the equilibrium relationship between software
sales in county i and county i’s characteristics, in the software market. The error εi,t is an
idiosyncratic taste shock specific to county i.
Consider the identification problem associated when panel data corresponding to the asymp-
totic situation whereby the number of periods T tends to infinity. The researcher knows l. In
the context of Example 1.2.1, l can be set to the number of years a student spends in school.
In the context of Example 1.3.1, l can be calibrated from the specifications of word-processing
softwares released each year. The researcher also knows the marginal distributions of the data
Fxt|xt−1s ,s and Fyt|yt−1s ,xts,s. These distributions are directly identifiable from cross-period varia-
tion in the data. The researcher does not know the joint distribution of the outcome and the
latent error Fyt,εt|yt−1s ,xt−1s ,s ≡ G or the function m : R
K+1 → R. The goal is to characterize
conditions on the data generating process under which m and G are identified.











in what follows. Consider the following assumptions.
Assumption 1.3.1. [Mean Independence] Error reflecting unobserved heterogeneity ε is mean
independent of historical characteristics xts and outcomes y
t−1
s , given peer group s: E[εt|yt−1s ,xts, s] =
E[εt|s] ≡ µ(s), where µ : N→ R is unknown to the researcher.
The rationale behind Assumption 1.3.1 has already been elaborated upon in the previous
section.
Assumption 1.3.2. [Function Differentiability] For each period t ∈ N, the support of m :
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RK+1 → R’s arguments, X , is open and convex. Also, m(e,x) is continuously differentiable in
(e,x) on X .
Assumption 1.3.2 ensures m(e,x) is identified on the support of its arguments, instead of
just the support of its instruments and exogenous regressors.
Assumption 1.3.3. [Rank Condition] There exists zi,t ∈ {yt−1s ,xt−i,s} such that the derivative
∂E[yt|yt−1s ,xts, s]
∂zi,t
exists and is non-zero for each individual i ≤ I in peer group s ≤ S and period t ≤ T .
Assumption 1.3.3 corresponds to the usual rank condition for IV, if one sees lagged outcomes
yi,t−j as instruments for contemporaneous and future expected peer outcomes E[yt+k|yt+k−1s ,xt+ks , s].
It turns out that these conditions are sufficient to identify the model, up to a constant.
1.3.2 Panel Identification
Proposition 1.3.1. Under assumptions 1.3.1, 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, m : RK+1 → R and µ : N≤S →
R are identified up to constants that sum to zero on X .
Proof. Taking expectations on both sides obtains


















The researcher can compute L.H.S. of the above from G, which he knows. Assume there exists
m′ : RK+1 → R and µ′ : N≤S → R that satisfy (1.10) too:
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So (m−m′)(e,x) is constant in e. It follows m−m′ is a constant. Hence µ− µ′, by virtue of
equaling m′ −m must also be a constant which when summed with m−m′ equals zero.
The above result is interesting because i) no interaction index restriction analogous to As-
sumption 1.2.2 is imposed and ii) the result continues to hold even when µ(s) = 0 for all
s ≤ S. Being able to observe individual outcomes over multiple time periods greatly weakens
the assumptions needed to identify peer effects. Intuitively, the change in lagged peer group in-
formation provides the variation in expected peer outcome, orthogonal to the errors, needed to
identify contrasts in m(e,x) caused by changing e. Manski’s non-identification result (restated
in Proposition 1.2.2) is thus circumvented.
The main drawback in the set-up just presented lies in the functional form implicitly chosen
and disguised in the non-parametric formula displayed in (1.9). This assumes outcomes depend
on mean peer outcomes over 2l + 1 periods, via a composition of a non-parametric function
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In the particular model described in Subsection 1.3.1, L corresponds to pre-multiplying a vector
of conditional expectations and sample averages by a vector of 1
2l+1
’s. Of course, there is no rea-
son for the average outcomes for each period to receive equal weights in a non-parametric model.
However, given that L is linear or satisfies an even milder property, Proposition 1.3.1 is the
best we can hope for in the following sense:
Proposition 1.3.2. Let {Lθ : R2l+1 → R : θ} be a family of functions parameterized by θ. If
assumptions 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, along with the following hold:
i) for each pair of parameters θ,θ′ ∈ R2l+1 and point r ∈ R, there exists r′ ∈ R such that














iii) the functions L(e;θ) are known to the researcher (for each value of θ), but θ is unknown,
then m : RK+1 → R and θ are not identified.
For intuition, suppose the family of parameterized functions in Proposition 1.3.2 were the set
of linear transformations given by L(e;θ) = θe. Then, scaling θ by a constant c while dividing







These functions define a new model that effectively mimics the data generating process from
the old model. Because both models cannot be distinguished by the marginal distribution of
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the data, m and θ are hence unidentified.
Proposition 1.3.2 implies that the researcher is required to take a stance on the value of
θ if L(e;θ) is assumed to hail from a known family of mappings parameterized by the vector
θ. If θ corresponds to weights on 2l + 1 conditional expectations of outcomes given x and
s while L(e;θ) is the associated linear mapping, then a choice of weights must be made by
the researcher to identify the model up to a constant. One can interpret the model analyzed
in this section as corresponding to the neutral stance whereby the expectations are weighted
symmetrically.
1.4 Microfoundations for the Cross-Sectional Model
As explained in Section 2.1, one factor motivating this paper’s non-parametric approach is the
recognition that the optimality conditions associated with the theoretical model implicitly un-
derlying peer effects, need not take on a specific functional form.
Providing explicit microfoundations is important for four reasons. First, a micro-founded
model improves interpretation of peer effects. They are now conceived as the outcomes arising
from an incomplete information simultaneous moves game. Second, the arguments of m(e,x) in
(1.1) contain the expected peer outcome E[y|s], rather than it’s sample analogue, ys. One might
regard this as a puzzle. In this section, (1.1) is derived in the limit from the best responses of
a game, as the number of peers tends to infinity.
Third, from a non-parametric perspective, Fy,x,s,ε is a primitive of the econometric model,
thus pinning down E[y|s] uniquely. But (1.1) is also a primitive, implying E[y|s] must solve
e =
∫
m(e,x)dF (x|s) + µ(s) ∀s ≤ S (1.11)
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for the model to be coherent. In Section 1.2, this issue was basically assumed away. Microfoun-
dations relates this issue to the concept of pure-strategy equilibria not existing. The assumption
of E[y|s] satisfying (1.11) can thus be replaced with hopefully more interpretable restrictions
on the primitives of a game theoretic model. Finally, observe that (1.11) may admit multiple
solutions. If the econometric model is taken to be the main equation (1.1) coupled with the
conditional distribution of errors Fε|x,s rather than Fy,x,s,ε, then the model is incomplete. It
turns out that such incompleteness stems from multiple equilibria existing in the underlying
game, but the econometric model being estimated doesn’t depend on the equilibria being coor-
dinated upon. Hence, microfoundations help again by showing such incompleteness should not
affect how one interprets peer effects estimates.
1.4.1 Bayesian Game
There are N players or individuals. The following sequence of play is observed.
1. For each individual i ≤ N , nature draws a private type (xi, εi) and a peer group si i.i.d.
from Fx,s,ε : N≤S ×RK+1 → R. The peer group si is disclosed to all players. Without loss of
generality, assume s has full support on N≤S. The private type xi is disclosed only to player
i. Observe xi and εi are allowed to correlate with each other, and with the peer group si.
So Fx,s,ε possibly masks an initial peer group formation stage where individuals choose their
peer group. Moreover, the peer group si serves as a signal to i’s rivals about i’s type.
2. Each individual i then simultaneously chooses action ai from a set A ⊆ R common to players.
Actions in conjunction with the ε component of private types determine outcomes:
yi = ai + εi
for all individuals i ≤ I. In the education example, ai might hence be the number of hours
student i sets as a target for study and practice, while yi might be the actual number of
hours worked. Alternatively, ai and yi might be the student’s targeted and actual grades on
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the final year exam. εi should thus be interpreted as reflecting student i’s hidden abilities
or measurement error.
3. Nature discloses the profile of outcomes y to all players, and y,x, s to the researcher.
Each player’s payoff in stage 3 depends on his action a, type (x, ε), peer group s and average
peer outcome ys in the following way:
u(ai, ys,xi) + c(ys,xi, si, εi).
Here, s = si. The function is symmetric across players so that {xi, si, εi}i≤N explain preference
heterogeneity across individuals. Observe rival actions a−i,s matter up to average outcomes ys.
Hence, peer types xs influence payoffs through the outcomes ys they induce in ys, rather than
by directly affecting the payoff function. When interpreted in the context of Example 1.2.1, the
payoff function implies student utility is influenced by school average test scores, rather than
the particular results of their schoolmates. Also, if ai measures student i’s effort, then peer
effects operate through an observable measure of effort ys, rather than through as. This makes
sense, since if the researcher does not observe the true effort level for each student, than the
students are unlikely to observe and be influenced by such hidden effort too. Finally, while a
student’s peer group s and hidden abilities in ε might affect his utility via the function c, these
variables do not appear as arguments of u. Hence, the student’s preferences over effort levels
are uninfluenced by s and ε.
Because peer outcomes are disclosed to students only after they exert effort, peer effects
strictly speaking, operate through the beliefs held by each student regarding their peers’ out-
comes, rather than directly via average peer outcome. Staying within the context of Example
1.2.1, the extensive form is plausible in that students are unlikely to know the personal com-
mitments of each of their peers when studying, and only keep track of their peers’ successes
either on year-end tests or the frequency at which their peers are seen to be studying. But
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since these outcomes occur only after effort has been exerted, students are thus influenced by
their peers through their beliefs over how successful, competitive or knowledgeable their peers
will be on average, rather than directly by peer outcomes.
Player i chooses ai to maximize
Eys,ε|s [u(ai, ys,xi)|xi, si] + Eys,ε|s [c(ys,xi, si, εi)|xi, si] .
Since player i only knows (xi, si) when choosing ai, a strategy for him is thus a (measurable)
map σi from the type space RK × N≤S onto the action set A. Because the draws of (xi, si, εi)
are i.i.d., so xi is uninformative about rival actions aj = σj(xj, sj). Only si serves as a signal
for peer types and thus average peer outcome ys,−i. In the following sections, I shall also use
Ns to notate the number of individuals in peer group s.
1.4.2 Equilibrium Analysis
The solution concept I use is symmetric (Pure-Strategy) Bayes Nash Equilibrium. These are
strategy profiles σ satisfying σi = σj, and solve
σ(xi, si) = argmaxaEys,ε|s [u(a, ys,xi)|xi, si] + Eys,ε|s [c(ys,xi, si, εi)|xi, si]





ys,−i. Observe the expectations are taken with
respect to the players’ common posterior over rival outcomes ys,−i|xi, si. This is constructed
from the players’ common prior over types, Fx,s,ε, strategy σ, and the number of players in the
peer group Ns. Hence, the expectations are conditional on xi, si and implicitly depend on σ
and Ns. Also, a in the expression above is effectively a parameter set by player i. If a is treated
as a (non-degenerate) random variable, than the expectations above implicitly condition on a
too.
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To derive the estimating equation of the econometric model as a best response equation, I
assume the following:
Assumption 1.4.1. The action set A is a convex subset of R.
Assumption 1.4.2. The payoff function u(a, y,x) + c(y,x, s, ε) is continuously differentiable
in (a, y,x) on A0 ×RK+1, while u(a, y,x) is quasiconcave in a with positive slope at infA and
negative slope at supA.
Assumption 1.4.3. The quantities supa,y E[|u(a, y,x)||x, s] and supy E[|c(y,x, s, ε)||x, s] are
finite for all si ≤ S and x ∈ RK .
Then taking the first order condition and interchanging expectations with derivatives obtains
0 = E [ua(ai, ys,xi)|xi, si] +
1
Ns
E [uy(ai, ys,xi)|xi, si] +
1
Ns
E [c(ys,xi, si, εi)|xi, si] (1.12)
a.s. with respect to Fx,s. In the limit as N → ∞, if Fs is full support, then Ns → ∞ for
each s ≤ S too. So by SLLN, ys → E[y|s] a.s. Then because u(.) and c(.) are continuously
differentiable, so by CMT,
ua(ai, ys,xi)→ ua(ai,E[y|s],xi)
uy(ai, ys,xi)→ uy(ai,E[y|s],xi)
cy(ys,xi, si, εi)→ cy(E[y|s],xi, si, εi)
as N →∞ a.s.
So, via Assumption 1.4.3 and DCT, the FOC transforms into
0 = E[ua(ai,E[y|s],xi)|xi, si] = ua(ai,E[y|s],xi)
as N → ∞ a.s. But because uaa < 0 at the optimal action, the above expression is invertible
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via IFT. This enables me to rewrite it as
ai = m (E[y|si],xi) (1.13)
or equivalently,
yi = m (E[y|si],xi) + εi
as observed by the researcher.
Proposition 1.4.1. Assume assumptions 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3 hold. Consider the bayesian
game in the limit as N = ∞. Suppose {yi,xi, si, εi}i≤I is a random sample from individuals
playing a symmetric BNE in the limiting game. Then {yi,xi, si, εi}i≤I satisfies (1.1) a.s., and
m(e,x) is differentiable in a sufficiently small neighborhood of (E[y|si],xi) for each i ≤ I.
The function m(e,x) analyzed in Section 1.2, can hence be interpreted as the best response
of an infinite player bayesian game, in response to symmetric rival strategies.
Finally, to ensure existence of a symmetric (PS)BNE, recognize (1.13) defines a mapping
from A into itself:
E[a|s] =
∫
m (E[a|s] + µ(s),x) dF (x|s). (1.14)
Observe m(e,x) is continuous in e by IFT and Assumption 1.4.2. So if the following holds:
Assumption 1.4.4. The action set A is compact.
then the quantity supa E[|m(a+ µ(s),x)||s] is finite for all s ≤ S since m maps into a com-
pact set. Hence,
∫
m (a+ µ(s),x) dF (x|s) is continuous in a too, by DCT.
It follows (1.14) is a continuous mapping from A onto itself, for all s ≤ S in their support.
It thus possesses a fixed point, which can be set to E[a|s]. Expected peer outcomes can thus
be computed from E[y|s] = E[a|s] + µ(s), and hence, optimal equilibrium strategies can be
computed from (1.13). This proves the following result.
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Proposition 1.4.2. Assume assumptions 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 hold. Consider the
bayesian game in the limit as N = ∞. Then there exists a symmetric BNE in this limiting
game.
Finally, perhaps some words on the N = ∞ requirement in propositions 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 is
merited. How onerous this requirement is probably depends on one’s perspective. From the
inference perspective of Section 1.2, one makes inferences about an asymptotic model as the
sample size I → ∞. Since the number of individuals playing the model’s underlying game N ,
is necessarily larger than the number of observed players I, so N must equal infinity anyways.
1.4.3 Compatibility with Identification Requirements
To ensure the game described in 1.4.1 produces identifiable best responses (to symmetric rival
strategies) m(., .), the following restrictions must be imposed.
Assumption 1.4.5. Fx,s,ε implies ε is mean independent of x: E[ε|x, s] = E[ε|s].
Hence, observable individual attributes measuring diligence and persistence are uncorrelated
with the contribution of hidden natural ability or measurement error to the outcome variable.
Assumption 1.4.5 is analogous to the exclusion restriction 1.2.1. The only subtlety is that the
assumption is imposed on the distribution of types Fx,s,ε across the population of individuals,
rather than the full distribution Fy,x,s,ε associated with the econometric model.
Assumption 1.4.6. There exists a j ≤ K such that xji measures how much player i’s prefer-
ences depend on rival outcomes: u(a, y, xj,x−j) = u(a,x−j) for all x−j in its support.
Under the game theoretic interpretation of peer effects, xji now measures how much player
i’s preferences depend on his peers’ choices, instead of simply his social interactions. In the
context of peer effects, Assumption 1.4.6 implies that the preferences of individuals whose types
mean they don’t interact with their peers, are uninfluenced by the decisions of their peers, a
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rather reasonable property of any social interactions model. Obviously, Assumption 1.4.6 im-
plies Assumption 1.2.2.
Proposition 1.2.1 implies that under assumptions 1.4.1 to 1.4.6, the best response function
m(., .) is identified from a cross-section of individual-level observations. However, the previous
subsection’s derivation shows m(E[y|s],x) yields information only on the “strategic” component
of player payoffs u(a, y,x), and is entirely uninformative about c(y,x, s, ε). Additional, possibly
parametric assumptions might be useful for drawing normative implications from peer effects
estimates.
1.4.4 Coherence and Incompleteness
As alluded to, whether the bayesian game, given by 〈N,Fx,s,ε, u(., ., .), c(., ., ., .)〉 is coherent
or complete depends on whether symmetric BNEs exist, and the number of such equilibria.
In particular, when the game admits a set of such BNEs, then (1.14) is satisfied by at least
one value for E[a|s]. This enables calculation of E[y|s] that also coheres with condition (1.11).
Hence, when the model is taken to be 〈N,Fx,s,ε, u(., ., .), c(., ., ., .)〉 rather than Fy,x,s,ε and equa-
tion (1.1), than ad-hoc conditions on m(e,x) are no longer needed to make Fy,x,s,ε cohere with
(1.1). Instead, intuitive assumptions ensuring the existence of symmetric BNEs, as displayed
in Proposition 1.4.2 ensure coherence.
However, (1.11) might still admit multiple solutions for E[y|s]. At the risk of further abus-
ing terminology from Tamer (2003), the econometric model in such a situation is said to be
incomplete. The source of incompleteness is multiple equilibria in the microfounding bayesian
game. This is because (1.11) is derived from (1.14) in the game. Hence the number of solutions
to both equations are identical. However, each solution to (1.14) produces a distinct action
profile a that is optimal for all players, given their type and peer group (x, s). So each solution
to (1.14) corresponds to a separate symmetric BNE strategy profile. Of course, regardless of
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which BNE is being coordinated upon, estimation of (1.1) will continue to produce meaningful
estimates, since m(e,x) is directly derived from the utility function u(a, y,x) common to all
players. In other words, when the researcher estimates peer effects, he effectively estimates the




Forming Firm-to-Firm Relationships under
Upstream Economies of Scale and Downstream
Product Differentiation
2.1 Introduction
A concern during the Great Recession was the collapse of American automobile producers hurt-
ing other firms in their industry. Central to this fear was the industry’s network of manufacturer-
supplier relationships1. This network supposedly externalizes firm-specific disasters when highly
connected. Yet as Oberfield (2018) and Taschereau-Dumochel (2020) observe, economic forces
shape how manufacturers choose suppliers. In the auto industry, two such forces would likely
be product differentiation and economies of scale. When manufacturers differentiate their prod-
ucts, they typically sell sophisticated goods with narrow market segments. Hence, they may
not realize economies of scale. However, if their inputs remain simple and homogeneous, their
suppliers can achieve scale economies by supplying multiple firms. From this viewpoint, highly
connected production networks are desirable, since they reduce production costs.
1. See https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/business/12rescue.html, http://mediamatters.org/video/2012/09/18/
ford-ceo-tells-foxs-cavuto-without-auto-bailout/189981 and Hoffman (2012) for expressions of such fears in the
media. See the introductions of Acemoglu et al. (2012) or Baqaee (2018) to gauge the extent to which this
issue motivates macroeconomics and production networks research.
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How do product differentiation and economies of scale affect manufacturer-supplier relation-
ships? How do they distort supply chains from their socially optimal shapes? Three observations
motivate these questions. First, as products become increasingly sophisticated and their supply
chains more elaborate, vertical firm-to-firm relationships will arguably grow in number2. Anal-
yses of such relationships are hence likely to be relevant to future industries. Second, studying
vertically-related markets can reveal inefficiencies missed by studying markets in isolation3.
Such inefficiencies are often more prevalent when product differentiation or economies of scale
occur, compared to situations where welfare theorems apply. Finally, inefficiencies in vertical
relationships possibly amplify economy-wide consequences of firm-specific predicaments. If so,
logic suggests such inefficiencies should bear on optimal macroeconomic policy.
This paper introduces a simple model of manufacturer-supplier relationship formation. Al-
though product differentiation and economies of scale are familiar notions, the model still helps
in clarifying how they interact to create inefficiencies. Specifically, these forces produce two
forms of inefficiencies, associated with overinvestment in vertical relationships and hold-up in
relationship investment. This paper also compares the model to product-level production net-
work data for U.S. auto parts. Amongst other patterns, the data shows auto producers sharing
more suppliers after the Great Recession. This aligns with theoretical predictions. Finally, the
data is combined with downstream automobile data, to estimate a more sophisticated model of
relationship formation. The estimates imply significant overinvestment in auto manufacturer-
supplier relationships.
2. For example, Shih (MIT Sloan Management Review, 2019) cites “increased product sophistication” and
“manufacturing processes requiring specialists” as reasons for “increased use of subcontracting in, and deepening
of global supply chains (paraphrased)”, in https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/is-it-time-to-rethink-globalized-
supply-chains/.
3. Literature on vertically-related markets including Ho (2008), document such inefficiencies in different
contexts.
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The simple model features two manufacturers, each separately affiliated to one of two sup-
pliers. A single unaffiliated manufacturer-supplier pair then decides whether to form a new
relationship. Based on the resulting network of manufacturer-supplier relationships, input
prices are determined by Nash bargaining if their payer is linked to one supplier, or a first-price
auction if otherwise. The model is analyzed under two cases, representing opposing ends of a
spectrum measuring how differentiated the manufacturers’ products are. This analysis indicates
product differentiation causes manufacturers to share suppliers.
Product differentiation also creates two kinds of inefficiencies, unrelated to deadweight loss
in the downstream market. First, adding another supplier to its network allows a manufacturer
to pit suppliers against each other, reducing its input price. Thus, to protect their oligopoly
rents, manufacturers waste resources into forming additional relationships. The result is ineffi-
cient “overinvestment” in relationships, á la Helper & Levine (1992) or Elliot (2015). Second,
manufacturers benefit from cheaper inputs, when their suppliers realize scale economies by sup-
plying rival firms. This externality holds up suppliers from investing in relationships, even when
such relationships are valued by society at large. As far as I know, the resulting inefficiency
has not been analyzed in the literature, except in considerably abstracter settings4.
Depending on whether overinvestment or hold-up dominates incentives, the manufacturer-
supplier network is either over or under connected with positive probability, vis-a-vis the social
planner’s network respectively5. Knowing which form of inefficiency dominates is important for
various reasons. One motive is its surprising connection to whether firm-specific shocks imply
welfare consequences in proportion to market shares. Hulten (1978) states that in a competitive
economy, the effect of a firm’s productivity on total surplus is basically its sales share. This
4. See Bloch & Jackson (2007) for example and details.
5. The manufacturer-supplier network however, is never simultaneously both over and under connected w.p.p.
for a given configuration of model parameters.
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well-studied theorem suggests the manufacturer-supplier network is - in a way- irrelevant for ex-
plaining total output fluctuations. One concern regarding this result is it assumes the network
is exogenous6. But when product differentiation is absent or the allocation is socially optimal,
my model equates marginal effects of firm-specific shocks to each firm’s expected market share
prior to network formation. So from this ex-ante partial equilibrium perspective, Hulten’s result
holds under network endogeneity.
Another concern regarding Hulten’s theorem is its applicability to imperfectly competitive
economies. When the downstream market features product differentiation, the model contra-
dicts Hulten in counter-intuitive ways. In particular, marginal effects of firm-specific shocks on
total surplus are above (below) what ex-ante market shares predict when supplier sharing is
sub-optimal (excessive), or when the network is ex-ante insufficiently (excessively) connected.
Welfare consequences of firm-specific shocks thus depend on the social planner’s network, in
addition to its equilibrium counterpart. Moreover, amplification of firm-specific shocks need
not correlate with highly connected or asymmetric networks, as intuition or casually reading
Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Carvalho (2014) might suggest. Instead, finding negative corre-
lation between performance volatility and network connectivity from data spanning multiple
industries, is possible.
Ex-ante, whether production networks are inefficiently over or under connected is theoret-
ically ambiguous. The relevance of the model to actual supply chains is also of interest. The
rest of this paper thus investigates how the model’s mechanisms extrapolate to automobile pro-
duction. To do so, prices and sales for US automobiles are combined with data regarding each
vehicle’s 10 most important suppliers, ranked by contract numerosity. Figure 2.1’s left panel
plots average price and sales, across domestic and imported auto models over 2008-16. The
6. In particular, each firm’s ability to transact with another depends on the firms’ respective industries, and
their representative production functions.
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right panel displays the average number of suppliers each model shares with another, over the
same categories and years. Manufacturer-supplier network connectivity - measured by supplier
sharing - visibly dips during 2008-10. These years mark the Great Recession, when fears of ex-
cessive network connectivity peaked. Whilst descriptive, Figure 2.1 underscores the importance
of accounting for network endogeneity, when studying shock propagation through production
networks.
Figure 2.1: Prices, Sales & Supplier Sharing over 2008-16 US Automobile Models
Additional patterns in the data also align with the model’s assumptions and predictions.
However, an appropriate empirical framework is needed to obtain conclusions of more causal
nature. This paper thus develops an empirical model of manufacturer-supplier relationship
formation. This model does not strictly generalize the simpler one. However, it incorporates
the simpler model’s key elements - upstream economies of scale, downstream product differ-
entiation, and relationship network contingent input pricing. Moreover, its key features are
identified. The identified features form steps towards: i) evaluating how product differentiation
and economies of scale affect auto production, and ii) quantifying inefficiencies in relationship
formation highlighted by the simpler model - outside option overinvestment and neighbor man-
ufacturer hold-up.
Quantifying the aforementioned distortions requires understanding how each firm’s costs
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varies with its output. Unfortunately, two factors impede identification of the suppliers’ cost
curves. First, input prices are absent from the data. Second, suppliers are chosen by man-
ufacturers, creating correlation between the manufacturers’ costs and widely used “BLP in-
struments”, introduced by Berry et al. (1995) to identify cost curvatures. These difficulties
are circumvented by assuming manufacturers Nash bargain with suppliers they inherit from
previous periods. One can then exploit variation in these suppliers’ quantities, to identify how
automobile production costs vary with rival product quantities.
The resulting estimates indicate suppliers of chassis and exterior inputs, along with suppli-
ers for all input categories combined, experience significant economies of scale at their average
output. Moreover, the manufacturers’ average benefit from forming their chosen relationships
is smaller than its distortion due to outside option overinvestment inefficiency. Hence, un-
less compensated by co-investing suppliers, manufacturers would not have benefited from their
chosen relationships without overinvestment rents. In contrast, the average distortion to the
suppliers’ benefits from forming equilibrium relationships, due to rival manufacturer hold-up,
is at most only 11% of the suppliers’ overall relationship-forming benefits. Finally, the hold-up
distortion actually acts in reverse to reinforce overinvestment in relationships with chassis and
exterior suppliers. This is due to convexities in input marginal costs, causing average costs to
rise over large quantity increments.
Whether auto industry relationships are dominated by overinvestment or hold-up is relevant
to policy. The simple model predicts more relationship investment when manufacturers face
greater demand. The empirical results indicate overinvestment dominates relationships. Hence,
subsidizing US automakers during 2008-16 may only increase relationship formation to more
inefficient levels. This observation opposes arguments for subsidizing the automakers based on
their supplier network.
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The aforementioned policy implication rests on several caveats. The empirical results’ pri-
mary shortcoming is that their associated relationship-forming benefits fix output levels to
equilibrium values as model-supplier relationships are altered. Thus, the benefits only ap-
proximate their ex-ante counterparts anticipated by firms when choosing whether to form new
relationships. Also, the paper’s scope neglects inefficiencies absent from the simple model plagu-
ing firm-to-firm relationships empirically. On the other hand, the results are advantaged by
their low reliance on stylized or unverifiable assumptions. In particular, identification does not
rely on cost functions or utilities taking on particular functional forms. The results also do
not depend on the specific information structure or sequence of moves governing relationship
formation. Last, the results are uncontingent on the precise auction formats determining the
models’ suppliers and input prices.
In what follows, the theoretical model is analyzed in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 reviews relevant
literature. Section 2.4 details data collection and descriptive analysis, while Section 2.5 describes
the empirical model. Section 2.6 presents empirical results. Proofs are located in the appendix.
2.2 Simple Model
Consider an industry populated by a unit continuum of consumers, 2 manufacturers and 2
suppliers. Manufacturers start with pre-existing relationships to distinct suppliers. Without
loss of generality, let s = m be manufacturer m’s affiliated supplier.
One can interpret these pre-existing relationships as due to the affiliated supplier being the
manufacturer’s past supplier. Alternatively, a pre-existing relationship might reflect the sup-
plier being the manufacturer’s in-house supplier, with the caveat that firms maximize their own
profits.
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Sequence of Play: The game between these participants unfolds as follows.
1. A fixed cost F of building a relationship between manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 is drawn.
F is privately disclosed to both firms. The cost reflects liaison infrastructure connecting
the firms, expenditures from ensuring compatibility of new automobile parts7, or relocation
costs from making one’s plant closer to a supplier’s or customer’s location8.
Costly link formation and pre-existing relationships creates persistence in manufacturer-
supplier relationships. Such persistence is consistent with US auto supplier survey results9.
Although the model abstracts from repeated play, this consistency is still reassuring.
2. Manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 publicly and cooperatively decide whether to build a rela-
tionship. If a relationship is built, they bargain over the division of the costs incurred.
i) The firms’ decisions over whether to invest in a relationship are denoted by
(a1, a2) ∈ {I,N} × {I,N}.
If monetary transfers allow both parties to benefit from investment, a link between
(m, s) = (2, 1) is added to the relationship network. If otherwise, no link is created,
and the network is simply two disconnected edges connecting manufacturers to their
affiliated suppliers. The model is thus consistent with pairwise stable network formation.
ii) If both firms invest, the share of F each party bears is determined by Nash bargaining.
Hence, usual hold-up associated with relationship-specific investments is not present10.
Instead, inefficiencies will stem from link formation between (m, s) = (2, 1) imposing
7. See Womack et al. (1990) and Ben-Shahar & White (2006)
8. Proximity to supplier or customer plants predict auto plant locations. (See Klier, 1999 and Rosenbaum,
2013).
9. See for example, Cusumano & Takeishi (1991, Table 6) and Choi & Hartley (1996, p. 341).
10. For an example of how this might arise, Ben-Shahar & White observe contractual clauses typically ame-
liorate hold-up caused by supplier switching costs in the auto industry.
46
externalities on neighboring firms in the network.
Note only one manufacturer-supplier pair is permitted to link up. This allows focused
study of how product differentiation and economies of scale influence link formation, without
interference from strategic linking behavior.
3. Each manufacturer m ≤ 2 publicly announces a price
pm ∈ R≥0
in the downstream market. Manufacturers commit to output prices before negotiating input
prices with their suppliers. Downstream market competition is thus “harnessable” by manu-
facturers to reduce input prices. While in contrast to recent I.O. vertical markets research11,
the sequence of play is consistent with surveys of the auto industry12.
4. Input prices are then determined either by Nash bargaining or a first-price auction:
i) Suppose a manufacturer is connected to only one supplier in the relationship network. As
the description of Stage 6 will clarify, the downstream prices p set in Stage 3 pin down
demand for the manufacturers’ output q(p). Each firm thus knows the surplus created
from producing inputs and assembling them into outputs sold to consumers. When this
surplus is positive, its division between both firms is determined by Nash bargaining.
ii) Suppose both suppliers are connected to manufacturer 2 in the relationship network. Then
each supplier s ≤ 2 submits a bid
bs ∈ R≥0,
11. See Ghilli (2016), Ho & Lee (2016) for examples of simultaneous input and output pricing, Ho (2006) and
Yang (2018) for models where input prices are determined before output prices, and Iozzi & Valletti (2016) for
a more similar sequence of play to my framework, and a counter-example to the statement.
12. Womack et al. document American auto manufacturers threatening to switch suppliers (p. 148) and
reducing input prices (p. 160) in response in downstream competition. Cusumano & Takeishi (1991) report
how Japanese auto manufacturers set target prices based on a new model’s sales price (p. 565), choose suppliers
based on their ability to meet this target (Table 9), and implement the target post supplier selection (Table 11).
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representing its desired price for the supply of inputs per output unit to the manufacturer.
5. i) If a manufacturer m is connected to a single supplier and there is non-negative surplus to
divide, it operates. If otherwise, the manufacturer shuts down. Denote this status by
sm ∈ {Operate, Shut Down}.
Let tm denote the price manufacturer m pays its supplier for inputs needed to make each
output unit, implied by Nash bargaining in the previous stage.
ii) Suppose both suppliers are connected to manufacturer 2 in the relationship network. Then
based on output prices p and bids b, manufacturer 2 decides whether to shut down, or to
operate with a chosen supplier:
s2 ∈ {1, 2, Shut Down}.
Its input price is the chosen supplier’s bid: t2 =
∑
s{s2 = s}bs.
Heterogeneity in input price determination is thus a consequence of the relationship network.
This in turn depends on whether manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 build a relationship. The
heterogeneity and its cause, reflect actual differences between American and Japanese au-
tomakers. As documented by several sources13, American auto manufacturers often employ
numerous suppliers, pitting them against each other when awarding contracts. In contrast,
Japanese manufacturers work with smaller supplier bases, to improve inter-firm communi-
cation and cooperation.
6. Each consumer i ∈ [0, 1] observes s and p before deciding whether to purchase a good, and
13. See Womack et al.’s description of the supplier selection processes for US and Japanese firms. Also, see
tables 1, 4, 6 and 7 in Cusumano & Takeishi’s survey of industry participants. Finally, see Mudambi & Helper
(1998) for a more recent survey supporting the adverserial model of US auto supplier relations.
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if so, which manufacturer to buy it from:
ci ∈ {1, 2,Outside Option}, sm = Shut Down⇒ ci 6= m.
The stage 5 and 6 decisions create a new network of manufacturer-supplier relationships,
based on production linkages. This will be referred to as the “production network”, to
distinguish it from the relationship network formed by a.
Beliefs: All players share a common prior G over the cost F of building a manufacturer-
supplier relationship. The prior quantifies the firms’ relationship-forming incentives by the
equilibrium frequency of investment. Also, no technology exists to authenticate F to manufac-
turer 1 and supplier 2. Hence, contracts stipulating F -contingent side payments by these firms
to the parties linking up, cannot be written. Finally, F is absolutely continuous over support
[F , F ] ⊆ R>0. These are imposed for tractability.
Payoffs: Each consumer i has utility
ui = vim − pm
from consuming a unit of output made by manufacturer m. Hence, vim is effectively consumer
i’s willingness-to-pay for manufacturer m’s product.
The model is analyzed under two special cases.
Assumption 2.2.1. [No Product Differentiation] Each consumer has identical willingness-to-
pay for each product sold by either manufacturer:
vim = v > 0 ∀(i,m) ∈ [0, 1]× N≤2.
Assumption 2.2.1 captures the situation where both manufacturers’ products are perfect
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substitutes. Each manufacturer’s demand is thus
qm(s−m,p) ∈

1 if pm < (p−m ÷ {s−m 6= Shut Down}) ∧ v
[0, 1] if pm = (p−m ÷ {s−m 6= Shut Down}) ∧ v
0 if pm > (p−m ÷ {s−m 6= Shut Down}) ∧ v
,
depending on its downstream rival’s status s−m and price p−m. When the rival shuts down, it
should be clear (p−m ÷ {s−m 6= Shut Down}) ∧ v = v in the expression above.
Assumption 2.2.2. [Full Product Differentiation] Half of the consumers are willing to pay up
to v1 for manufacturer 1’s output and nothing for manufacturer 2’s:
(vi1, vi2) = (v1, 0) > 0 ∀i ∈ [0, 0.5] .
The remaining half will pay up to v2 for manufacturer 2’s output and nothing for the rival
product:
(vi1, vi2) = (0, v2) > 0 ∀i ∈ [0.5, 1] .
Under Assumption 2.2.2, both manufacturers’ products are completely horizontally differ-
entiated - the polar opposite of the previous assumption. Each manufacturer’s demand is thus









if pm = vm
0 if otherwise
.
When v1 6= v2, Assumption 2.2.2 also implies manufacturers are vertically differentiated.
While restrictive, assumptions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 decontaminate the network-based effects of
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downstream product differentiation on social welfare, from (well understood) downstream mar-
ket deadweight loss. Of course, stark but interpretable assumptions like these also promise
sharper insights in environments where understanding is otherwise difficult to acquire.
Each manufacturer’s payoff is its variable profit, less costs incurred from establishing rela-
tionships with unaffiliated suppliers in Stage 2:
πMm = qm(pm − tm)− T21 {a = I,m = 2} ∀m ≤ 2.
Notice both manufacturers incur the same marginal cost from assembling inputs into any quan-
tity of output. This cost in turn has been normalized to zero. vm and pm thus acquire alternate
interpretations as the willingness-to-pay and output price net of of marginal assembly costs for
manufacturer m respectively. Hence, the model’s equilibrium response to changes in vm also
capture equilibrium effects of shocks to m’s assembly costs. Also, manufacturer 2 incurs a sunk
cost T21 from forming a relationship with supplier 1 in Stage 2. As the sequence of play clarifies,
T21 is determined by Nash bargaining with supplier 1.
Each supplier’s payoff is also its variable profit, less costs incurred from establishing rela-
tionships with unaffiliated manufacturers:
πS1 = q1t1 − C(q1) + {s2 = 1} (q2t2 − C(q1 + q2) + C(q1))− {a = I} (F − T21)
πS2 = {s2 = 2} (q2t2 − C(q2)) .
Suppliers possess identical cost functions C(Q), which are assumed to be strictly concave.
Hence, upstream economies of scale are captured by how much average input production costs
AC(Q) declines in quantity Q.
Strategies: The sequence of play implies each player’s strategy is contingent on past ac-
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tions, many of which are irrelevant to the player’s payoffs. To simplify analysis, I assume players
adopt payoff relevant strategies. In particular, consumers choose what to consume, based only
on output prices p and whether each manufacturer operates or shuts down, encoded in s. A
strategy for consumer i is hence of the form:
σi : {Operate, Shut Down}2 × R2≥0 → {1, 2,Outside Option}. (2.1)




{σi(s,p) = m}di. (2.2)
Assume each consumer consumes if indifferent between consuming its utility maximizing inside
option and not consuming. Similarly, since manufacturer 2’s optimal price does not depend on
F , while its optimal supplier does not depend on F , a and p1, its strategies are of the form
σM2 (F, a,p,b) = (a2(F ), p2(F, a), s2(F, a,p,b)),
satisfying
p2(F, a) = p2(a) s2(F, a,p,b) = s2(p2,b). (2.3)
Finally, since supplier 1’s profit depends on F only through a, its chosen strategy
σS1 (F, a) = (a1(F ), b1(F, a,p))
satisfies
b1(F, a,p) = b1(p). (2.4)
Both suppliers thus bid with reference only to output prices14.
14. Without loss of generality, assume supplier 2’s bid b2(a,p) = b2(p) too, since supplier 2 bids only when
a = I.
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Terminology: Under the strategy sets considered, the players’ actions from Stage 2 on-
wards are contingent only on public information. Moreover, the players’ ex-post payoffs as
functions of their actions, depend on private information F only through investment decisions
a publicly chosen in Stage 2. Hence, by constructing a new game mirroring the extensive form
originating from the investment decisions, one obtains a proper perfect information subgame.
I hence refer to the extensive form initiated by any profile of investment decisions a as a
“subgame” from here on without apology. Notice any sensible solution concept thus requires
its strategies σ when truncated in any of these subgames σ|a, to be subgame perfect Nash
equilibria.
Nash Bargaining: Completing the model requires specifying threat points and bargaining
powers when manufacturers and suppliers Nash bargain. When a manufacturer and its affiliated
supplier bargain in Stage 4 over how much the supplier receives for inputs, the manufacturer
shuts down while the supplier loses a customer if they fail to agree. This defines their threat













Here, πMm (σ − sm, Shut Down) = −{m = 2, a = I}F , while πSs (σ − sm, Shut Down) is sup-
plier s’s profit from either supplying the remaining manufacturer or not supplying any firm at
all, depending on σ. Observe any solution concept strategy profile σ thus ought to satisfy (2.5).
When manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 bargain over how much each contributes towards
funding a new relationship between them, each firm’s threat point is the profit incurred from
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πM2 (I,σ|I;T )− πM2 (N, I,σ|(N,I))
)β21 × (πS1 (I,σ|I;T )− πS1 (I,N,σ|(I,N)))1−β21 .
(2.6)
Thus, any equilibrium strategy profile σ ought to satisfy (2.6) too.
Observe the manufacturer-supplier specific bargaining parameters β need not equal each
other15. The only restrictions imposed are that β21 ∈ (0, 1) and βm ∈ (0, 1) for each m ≤ 2.
Solution Concept: The model is a dynamic game with private information disclosed to
some players in Stage 1. Since beliefs are governed by a common prior, (pairwise stable) Bayes
Nash equilibrium (BNE) is a reasonable starting point for a solution concept. The BNE strate-
gies σ must also satisfy the informational requirements (2.1) to (2.4), and be consistent with
the bargaining formulae in (2.5) and (2.6). To simplify exposition, one may also assume man-
ufacturer 2 and supplier 1 invest in Stage 2 if indifferent between investing and not investing.
Because F is absolutely continuous, this assumption binds only with zero probability.
Yet even with these restrictions, the model admits multiple equilibria. One reason why
this occurs lies with the first-price auction embedded within its sequence of play. The obvi-
ous solution where both bidders bid the inefficient bidder’s valuation is the auction’s intuitive
outcome. It is also the unique limit of weakly undominated Nash equilibria in discrete bidding
first-price auction analogues, as shown by Alcalde and Dahm (2011). Unfortunately, alternate
equilibria where both bidders bid common values located between their valuations also exist.
These equilibria are unintuitive, but their existence impedes basic counterfactual analysis.
15. For example, Cusumano & Takeishi (p. 582)’s interviewees report lower profit margins for Japanese
auto suppliers vis-a-vis their American counterparts while Dyer (1996, p. 281)’s descriptive statistics suggests
Japanese manufacturers capture higher shares of joint profits with their suppliers compared to US manufacturers.
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To deal with this issue, I assume:
Assumption 2.2.3. [Limit Bidding] Supplier 2 never submits a bid b2 weakly dominated by
bidding its lowest possible unit cost AC(q2(s1,p)), across all feasible operate-or-quit decisions
s1 by manufacturer 1.
It is easily shown when both suppliers are restricted to bids weakly undominated by bidding
their unit cost, the unique NE in the first-price auction is the intuitive solution. Assumption
2.2.3 is a weaker requirement that happens to yield the same outcome in this model.
Another reason why multiple equilibria arise is due to payoff complementarities associated
with supplier-level economies of scale. Intuitively, when a manufacturer shuts down by setting
an unreasonably high output price, its supplier’s average cost of supplying the manufacturer’s
rival increases. This can cause the rival to shut down too, by depleting it of an affordable input
sourcing option. The model thus admits equilibria featuring both manufacturers operating or
both shutting down, when the relationship network is connected.
One solution to this problem assumes:
Assumption 2.2.4. [Pareto Efficient Bargaining] Manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 attain pareto
efficient payoffs if the subgame originating from them investing a = I is initiated, amongst the
set of SPNE payoffs satisfying Assumption 2.2.3.
Assumption 2.2.4 corresponds to the pareto efficiency axiom associated with Nash bargain-
ing in the following sense. Given manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 obviously communicate when
bargaining over the splitting of their investment return, their bargained outcome ought to lie on
the pareto efficient frontier for their payoffs. Requiring all four firms to coordinate on equilibria
maximizing the bargaining firms’ post-investment joint profit, is thus not unreasonable from
this perspective.
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An alternate approach refines equilibria by imposing the following assumptions:
Assumption 2.2.5. [Forward Induction] Let
πM2 = min
σ|(N,I)
πM2 ((N, I),σ|N,I) πS1 = min
σ|(I,N)
πS1 ((I,N),σ|I,N)
be the minimal possible payoffs manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 can attain from not investing in
Stage 2, under all SPNEs satisfying Assumption 2.2.3. If there exists another SPNE satisfying
Assumption 2.2.3 in the subgame initiated when a = I and a T21 ∈ R where both firms attain
payoffs pareto superior to (πM2 , π
S
1 ), their equilibrium payoffs in the subgame are not pareto
inferior to (πM2 , π
S
1 ).
In my view, Assumption 2.2.5 resembles the forward induction refinement considered in
games where a player effectively guarantees cross-player coordination on a desired outcome, by
not preemptively enforcing an inferior outcome for himself. In this context, manufacturer 2 and
supplier 1 sacrifice payoffs equal to (πM2 , π
S
1 ) when establishing a relationship. Rival firms thus
anticipate manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 coordinating on strategies where they attain payoffs
pareto undominated by (πM2 , π
S
1 ), if they invest in a relationship.
Assumption 2.2.6. [Time Consistency] Neither manufacturer can strictly improve its payoff
by altering its downstream price pm at the start of Stage 6, after its input price tm has been
determined.
As already discussed, manufacturers commit to output prices before negotiating input prices
with connected suppliers. The issue with this sequence of play is that manufacturers may lack
the required commitment ability. Moreover, manufacturers can often profit from raising output
prices post input price determination, since product differentiation renders their demand sched-
ules more inelastic. Assumption 2.2.6 should thus be interpreted as requiring output prices to
remain incentive compatible, if manufacturers cannot commit to them during input price ne-
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gotiations.
It turns out that making assumptions 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, or imposing 2.2.3, 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 yields
a unique equilibrium relationship network for each realization of investment cost. Moreover,
the equilibrium networks are identical irrespective of which assumption set is imposed. In
what follows, I show why this is so, and compare the equilibrium allocations to their surplus-
maximizing counterparts.
2.2.1 Planner’s Allocation when Product Differentiation is Absent
Consider the problem facing a social planner attempting to maximize total surplus:
max
q,s2
q1v + q2v − C(q1)− C(q2)− {s2 = 1} (C(q1 + q2)− C(q1)− C(q2) + F )
subject to
q1 + q2 ≤ 1, q ≥ 0.
So the planner effectively allocates consumers to manufacturers through its choice of q, and
manufacturers to suppliers through its choice of s2.
When q >> 0, cost minimization implies s2 = 1 iff
F ≤ C(q1) + C(q2)− C(q1 + q2)
up to allocations indifferent to the planner. But by allocating manufacturer 2’s customers to
manufacturer 1, the planner avoids needing to link manufacturer 2 to another supplier. Under
this allocation, the planner conserves costs from not forming relationships. It benefits from
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economies of scale during input production too. So the planner only produces when
v > AC(1)
and sets
q ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}, s2 = 2
if so. Total surplus of the planners’ allocation is thus
(v − AC(1)) ∨ 0
ex-ante and ex-post.
The socially optimal allocation features no supplier sharing when product differentiation is
absent. Intuitively, when manufacturers sell homogeneous products, one can allocate consumers
to a single manufacturer without reducing consumer utility. Thus, no costly investment in new
relationships is needed to realize economies of scale via supplier sharing.
Figure 2.2: Example Social Planner’s Network
2.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis when Product Differentiation is Absent
The equilibrium outcome is found using backward induction.
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Stages 6 & 5: When q2(s1(p,b),p) > 0, manufacturer 2 chooses the lowest bidder
s2 = argmins≤2bs
when b1 ∧ b2 < v2. The manufacturer is indifferent between using that supplier or shutting
down when b1 ∧ b2 = v2. It thus behaves like a first-price auctioneer.
Stages 4 & 3: Suppose a 6= I so that the relationship network is disconnected, as in
Figure 2.3. Nash bargaining between each affiliated manufacturer-supplier pair implies their
negotiated input price is a convex combination of average cost AC(qm(s−m(p),p)) and output
price pm:
tm = βmAC(qm(s−m(p),p)) + (1− βm)pm.
Such bargaining occurs when manufacturer 1 operates or equivalently, pm ≥ AC(qm(s−m(p),p)).
As in Bertrand competition, each manufacturer’s payoff is thus stepwise in price:
πMm =

βm(pm − AC(1)) ∨ 0 if pm < (p−m ÷ {s−m 6= Shut Down})
βmqm(s−m,p)(pm − AC(qm(s−m,p))) ∨ 0 if pm = (p−m ÷ {s−m 6= Shut Down})
0 if otherwise
where s−m = s−m(p).
Figure 2.3: Disconnected Relationship Network
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It follows neither manufacturer anticipates any profit when setting its output price in Stage
3.
Lemma 2.2.1. Suppose Assumption 2.2.1 holds. Then neither manufacturer makes a strict
profit
πM1 = 0 π
M
2 = 0,
in any of the Nash equilibria of the subgame initiated by a when a = I in Stage 2.
The proof simply requires routine checking of incentive compatibility for each feasible con-
figuration of output prices. Intuitively, the logic of Bertrand competition equates downstream
profits to zero.
Now suppose a = I so that the relationship network is connected, as in Figure 2.4. Deriving
this subgame’s equilibria is less straightforward. Nash bargaining between manufacturer 1 and
supplier 1 implies
t1 = β1 (AC(q1(s2(p,b),p)){s2(p,b) 6= 1}+ ∆C(q(s(p,b),p)){s2(p,b) = 1}) + (1− β1)p1
whenever manufacturer 1 operates. Moreover, manufacturer 2’s input price equals
t2 = b1 ∧ b2
whenever it operates. Clearly, manufacturer 1’s input price t1, and its choice of whether to
operate s1(p,b), depends on manufacturer 2’s chosen supplier s2(p,b). Moreover, both manu-
facturers’ input prices depend on bids b strategically chosen by suppliers in a first-price auction.
Deriving the set of Nash equilibria outcomes thus requires evaluating the supplier’s payoffs for
every possible configuration of bids, incentive compatible supplier-or-quit choice maps s(p,b),
and incentive compatible market share functions q(s,p). This allows derivation of all possible
equilibrium bids and thus, all possible equilibrium input prices.
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Figure 2.4: Connected Relationship Network
However, a simpler argument shows neither manufacturer makes any profit in equilibrium.
Lemma 2.2.2. Suppose Assumption 2.2.1 holds. Then neither manufacturer strictly profits
πM1 ≤ 0 πM2 ≤ 0,
in any of the Nash equilibria of the subgame initiated by a when a = I in Stage 2.
As when a 6= I, Bertrand competition between homogeneous manufacturers equates their
profits to zero.
Stage 2: The lemmas establish manufacturer 2 never benefits from forming a new rela-
tionship. The relationship network is thus disconnected, while supplier sharing never occurs in
equilibrium.
Intuitively, price competition between homogeneous manufacturers concentrates production
along a single manufacturer-supplier pair to fully realize economies of scale in input production.
So supplier sharing never occurs, regardless of whether the relationship network is connected
or not. Consequentially, additional manufacturer-supplier relationships, typically created to
facilitate supplier sharing, do not increase any firm’s payoff.
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Figure 2.5: Production Network Examples when a 6= I (LHS) and a = I (RHS)
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium Path Production Network Example
Observe the allocation of consumers to manufacturers to suppliers on the equilibrium path,
coincides with the social planner’s allocation. Ex-ante, the total surplus it generates is hence
TS = (v − C(1)) ∨ 0 = (q1v + q2v − C(1)) ∨ 0
almost surely. The equilibrium allocation thus maximizes ex-ante total surplus.
Now, consider an infinitesimal increase in each manufacturer’s ability to charge a markup
above its assembly costs. Observe
∂TS
∂v
= {v > AC(1)} = q1 + q2.
So the marginal effect of higher willingness-to-pay for the manufacturers’ products (or equiv-
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alently lower assembly costs for both manufacturers) on total surplus is the manufacturers’
combined market share. Also, consider a constant increase in the suppliers’ marginal costs of
making some quantity of inputs. Formally, suppose C(Q) is increased to C(Q) + cQ for all
Q ≥ 0. Then
∂TS
∂c
= −{v > AC(1)} = −qS1 − qS2 .
Thus, the increase in marginal cost causes a loss of surplus equal to the suppliers’ upstream
market shares combined.
Now, Hulten (1978) basically equates marginal effects of firm-specific shocks on total output
to the firms’ respective shares of aggregated output. The marginal effects derived above are
thus consistent with Hulten’s theorem in a partial equilibrium sense. Specifically, they equate
each firm’s importance to total surplus to its share of its own market. Intuitively, this result
follows from the envelope theorem. Due to downstream competition between manufacturers,
conditional on any relationship network, the equilibrium allocation of consumers to manufac-
turers to suppliers maximizes total surplus. Moreover, any shock to a firm’s markup, either
via the willingness-to-pay for its product or its marginal costs, affects total surplus in only
two ways. First, firm-specific markup shocks directly affect total surplus through the firm’s
portion of the surplus. This direct effect equals the firm’s market share. Second, firm-specific
shocks also influences total surplus by altering each firm’s market share. However, since the
equilibrium allocation maximizes total surplus, the second indirect effect is zero, implying the
result.
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2.2.3 Planner’s Allocation when Product Differentiation is Com-
plete
The social planner under Assumption 2.2.2 solves
max
q,s2
q1v1 + q2v2 − C(q1)− C(q2)− {s2 = 1} (C(q1 + q2)− C(q1)− C(q2) + F )
subject to




The planner’s allocation of manufacturers to suppliers is determined by the variable s2 as before.
However, in contrast to Subsection 2.2.1, the planner’s allocation of consumers to manufactur-
ers respects the market segments catered for by the manufacturer products.






implies the following result.
Proposition 2.2.1. Suppose Assumption 2.2.2 holds. Supplier sharing occurs only if
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and occurs with frequency G(F̂ ) under the social planner’s allocation.
Proposition 2.2.1 says the socially optimal network depends on model primitives in intuitive
ways. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 illustrate this. Briefly, the network is usually connected when the
maximal willingness-to-pay for each product is high relative to the cost of building new vertical
relationships. Moreover, production is often centralized along one manufacturer-supplier pair
when only one market segment’s willingness-to-pay is high.
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Figure 2.7: Planner’s Production Network when F is Low (LHS) or High (RHS) versus v
Figure 2.8: Planner’s Production Network when v1, F (LHS) or when v2, F (RHS) are High
In contrast to the previous subsections, the production network endogenously depends on
F . Hence, ex-ante and ex-post total surpluses are distinct. The effects of model primitives
on ex-ante total surplus, thus depend on how they influence network formation, in addition to
their effects on each firm’s ex-post market share and markup.
Yet, the social planner’s allocation still respects Hulten’s theorem in an ex-ante sense. Dif-
ferentiating ex-ante total surplus with respect to the model parameters obtains
Proposition 2.2.2. Suppose Assumption 2.2.2 holds. Marginal effects of the willingness-to-
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The intuition underlying this result is similar to the explanation given in Subsection 2.2.2.
The planner’s allocation maximizes ex-post total surplus and hence ex-ante surplus too. In
particular, supplier sharing occurs only when it is socially optimal for manufacturers to share
suppliers. The envelope theorem implies the marginal effect of a firm-specific shock on total
surplus through relationship formation is nil. This marginal effect thus occurs directly from
firm-specific parameters to total surplus. This effect in turn equals the firm’s ex-ante market
share.
2.2.4 Equilibrium Analysis when Product Differentiation is Com-
plete
The game’s equilibria are analyzed using backward induction as in Subsection 2.2.2. This
involves deriving the suppliers’ payoffs as functions of their bids, and rolling back to obtain
the manufacturers’ profits as functions of output prices. Solving for all equilbria obtains the
following result.
Proposition 2.2.3. Suppose assumptions 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 hold. The set of equilibrium rela-
tionship and production networks satisfying Assumption 2.2.4 or assumptions 2.2.5 and 2.2.6
66



































in any of these equilibria.
In contrast to the equilibria of Subsection 2.2.2, supplier sharing can occur with positive
probability. The intuition is twofold. First, Assumption 2.2.2 effectively locks consumers to
separate manufacturers. Supplier 1 hence enjoys economies of scale only by supplying both
manufacturers. Second, product differentiation implies manufacturers enjoy market power.
Hence as in Helper & Levine (1992), manufacturer 2 is more willing to consider new suppliers.
Doing so prevents supplier 1 from bargaining away a share of its oligopoly rent.
Proposition 2.2.3 also relates ex-ante relationship network connectivity to the model param-
eters. Ex-ante, supplier sharing is obviously independent of manufacturer 2’s bargaining power
β21 when it bargains with supplier 1 over the split of their joint investment’s returns. Supplier
sharing is also obviously decreasing in the distribution of investment costs G, when the latter
is ordered by FOSD. Finally, supplier sharing relates to the remaining parameters as follows.
βm: Ex-ante, supplier sharing is non-increasing in manufacturer 1’s bargaining power when
negotiating input prices. For intuition, observe such negotiations occur after relationships are
formed. Hence, manufacturer 1 extracts a share of any surplus created by manufacturer 2
and supplier 1 investing, via lower input prices. As β1 increases, this share rises, leaving less
surplus to split between the investing firms. Ex-ante, supplier sharing is also non-increasing
in manufacturer 2’s bargaining power. As β2 rises, the input price manufacturer 2 pays when
the relationship network is disconnected falls. In contrast, its input price when the network is
connected is determined by an auction, and is thus independent of β2.
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vm: Ex-ante, supplier sharing is non-decreasing in the maximal willingness-to-pay for man-
ufacturer 1’s product. For intuition, observe the feasible payoffs during Nash bargaining over
input prices enlarges as v1 rises. Hence the input price manufacturer 1 negotiates with supplier
1 also increases. However, supplier-level economies of scale enables manufacturer 1 to operate
when the relationship network is connected, even when it can’t under a disconnected network.
Supplier 1 earns this input price only when the network is connected under such circumstances.
Hence, its incentive to form a new relationship increases in v1.
Ex-ante, supplier sharing is also non-decreasing in manufacturer 2’s ability to charge higher
markups v2 over its assembly costs. The underlying intuition depends on whether manufacturer
2’s markup is sufficiently high to allow either supplier to fulfill its input needs. Suppose this






Then a procurement auction prevents suppliers from extracting manufacturer 2’s oligopoly rent
through Nash bargaining. Manufacturer 2 is thus more willing to invest in new supplier relation-





instead. Each supplier is incapable
of supplying manufacturer 2 without also supplying manufacturer 1. Hence any increase in
the markup enlarges the surplus created by manufacturers sharing suppliers. This encourages
supplier sharing.
AC(Q): Supposed input production costs C(Q) are increased to C(Q) + cQ for all Q ≥ 0.
Proposition 2.2.3 implies this reduces the frequency of supplier sharing. Such a change leaves





, unchanged. It also implies
higher equilibrium bids received by manufacturer 2 when the relationship network is connected.
Manufacturer 2 is hence more reluctant to invest in relationships with new suppliers.
These comparative statics apply to typically unobserved relationships, as opposed to pro-
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duction linkages. Fortunately, the production network features similar comparative statics.
Proposition 2.2.4. Suppose assumptions 2.2.2 to 2.2.4 or 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 hold.
The probability of both manufacturers producing strictly positive quantities and sharing a sup-
plier, is
1. weakly increasing in the willingness-to-pay for their products v, and the distribution of rela-
tionship building costs G (ordered by FOSD),
2. weakly decreasing in their bargaining powers β, and input production marginal cost c where
C(Q) is increased to C(Q) + cQ,
in any equilibrium.
Hence, the frequency of supplier sharing occurring under the production network responds
to model primitives in the same way as supplier sharing does under the relationship network.
This yields testable predictions from production network data. Obviously, whether manufactur-
ers operate correlates with whether they share suppliers. Hence, the aforementioned frequency
differs from the probability of supplier sharing conditional on particular manufacturers operat-
ing. For example, suppose manufacturers sell products with equal willingness-to-pay. Corollary
2.9.3, located in the appendix, shows the latter conditional probabilities initially weakly in-
creases as the willingness-to-pay parameters rise. Later, the probabilities discontinuously fall
due to manufacturers entering the market without sharing suppliers. The non-decreasing rela-
tionship between willingness-to-pay and supplier sharing resumes after the jump.














denote the average cost of producing 1
2
output units of input, conditional on already producing the same amount.
To evaluate Assumption 2.2.2’s welfare consequences, one can start with the difference in
ex-ante surpluses for the social planner’s and equilibrium allocations. One then characterizes its
relationship to the model’s parameters. However, investment costs are not distributed according
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to a convenient functional form. Hence, this exercise is unlikely to yield informative comparative
statics. I thus assess the model’s welfare implications via a less direct approach. Propositions
2.2.1 and 2.2.3 yield necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibrium and socially optimal
relationship networks to be connected. These conditions constitute upper thresholds for the
cost of relationship creation F . Comparing the thresholds yields the following result.
Proposition 2.2.5. Suppose assumptions 2.2.2 to 2.2.4 or 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 hold.
The relationship and production networks are over or equally connected in comparison to their


































































The equilibrium and social planner’s allocations coincide almost surely if neither inequality
holds.
For intuition regarding Proposition 2.2.5, observe inefficient network formation occurs for
two reasons. First, Nash bargaining between manufacturer 1 and supplier 1 enables the former


























of the surplus created when manufacturers share suppliers operating economies of scale technol-
ogy. This holds up investment by supplier 1 and manufacturer 2 in a new relationship. Supplier
sharing is thus inefficiently discouraged.
Second, by developing a new relationship with supplier 1, manufacturer 2 introduces com-
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petition to supplier 2. This erodes supplier 2’s market power in the upstream market. Such
competition typically benefits consumers by reducing costs and increasing output. However, the
extreme nature of product differentiation considered under Assumption 2.2.2 means manufac-
turer 2 behaves like a downstream market monopolist. Thus, this competition merely transfers









to manufacturer 2. As Elliot (2015) explains, investment by manufacturer 2 can thus be seen
rent-seeking. From this perspective, such investment is excessive.
Hence, whether the relationship network is over or under connected relative to its social
optimum, depends on which of these two inefficiencies dominate. When hold-up of investment
by manufacturer 1 is severe, the quantity in (2.9) exceeds that in (2.10). Thus, Proposition
2.2.5 implies the network is under connected when inefficient. Conversely, suppose rent-seeking
overinvestment by manufacturer 2 is severe. The proposition implies the network is too con-
nected when inefficient.
Finally, Proposition 2.2.5 also sheds light on when shocks to individual firms have dispro-
portionately large welfare consequences. Computing the total surplus generated in equilibrium
and taking derivatives yields the following result.
Proposition 2.2.6. Suppose either assumptions 2.2.2 to 2.2.4 or 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.5 and 2.2.6




F̂ − F (σ|I)
)
, where F̂ is defined in (2.7) and F (σ|I) is G’s argu-
ment in (2.8). Then



































and strictly exceed (is less than) their manufacturers’ ex-ante output only if the relationship
and production networks are not over (under) connected w.p.p. vis-a-vis the social planner’s
networks,

































whose magnitude strictly exceeds (is less than) their combined ex-ante output only if the re-
lationship and production networks aren’t over (under) connected w.p.p. versus the planner’s
networks,













The marginal effects described by Proposition 2.2.6 do not respect Hulten’s theorem. More-
over, these effects are (weakly) amplified rather than dampened vis-a-vis ex-ante market shares
when the production network is ex-ante overly disconnected. The latter is surprising in light
of recent macroeconomics research on production networks. The intuition one acquires from
this literature is that shocks to small firms can have large welfare consequences. This is due to
shock propagation across a highly connected network17. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2012)
demonstrate aggregate output volatility caused by microeconomic shocks fails to vanish in large
economies, when production network interconnectivity is highly asymmetric across nodes. Fig-
ure 2.7’s LHS panel illustrates such a network. Acemoglu et al. establish their results via a
multi-sector model of competitive markets. In contrast, this paper focuses on the effects of
product differentiation and economies of scale on network formation. When such forces are
accounted for, Proposition 2.2.6 shows the usual intuition correlating shock amplification to
16. The three derivatives’ magnitudes also strictly exceed (is less then) ex-ante output only if the relationship
network is under (over) connected w.p.p. See the proposition’s proof for details.
17. This assertion is backed by Carvalho (2014)’s survey of the literature, and in particular, his comparison
of “network multipliers” for horizontal, vertical and star production networks.
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network connectivity may not hold, and is possibly reversed.
The intuition for why Hulten’s theorem fails is simple. Marginal effects of shocks to the firms’
markups on ex-ante total surplus equal their ex-ante market shares under the socially optimal
allocation. This is due to the envelope theorem. However, downstream product differentiation
distorts supplier 1 and manufacturer 2’s relationship-forming incentives. Inefficient network
formation hence causes Hulten’s result to break. Understanding why firm-specific shocks have
disproportionately large welfare consequences when the network is infrequently connected is
less straightforward. Consider a shock to the maximal willingness-to-pay for manufacturer m’s
product, vm. By the envelope theorem, the direct effect of such a shock on ex-ante total surplus
is m’s ex-ante market share Eqm. However, the frequency of supplier sharing is also increasing
in vm by Proposition 2.2.3. So the indirect effect of vm on total surplus due to network for-
mation, reinforces the direct effect when supplier sharing is infrequent compared to the social
optimum. Conversely, the indirect effect of vm due to network formation dampens the original
effect when supplier sharing is too frequent. The intuition correlating shock amplification with
network connectivity is thus reversed. This intuition carries over to how total surplus responds
to changes in supplier marginal costs c too.
We conclude this section by evaluating the welfare consequences of manufacturer-specific
bailouts. The 2008 financial crisis saw Ford lobbying Congress to bailout its rivals, citing
interdependence in auto manufacturers’ fortunes through common suppliers. Baqaee (2018)
suggests an explanation for Ford’s unusual behavior. He uses a general equilibrium model
similar to Acemoglu et al.’s, but featuring costly entry and exit. Ford’s behavior is also rational
in this model.
Corrollary 2.2.1. Suppose either assumptions 2.2.2 to 2.2.4 or 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.5 and 2.2.6
hold. Let m ∈ N≤2. Manufacturer m’s ex-ante profit EπMm is non-decreasing in its rival’s







sharing both occurs and doesn’t with positive probabilities in the relationship network.
However, the intuitions underlying Baqaee’s result and Corollary 2.2.1 differ. In Baqaee’s
model, adverse shocks to a subset of downstream firms cause many of them to exit. This
triggers a cascade of exits amongst their upstream suppliers too. Because manufacturers have
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over inputs, the surviving downstream firms incur costs when sub-
stituting from exiting suppliers to new ones. In my model, suppliers produce homogeneous
inputs. Hence, technological economies of scale experienced by suppliers, rather than external
economies of scale due to input variety, are responsible for shock propagation. The proof of
Corollary 2.2.1 is simply a consequence of Proposition 2.2.3. Any increase in either manufac-
turer’s markup through v, causes more frequent supplier sharing. But when manufacturers
share suppliers, manufacturer 1’s ability to extract part of the surplus created by supplier
sharing implies its (ex-post) profit increases by (2.9). Moreover, manufacturer 2’s rent-seeking
motive when investing in new relationships means its profit increases by (2.10). Each manu-
facturer thus benefits when a subsidy increases their rival’s markup.
The difference in intuitions manifest in the way firm-specific shocks predict supplier en-
try and exit. Baqaee’s intuition implies manufacturer-specific shocks are positively correlated
with upstream entry18. The counterpart correlation in my model depends on the downstream
market’s state. Suppose manufacturers face low willingness-to-pay so that v1 ∨ v2 is below the





. Any increase in either manu-
facturer’s markup increases the ex-ante number of operating suppliers. This is because neither
supplier operates unless supplier sharing occurs, while higher downstream markups imply more





instead. Now manufacturers and suppliers
can still operate profitably absent supplier sharing. Supplier sharing hence causes a supplier
to shut down. Upstream entry thus is inversely correlated with manufacturer-specific shocks
18. when the elasticity of substitution across upstream market inputs is sufficiently small. See the explanation




Methodologically, this paper closely relates to the theoretical buyer-seller networks literature.
A key question in this area is whether network formation is efficient when specialized to a
buyer-seller context. Kranton & Minehart (2001) is a pioneering paper in this research strand.
These authors show buyer-seller networks produce efficient outcomes when the more informed
side of the market (buyers) incurs the cost of link formation, and prices are determined by
Walrasian-style ascending bid auctions19. In my view, the paper in this literature most closely
related to mine is Elliot (2015). Elliot points out when prices are determined by bilateral
bargaining rather than auctions, hold-up in relationship-specific investments inefficiently dis-
courages relationship formation. Moreover, when both buyers and sellers bear the cost of link
formation, buyers are encouraged to over-invest in new relationships, as in my model.
Whilst being simpler, my paper departs from Elliot’s in three ways. First, I highlight an-
other source of inefficiency - investment hold-up by neighboring firms - in buyer-seller network
formation. Because this inefficiency hinges on suppliers experiencing economies of scale when
supplying multiple buyers, they do not arise in Elliot’s model. Analyses of similar inefficien-
cies appear mainly located in more abstract networks research, such as by Bloch & Jackson
(2007). Second, by basing my model on documented features of the auto industry, I account
for heterogeneities in pricing protocols that Elliot’s particular parameterizations miss. More
specifically, a buyer’s price in my model is determined by bilateral bargaining or a first-price
auction, depending on its number of connected suppliers. This heterogeneity is significant be-
19. For another example, Condorelli and Galeotti (2012) highlight coordination failure associated with multiple
equilibria and positive externalities when path connected agents serve as trading intermediaries, as causes
for inefficient network formation. For a final example, Wang & Watts (2006) highlight how supplier vertical
differentiation or sellers’ associations cause ex-post mismatch when multiple buyers (sellers) ex-ante prefer to
link with a common seller (buyer), but regret their choice after being rationed ex-post.
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cause the buyer pays the less efficient supplier’s cost under the auction’s intuitive outcome.
The payment is larger then what the buyer pays under Elliot’s bargaining protocol. Incentives
to invest in relationships are hence smaller. This suggests Elliot’s computed overinvestment
efficiency losses are upwards biased if applied to the auto industry. As far as I know, pricing
protocol heterogeneity in buyer-seller networks is studied in only one other paper, Watts (2016).
This paper is not focused on inefficient network formation. Finally, I introduce model-specific
refinements to address the issue of multiple equilibria, instead of employing upper bounds for
welfare losses. Multiple equilibria arise for different reasons in Elliot’s model and mine. Due to
payoff complementarities created by supplier-level economies of scale, multiple equilibria occur
in my model. Because more than one buyer-seller pair can form links, strategic considerations
imply multiple equilibrium networks in Elliot’s. The hope is for my approach to be as useful
for more general analyses of manufacturer-supplier networks.
This paper also relates to the literature on production networks. A portion of this literature
attempts to explain distinct features of production networks seen in data. For example, Ober-
field (2017) shows how slight dispersion in match-specific productivities creates highly efficient
suppliers with unusually many customers. This is accomplished via a micro-founded model of ef-
ficient network formation20. Another portion of this literature concerns how network formation
interacts with imperfect competition to create inefficiencies. These papers typically focus on a
particular industry. For example, Ho (2009) studies insurer-hospital network formation when
hospital heterogeneity confers market power to high quality hospitals21. A final portion of the
20. For another example, Atalay et al. (2016) show how realistically accounting for link formation when firms
enter or exit, in a less micro-founded model, allows one to explain abnormally thick (thin) right (left) tails of
the in-degree distribution for the U.S. economy’s production network. For a final example, Mizuno et al. (2014)
highlight how past manufacturer-supplier relationships determines future production networks, through network
persistence in Japanese data.
21. Also, Ho & Lee (2015) highlight how greater downstream competition between insurance firms lead
to higher hospital prices due to hospitals playing insurers off each other when bargaining with more than one
insurer. And, Lee (2013) studies network formation between videogame developers and platform manufacturers,
to evaluate the welfare consequences of vertical integration.
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literature emphasize how inter-firm relationships propagate local shocks across an economy22.
An important paper here is Acemoglu et al. (2012). These authors show how sectoral shocks
cause aggregate output fluctuations through asymmetric production networks. In my view,
the papers in this area closest in scope to mine are Baqaee (2018) and Taschereau-Dumochel
(2020). These analyze how firm or industry-specific shocks trigger cascades of firm shutdowns
through manufacturer-supplier relationships when imperfect competition is present. However,
Baqaee focuses on the equilibrium network while Taschereau-Dumochel focuses on the socially
optimal network.
My paper departs from Baqaee’s and Tascehreau-Dumochel’s in three ways. First, I con-
sider a partial equilibrium model focused on a single industry. This approach allows me to
better account for forces thought to be recently affecting the auto industry. Such forces in-
clude economies of scale and input pricing heterogeneity. Given the extent to which automaker
bankruptcies during the Great Recession motivates macroeconomics research on production
networks, I see my focused approach as being sensible and complementary. Second, I ana-
lyze formation of both equilibrium and socially optimal networks under a single, albeit simpler
framework. This allows definition of when a network is “under” or “over” connected. Also, the
effects of firm-specific shocks on overall welfare can be compared to the same effects under a so-
cially optimal allocation. One can thus characterize how production network over-connectivity
relates to amplification of firm-specific shocks beyond its socially optimal benchmark. Last, my
empirical analysis uses product-level data from one industry, rather than more aggregated data.
Hence, methods introduced by Berry et al. (1995) can be adapted to analyze how product dif-
ferentiation affects network formation. Obviously, my empirical results are especially relevant
to automobile production.
22. Acemoglu et al. (2012)’s main result has already been discussed. See Baqaee & Farhi (2018) for a
restatement of Hulten’s theorem, in addition to analysis of potentially large, second-order welfare consequences
of firm-specific disasters. See Grassi (2018) for understanding shock propagation through production networks,
when product differentiation exists in input and output markets. Finally, see Carvalho et al. (2014) for a purely
empirical analysis of shock propagation using economy-wide firm-level data.
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This paper also relates to the vast scholarship on the American auto industry. A literature
on the industry’s recent bailouts has recently developed23. However, none of these papers con-
cern manufacturer-supplier network effects. Another literature focuses on empirically explaining
when manufacturer-supplier relationships form. Benelli (2017), Fox (2017) and Badorf et al.
(2019) typify this approach24. However, the papers do not formalize why relationship formation
may be inefficient. Perhaps the approaches in this area most similar to mine, are theoretical
studies of manufacturer-supplier contracting, based on documented aspects of the industry. For
example, guided by international differences in auto manufacturer-supplier relationships, Helper
& Levine (1992) theorize how variation in downstream market power causes heterogeneity in
input market contracting. For another example, guided by dual-sourcing auto manufacturer
behavior, Riordan (1996) shows how contracting under incomplete information causes manu-
facturers to build relationships with multiple suppliers. In these papers, inefficiencies arise due
to relationship-specific investment hold-up and asymmetric information25. However, neither of
these papers account for the supplier sharing behavior that partially rationalized the bailout26.
Finally, a considerable amount of management research on auto suppliers also exists. Within
this literature, a debate rages as to whether relationship-specific assets exist, and explain own-
ership structure or firm performance in the industry27. An obstacle towards answering these
23. In particular, Anginer & Warburton (2010) and Baumann & Thompson (2015) analyze the auto bailout’s
effect on credit and labor markets respectively, Hortacsu et al. (2011, 2013) analyze how financial distress prior
to the bailout affected assembler sales, while Woollmann (2016) studies its effect on entry of new truck models.
24. Also, see Klier & Rubenstein (2008). Also, see Klier (1999), Buenstorf & Klepper (2009), Rosenbaum
(2013), and Adams (2015) for studies of how manufacturer-supplier interactions explain plant locations in the
auto industry.
25. In Helper & Levine, adverse selection is caused by suppliers not knowing their customers’ oligopoly rents.
Also, hold-up is present. In Riordan, moral hazard is created when manufacturers do not observe suppliers’
efforts. Also, Riordan shows how endogenous supplier effort can create upstream economies of scale.
26. See Goolsbee & Krueger (2015) for details on policymaking during the crisis.
27. For a flavor of this debate, Monteverde & Teece (1982), Mastern et al. (1989), Dyer (1996) and Head,
Reis & Spencer (2004) find evidence in favor of both claims, while Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) disagree with
considerable conviction. Also, see Choi & Hartley (1996) for further details on how auto suppliers are selected,
Ben-Shahar & White (2006) for how auto parts contracts are written, Mudambi & Helper (1998) for how
relationships are perceived by U.S. auto suppliers, and Cusumano & Takeishi (1991) for comparisons of auto
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questions is the difficulty of measuring specificity of any asset to a relationship, as Dyer (1996)
notes. This paper implicitly presumes relationship-specific assets exist. However, its primary
concern is the consequence of these assets on manufacturer-supplier network formation, rather
than vertical integration or performance. In sum, my paper departs from this literature by
focusing on the manufacturer-supplier network’s shape, and its associated inefficiencies.
2.4 Data
The primary data sources are the collection of Ward’s Auto Yearbooks for the years 1994-2016,
and the Who Supplies Whom database over 2008-2016. As discussed in Berry et al. (1995), the
Ward’s yearbooks provide the characteristics of nearly every car model sold in the US. In par-
ticular, the dimensions, horsepower, weight, miles per gallon and import status of each model
is tabulated at the back of every book, while the annual sales (the quantity sold) of the same
models are provided in a different chapter. When the models’ characteristics are matched to
their sales, one obtains an unbalanced panel of 2971 model-year pairs, over the years 1994-2016.
As discussed in Rosenbaum (2013) and Benelli (2017), the Who Supplies Whom (WSW)
database consists of auto parts contracts for selected model-supplier relationships, based on an
online survey of auto manufacturers and suppliers. In particular, for each contract, the database
provides the model’s and supplier’s name, the model’s launch year and assembly plant, and brief
descriptions of the auto part in varying levels of specificity. In addition, for a small subset of
contracts, the relationship’s start and end dates are also observed.
Matching the main WSW relationships to the Ward’s models yields a subsample of 879
model-year observations over the years 2008-2016. Each model-year observation in this sub-
sample is accompanied by its ten most important suppliers, judged by the number of contracts
supplier relationships by nationality.
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the suppliers sign with the observed model. Each observation also yields its ten most important
suppliers for auto parts in each of the five separate categories: powertrain, electrical, chassis,
exterior and interior. Finally, the launch dates and assembly locations for the subsample’s
automobiles are also observed.
This model-level dataset is augmented with annual information from multiple external
sources. This paper uses time series of average petrol prices and US auto manufacturing wages
from the Energy Information Administration and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) respec-
tively. Also used are the annual estimated number of US households, and producer price indices
for various inputs from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website. Finally, data on
US inflation was obtained from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
while mean and median household incomes were obtained from the BLS Consumer Population
Survey.
2.4.1 Data Preparation
The manner in which data were collected and transformed is now discussed in more detail. To
obtain downstream market data, the sales and remaining specifications of each model-year enu-
merated in the Ward’s yearbooks were scraped from library copies. The specifications collected
was each model’s name, year, brand, manufacturer, drive type, body style, length, breadth,
height, horsepower, weight, estimated miles per gallon (separately for city and highway travel),
whether the model was imported and the manufacturer’s suggested retail price.
This process was complicated by the presence of multiple versions of a model-year, giving
rise to multiple values for the characteristics to choose from. For example, the 2010 variant
of the Honda Civic features sedan, coupe and luxury editions, each with unique dimensions
and horsepower specifications. In line with Berry et al. (1995), I attempted using base version
specifications for each model-year. When a model’s base version was ambiguous, its cheapest
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version was used. Often, the chosen version of a model-year observation was simply the first
version listed in the relevant yearbook. As will be discussed in further detail, I also googled
the production history of many models to facilitate construction of my final dataset. When in
this process it was discovered that a given model’s base version was in error, its base version
specifications were promptly rectified.
As aforementioned, the sales and specifications data were collected from different locations
in the books and hence had to be matched. The matching was based on each model’s name. For
every model-year where sales datum was available (say the 2016 Mazda3), I located characteris-
tics data for a model-year with the same name and year (say 2016 Mazda3 sedan specifications).
On many occasions, no model-year with identical name and year could be found. For exam-
ple, specifications for the 2005 Mercedes CLS are unavailable in the 2005 yearbook. In such
situations, I googled the model’s production history to locate its actual year of launch. The
characteristics for the relevant model-year was then used, with its retail price appropriately
deflated using inflation data (So the 2006 CLS coupe specifications were paired with 2005 CLS
sales, with its 2006 price deflated to 1992 dollars). Often, the actual year in which a model-year
was released was adjacent, if not equal to the year of the yearbooks where its sales datum was
recorded. This process left only a handful of model-year observations with negligible market
shares unmatched.
After assembling an unbalanced panel of model-year observations with their downstream
market attributes, the data was transformed so that each model-year’s size (length times
breadth), volume, horsepower-to-weight and average miles per gallon (average of city and high-
way miles per gallon) were computed. OECD inflation data was also used to deflate each
model-year’s price, and the fuel price index. Each model-year’s miles per dollar was thus com-
puted from its average miles per gallon and the real fuel price for the model’s year. Finally,
models with inside market shares smaller than 0.05% were discarded. This process produces
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an unbalanced panel of 2971 model-year observations. The variables in this panel are brand,
size, volume, horsepower-to-weight (hpw/wgt), miles per dollar (MPD), price, sales and import
status.
To obtain the 2971 model-years’ remaining information, each model-year was manually
matched to model-supplier contracts in the WSW database. For a contract to be linked to
a particular model-year, it must i) share the same model name or pseudonym, ii) feature a
brand and assembly location compatible with the model-year’s brand and import status, and
iii) possess the latest launch year amongst WSW contracts satisfying i) and ii). For example,
because there were no contracts for models launched during 2015-16 with model name and
brand resembling Mazda3, the Mazda3 attributes in the 2016 Ward’s yearbook were matched
to the set of contracts whose model was listed as 3 (2014), under the brand Mazda, launched in
2014, and assembled in Salamanca, Mexico. For another example, if there was another contract
with identical brand, model name and launch year, but whose assembly plant wasn’t North
American, it would remain unpaired with the Ward’s attributes since the Mazda3 is classified
as a non-import in the 2016 yearbook.
This matching process was complicated by models often possessing multiple aliases, unlisted
in either the Ward’s or WSW data. For example, the Subaru BRZ is also called the Toyota
FT/GT 86 or the Scion FR-S, depending on the country in which the model was marketed.
Wikipedia was thus employed to verify whether distinct model names were indeed aliases. As
a result, model-years were sometimes matched to contracts with apparently different model
names. To complete the example, the 2015 Ward’s yearbook attributes of both the Subaru
BRZ and the Scion FR-S were paired with supplier information for the Toyota (GT) 86 model
launched in 2012.
After the matching process was completed, data summarizing each model’s auto parts con-
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tracts was algorithmically extracted from the WSW database. As aforementioned, each contract
in the data specifies names for a model and its supplier, along with the model’s brand, assembly
location and initial year of launch. Each contract also details the general function of the auto
part supplied (contract area), the part’s broad location in a typical automobile (contract sector
and sub sector) and an ad verbatim description of the part. Finally, a small subset of contracts
feature start and end dates.
Unfortunately, most models contain approximately 200-270 contracts in the WSW database,
with little objective distinguishing information beyond broad contract area and sector. Also,
most of the matched model-years are contracted to approximately 40-50 suppliers. Working
with all contracts would thus produce a network of model-supplier relationships too dense and
difficult to analyze. Hence, the empirical analysis that follows focuses on only the 10 most
important suppliers, as judged by contract numerosity amongst all contracts and in 5 sepa-
rately chosen contract areas. This yields up to of 60 distinct suppliers per model-year. The
contract areas chosen were powertrain, electrical & electronics, chassis, exterior and interior (as
per the WSW classification system). The areas omitted were infotainment, lighting, thermal
management, user interface and miscellaneous.
Selection on number of contracts means the chosen suppliers are likely to be large firms
benefiting from economies of scale. In addition, for each model-supplier relationship in the
analyzed sample, the number, modal area and modal sector of the relevant contracts was used
to characterize its nature. The analysis thus ignores input heterogeneity found within model-
supplier relationships beyond the broad 5 contract areas analyzed. Finally, for the subset of
relationships where this was possible, the modal start and end dates across contracts under each
relationship was also noted. The start dates for these contracts align with the model’s launch
year. Moreover, the vast majority of contracts under these relationships have identical start
and end dates. Hence, little information is lost by summarizing the relationships’ durations via
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their modal dates.
Unfortunately, a mergers and acquisitions boom amongst auto suppliers during 2010-16,
compromises the identities of multiple models’ main suppliers28 . To address this, each main
supplier’s company website and the first 10 pages from googling its name alongside the words
“merger” and “acquisition”, was manually combed. Each supplier’s history of mergers, ac-
quisitions and divestments was thus constructed. The compromised suppliers’ IDs was then
substituted with those of their acquirers or mergents, to improve data accuracy.
Merging the Ward’s and WSW data produces 1286 model-year observations, with 879 of
these observed during 2008-1629. Because the statistical analysis that follows assumes we ob-
serve close to the entire network of model-supplier relationships, its conclusions depend only
on data spanning 2008-16. Finally, demographic and input price data were also used. These
were downloaded from publicly available and more easily verifiable sources.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 tabulate the means and standard deviations of the Ward’s model-year at-
tributes in each year. (Even numbered rows display standard deviations.) In particular, size
(1000 inches2), horsepower-to-weight (hpw/1000ibs) and price (1000 92US$) are measured in a
way ensuring comparable magnitudes across all variables. The definitions of price, hpw/wgt,
and MPD (miles per 92US$) are also compatible with the those featured in Table 1 of Berry et
al. (1995).
The models exhibit substantial cross-sectional variation in prices and sales. This is consis-
28. See Foy’s (2014) Financial Times article titled “The Age of Mega Suppliers Heralds Danger for Carmakers”
at https://www.ft.com/content/50c272c4-dce9-11e3-ba13-00144feabdc0.
29. 1485 out of 2971 model-year observations have at least one supplier in the WSW database, of which 1286
of these have at least one unexpired supplier relationship. 879 of these model-years are found across 2008-2016.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics, Model Attributes over 1994-2007
# of Models Size Height Hpw/Wgt MPD Price Sales Share Import
1994 139.00 12.96 53.95 48.97 25.65 19.94 64.05 0.71 0.42
0.00 1.62 2.17 10.00 4.89 12.01 69.32 0.77 0.50
1995 135.00 13.03 54.14 50.73 25.57 20.58 63.45 0.73 0.42
0.00 1.63 2.11 9.83 4.53 11.87 68.95 0.80 0.50
1996 126.00 13.08 54.25 51.85 24.25 21.15 67.27 0.79 0.38
0.00 1.65 1.97 10.54 4.39 12.12 76.36 0.90 0.49
1997 128.00 13.05 54.35 51.97 25.21 20.57 64.25 0.78 0.40
0.00 1.54 2.01 11.45 4.64 11.31 74.50 0.90 0.49
1998 125.00 13.10 54.67 54.38 29.73 21.81 64.85 0.80 0.43
0.00 1.49 2.00 11.39 5.57 11.67 75.98 0.93 0.50
1999 128.00 13.07 55.05 54.60 27.02 21.26 67.76 0.78 0.45
0.00 1.50 2.31 11.32 4.42 11.91 73.90 0.85 0.50
2000 131.00 12.93 55.10 55.09 21.24 20.63 67.27 0.76 0.46
0.00 1.57 2.40 12.04 3.65 11.22 72.15 0.82 0.50
2001 137.00 12.98 55.09 56.65 22.65 20.95 61.35 0.73 0.52
0.00 1.42 2.14 12.38 4.79 11.28 70.45 0.84 0.50
2002 132.00 12.98 55.41 56.42 24.44 20.36 61.22 0.75 0.50
0.00 1.39 2.39 12.41 4.14 10.68 68.09 0.84 0.50
2003 127.00 13.02 55.69 57.78 21.28 21.06 59.57 0.78 0.54
0.00 1.36 2.35 13.24 3.66 11.04 70.27 0.92 0.50
2004 134.00 13.06 55.96 57.17 18.23 20.79 55.70 0.74 0.54
0.00 1.35 2.49 13.49 3.25 11.23 72.78 0.97 0.50
2005 138.00 13.07 56.26 60.74 15.14 21.64 55.33 0.72 0.54
0.00 1.45 2.50 15.72 2.68 11.96 71.20 0.93 0.50
2006 132.00 12.96 56.47 60.85 13.95 21.02 58.61 0.75 0.55
0.00 1.48 2.69 15.67 2.48 11.62 69.64 0.89 0.50
2007 127.00 13.01 56.88 61.06 13.20 20.04 59.67 0.78 0.55
0.00 1.43 3.08 16.35 2.41 11.73 74.98 0.98 0.50
tent with auto manufacturers vertically differentiating. Also, as shown in Figure 2.9’s left panel,
sales decline sharply over the GFC years (2007-09), and recover over the following years. This
trend appears driven primarily by variation in domestic output30. Finally and in comparison,
real prices (Figure 2.9, LHS, dashed) are temporally stabler, even during the GFC. Because
sales per model changes over the same timeframe, attributing such stability to long-run aver-
age cost minimization is problematic. Rather, price stickiness during the GFC suggests either
manufacturers face inelastic marginal cost curves, or that these curves shifted up during the
30. The latter includes models sold by General Motors (GM) or Chrysler, companies reportedly most affected
by the GFC (Ingrassia, 2011)
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics, Model Attributes over 2008-2016
# of Models Size Height Hpw/Wgt MPD Price Sales Share Import
2008 124.00 13.04 57.13 61.54 10.73 19.98 54.56 0.80 0.56
0.00 1.55 2.66 15.70 1.82 11.10 70.89 1.04 0.50
2009 127.00 13.02 57.31 61.20 15.41 19.61 42.69 0.78 0.58
0.00 1.58 2.59 15.63 2.64 10.92 59.30 1.09 0.50
2010 116.00 13.11 57.51 61.10 13.36 19.86 48.29 0.86 0.59
0.00 1.61 2.30 16.65 2.50 11.11 64.02 1.14 0.49
2011 122.00 13.09 57.35 62.03 11.18 20.95 49.66 0.82 0.60
0.00 1.45 2.50 15.72 2.68 11.96 71.20 0.93 0.50
2012 126.00 12.95 57.25 62.32 11.61 20.47 57.20 0.79 0.57
0.00 1.48 2.69 15.67 2.48 11.62 69.64 0.89 0.50
2013 127.00 12.95 57.24 63.23 12.70 21.24 59.31 0.78 0.60
0.00 1.43 3.08 16.35 2.41 11.73 74.98 0.98 0.50
2014 133.00 12.86 57.25 63.24 14.10 21.21 57.38 0.75 0.56
0.00 1.55 2.66 15.70 1.82 11.10 70.89 1.04 0.50
2015 126.00 12.98 57.21 63.31 19.66 21.36 59.29 0.79 0.56
0.00 1.58 2.59 15.63 2.64 10.92 59.30 1.09 0.50
2016 131.00 13.08 57.13 62.60 22.40 21.26 52.03 0.76 0.55
0.00 1.61 2.30 16.65 2.50 11.11 64.02 1.14 0.49
financial crisis. The former explanation is consistent with external economies of scale reducing
the slope of cost curves. The latter is consistent with financially distressed carmakers facing
difficulties in financing their operations, as documented by Ingrassia (2011), Hoffman (2012),
and Hortacsu et al. (2011, 2014).
The number of models appears to be falling, especially over 2006-10 (Figure 2.9, RHS).
Deliberate adjustments to the manufacturers’ product lineups in response to the GFC might be
a cause. It is difficult however, to disentangle the alleged GFC decline in this variable from or-
dinary oscillations around its trend. Also, while the set of models shrinks only slightly over the
sample’s timeframe, its composition has evolved markedly to include more imports. Because
the compositional trend predates the GFC, it likely reflects longer term changes in the economy.
Table 2.3 tabulates summary statistics for model-years over 2008-16 with at least one sup-
plier in the WSW data. In particular, Column 1 displays the number of models with WSW
information per year, while columns 2-6 summarize the models’ age from launch year, assem-
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Figure 2.9: Price, Number of Models and Sales over 1994-2016
bly location, number of suppliers and number of auto part contracts. The last three columns
describe data specific to the collection of the models’ main 10 suppliers. Columns 7-8 count
the number of distinct main suppliers and the parts sectors they inhabit. Column 9 counts the
number of contracts (in thousands) with the main suppliers.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics, Model-Supplier Attributes over 2008-16
Models Age Latitude Longitude Suppliers Contracts Main Sup. Main Sec. Main Con.
2008 90.00 2.43 41.30 -28.33 54.01 264.14 209.00 41.00 12.22
0.00 1.85 10.35 67.16 25.60 154.54 0.00 0.00 0.00
2009 95.00 2.73 40.08 -25.27 51.66 253.60 216.00 42.00 12.50
0.00 2.07 10.96 72.83 27.28 164.68 0.00 0.00 0.00
2010 86.00 2.95 39.77 -20.69 52.71 259.34 202.00 43.00 11.50
0.00 2.02 11.34 75.67 28.20 172.85 0.00 0.00 0.00
2011 94.00 2.36 40.02 -15.18 49.22 239.91 207.00 44.00 12.03
0.00 2.10 11.00 78.15 26.74 165.44 0.00 0.00 0.00
2012 102.00 2.39 39.25 -14.27 47.29 221.67 198.00 45.00 12.22
0.00 2.16 12.27 83.76 25.81 147.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
2013 103.00 2.68 38.87 -15.07 47.56 223.58 197.00 45.00 12.46
0.00 2.16 12.69 84.25 25.43 151.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
2014 107.00 2.88 37.78 -20.47 47.21 222.09 194.00 45.00 12.91
0.00 2.20 14.47 80.71 25.62 152.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
2015 100.00 2.86 37.35 -22.08 43.67 199.12 185.00 44.00 11.11
0.00 2.33 14.36 81.55 23.98 137.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
2016 102.00 3.22 37.41 -20.12 41.71 191.92 179.00 44.00 11.19
0.00 2.41 14.47 81.61 23.15 132.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
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When plotted on the LHS of Figure 2.10, one finds the number of models with WSW data
to be growing (and oscillating) in tandem with its Ward’s yearbooks counterpart, over 2008-16.
These numbers probably reflect recovery in auto industry conditions after the GFC. However,
the number of distinct main suppliers falls over the same timeframe. Moreover, as Figure 2.10’s
right panel shows, the decline in suppliers relative to models holds regardless of auto part
contract type (powertrain/electrical/etc.). When paired with the post-GFC recovery in auto-
mobile sales, these trends controvert theories positing higher input market profits and entry
from higher output demand. As discussed in Section 2.2, I suspect Baqaee’s (2018) model of
cascading failures to be such a theory.
The trends however, are consistent with press accounts suggesting post-GFC consolidation
in carmaker supplier networks31. These accounts are further supported by Column 5 of Table
2.3. The column reveals a significant drop in the average number of (main and minor) suppliers
per model. This decline suggests Figure 2.10 is representative of the overall supplier population,
rather than merely the subset of main suppliers. Column 6 provides a final piece of evidence
that tips the scales further away from Baqaee’s theory. This shows a decline in the average
number of contracts per model. Hence, auto input variety as measured by contract multiplicity
decreased while demand for inputs presumably rose, over 2008-16. This is inconsistent with
theories relying on “love-of-variety” models of input demand to capture imperfect competition,
such as Baqaee’s.
Now, a declining survey response rate is potentially responsible for the aforementioned
trends. In support of this view, Column 2 shows model-years ageing. It is unclear whether
this is due to fewer responses to the WSW survey. Figure 2.11’s LHS assesses this viewpoint.
31. See “Global Industry craves Mega Suppliers” in the June 17th, 2013 issue of Automotive
News by David Sedgwick at https://www.autonews.com/assets/PDF/CA89220617.PDF. Also see Foy’s
(2014) Financial Times article titled “The Age of Mega Suppliers Heralds Danger for Carmakers” at
https://www.ft.com/content/50c272c4-dce9-11e3-ba13-00144feabdc0.
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Figure 2.10: Number of 2008-16 Models (with Supply Network Data) & Suppliers
It does so by plotting the fraction of main Ward’s model-supplier relationships with available
WSW datum, assuming each Ward’s model has at least 10 suppliers. The dashed line shows the
fraction of main relationships covered by the WSW data when contract end dates are ignored.
The red line shows the analogous fraction once expired links are deleted. Both lines trend up.
Hence, equating the Ward’s models with the population of US marketed models suggests the
survey response rate is increasing rather than deteriorating. Since a WSW survey participant
has little reason to hide part of its contracts with a counterparty while reporting agreement on
another, survey response rates aren’t likely causing contract numerosity to fall in Column 6 too.
The dashed lines in Figure 2.11’s RHS replicate the fraction of main relationships covered by
the (unexpired) data, but for differing contract types. Similar to before, each model is assumed
to possess at least 10 suppliers for each contract category. Under this caveat, coverage appears
to have declined across all but one category. It follows the falling number of non-powertrain
suppliers shown on Figure 2.10’s right, are potentially explained by declining WSW survey
responses. Unfortunately, a model is more likely to have fewer than 10 suppliers of a given
category, than 10 suppliers in total. Hence, it is unclear if declining survey responses or other,
possibly technological factors are responsible for Figure 2.10’s trends.
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Figure 2.11: Fraction of Main Relationships Covered by Supply Network Data
In addition to survey response rates concerns, there is also the consideration of survey par-
ticipants evolving over time. The aging of models in Column 2 has already been discussed.
Columns 3-4 further reveal models being assembled in more southern and eastern locations
over 2008-16. Obviously, this feature of the data is consistent with both the unstructured
nature of the WSW survey, and more fundamental forces shifting assembly plant locations.
The latter explanation is consistent with the rising number of imported models in the (pur-
portedly) more reliable Ward’s data. Moreover, when the plant coordinates are superimposed
on a world map in Figure 2.12, we see plants persistently located in similar areas across time.
From this perspective, the evolution of survey respondents according to plant locations is slight.
Table 2.4 displays summary statistics for supplier sharing by model-years through their main
10 suppliers amongst all auto part types. Columns 1-2 summarize the proportion of suppliers
and contracts covered by the main suppliers. The remaining columns summarize the number
of competing models contracting with another model’s main supplier, in the same year.
Whilst making up only 27-39% of all suppliers, the main suppliers’ contracts account for 60-
67% of all sampled contracts. Moreover, although main suppliers and contracts fell in number
over 2008-16 (Columns 7 and 9, Table 2.3), their shares of all sampled suppliers and contracts
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Figure 2.12: Assembly Plant Locations of 2008-16 Models (with Supply Network Data)
rose (Columns 1 and 2, Table 2.4). Hence, main suppliers appear to have grown in importance
to the industry. Main suppliers and contracts also seem to comprise growing fractions of all
Ward’s models’ suppliers and contracts. This is driven by the rising shares in columns 1 and
2 of Table 2.4, and the rising number of model-years with WSW data (Column 1, Table 2.3).
Figure 2.13 illustrates this. The red line on its LHS plots the fraction of Ward’s models matched
to unexpired supplier data. The dashed lines plot the shares in columns 1 and 2, multiplied
by the red line’s height. The dashed lines’ slopes thus suggest main suppliers and contracts
increasingly represent all suppliers and contracts.
When focused on specific contract categories, one finds main contracts in each category com-
prise more of their population of sampled and unsampled contracts. More specifically, Figure
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics, Main Supplier Sharing over 2008-16
Sup.% Con.% S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10
2008 0.27 0.59 21.93 24.74 16.48 19.17 11.92 10.86 9.14 9.83 12.25 9.80
0.24 0.16 16.06 17.13 15.82 16.49 13.26 12.54 10.39 11.07 14.01 12.35
2009 0.30 0.61 24.11 24.55 15.30 18.41 11.62 10.60 9.82 10.26 12.05 9.51
0.26 0.18 17.35 17.16 15.09 16.31 13.09 11.80 10.77 11.37 13.00 12.90
2010 0.30 0.61 20.83 21.99 12.79 14.76 9.59 10.61 8.41 8.23 9.26 8.00
0.26 0.18 16.04 15.25 13.15 14.00 11.32 10.76 9.21 8.65 10.84 9.99
2011 0.32 0.63 22.89 19.57 15.89 12.95 12.17 9.67 9.33 11.12 10.06 9.21
0.27 0.18 18.39 16.18 15.73 12.92 12.00 10.41 10.27 10.88 12.04 10.58
2012 0.34 0.64 23.29 18.80 16.43 13.34 14.12 11.31 10.48 12.27 10.48 10.34
0.30 0.19 18.30 15.82 15.26 13.51 13.87 11.16 9.91 12.53 11.53 10.86
2013 0.34 0.64 23.00 18.47 16.54 13.50 15.17 12.61 11.55 13.20 10.46 11.09
0.29 0.18 17.15 15.36 14.29 12.83 14.38 12.14 10.70 12.74 11.59 10.72
2014 0.34 0.64 20.64 17.78 16.57 13.27 15.64 12.88 11.45 13.27 10.31 11.16
0.30 0.19 16.67 14.33 14.16 12.09 13.81 12.13 10.31 12.61 10.33 11.09
2015 0.38 0.66 21.09 18.43 15.66 15.78 16.59 12.47 11.22 14.54 10.47 12.51
0.32 0.19 17.74 15.75 14.44 15.06 14.56 13.45 10.74 14.60 11.67 13.13
2016 0.39 0.67 22.63 19.27 16.23 15.82 16.89 14.57 11.93 15.44 11.29 12.77
0.32 0.19 17.62 16.33 14.20 13.33 15.46 14.65 11.05 15.00 12.88 14.42
2.13’s RHS displays the bold line from its LHS, and counterparts to the taller dashed line for
specific contract areas. The RHS dashed lines are clearly higher than their LHS counterpart.
Hence, main contracts represent more of all contracts in each category, compared to when all
categories were combined. Figure 2.13’s dashed lines are also uniformly rising. Hence, the share
of main contracts amongst all contracts per category has increased. In sum, even as the num-
ber of distinct main suppliers declined, their importance vis-a-vis rival suppliers - even those
missing from the data - appears to have grown. This partially justifies the paper’s focus on
main model-supplier relationships. It also eases concerns over declining survey responses raised
earlier.
The main suppliers’ distorted importance to the industry also manifests in the cross-sectional
distribution of models and market shares to suppliers. Figure 2.14’s LHS plots the frequency
of individual suppliers appearing as main suppliers over 2008-16. Clearly, the returns in terms
of customer popularity from superiority over rival suppliers are concentrated at the top. The
figure’s RHS shows the same is true when returns are measured in terms of output.
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Figure 2.13: Fraction of Main Suppliers & Contracts over 2008-16 Models (with Supply Data)
Figure 2.14: Distribution of 2008-16 Models & Output across Suppliers
Differences in input types sold by main suppliers are not solely responsible for these asym-
metries. (See Figure 2.22 and accompanying explanation in the appendix for details.) Rather,
the unusually high returns for top suppliers appears linked to the frequency of new models
sharing suppliers with older rival models. Figure 2.15’s LHS shows suppliers inheriting more
customers from previous periods typically attract more entrant models. This suggests either
economies of scale influence input production, or suppliers are vertically differentiated. Figure
2.15’s right panel illustrates a weaker, but still positive relationship between the output sup-
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pliers sell to old and new customers. Since both variables are simultaneously chosen by firms,
an additional consideration here is new model-supplier relationships expanding entrant model
market share, at the older models’ expense.
Figure 2.15: New Customers vs Old Customers & Output over 2008-16 Suppliers
Figures 2.16 and 2.17 investigate supplier sharing from more general viewpoints. In these
plots, supplier sharing is measured by the average number of rivals using a model’s main sup-
plier. Figure 2.16’s LHS depicts how supplier sharing is typically higher for models assembled
closer to their rivals’ locations. This correlation supports viewing these location choices as
relationship-specific investments, as suggested in Section 2.2. As explained by Rosenbaum
(2013), models are built closer to their suppliers’ plants to conserve transportation costs. This
in turn facilitates manufacturer-supplier transactions. To clarify whether the plotted relation-
ship is confounded by extraneous effects of other location related variables, the panel also
classifies the plotted observations by import status. Conditional on distance to rival location, a
model’s import status has a small, positive effect on supplier sharing. However, the relationship
between supplier sharing and distance to rival plants remains negative regardless of whether
models are imported.
Figure 2.16’s RHS illustrates a positive relationship between the number of new suppliers
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chosen, and supplier sharing by entrant models. Under Section 2.2’s simple model, a manufac-
turer switching its supplier automatically shares its rival’s supplier. Hence, whilst loose, the
supplier switching and sharing relationship on Figure 2.16’s right supports Section 2.2’s frame-
work. To better understand what causes supplier switching, Figure 2.16’s RHS also categorizes
model observations by brand nationality. As discussed in Section 2.2, the simple model’s asym-
metric treatment of firms was partly motivated by documented cross-nationality differences in
supplier selection practices32. These differences indicate Japanese automakers prefer working
with fewer suppliers vis-a-vis US manufacturers. Such differences also appear in Figure 2.16’s
right panel. New Japanese models plotted in red typically retain more and share less suppliers,
compared to their blue American counterparts.
Figure 2.16: Supplier Sharing, Distance to Rival Models & Supplier Switching over 2008-16
In contrast to Section 2.2’s assumption regarding economies of scale, Figure 2.17 illustrates
supplier sharing correlating negatively with output (LHS), and positively with prices (RHS).
Obviously, models with lower output but higher prices possibly appeal only to niche consumers.
Hence, the simple model suggests such products may share more suppliers due to greater prod-
32. See p. 148 and p. 160 of Womack et al. (1990), or p. 565, and tables 9 and 11 of Cusumano & Takeishi
(1991) as discussed in footnote 6. Also see tables 1, 4, 6 and 7 of Cusumano & Takeishi (as first mentioned in
footnote 7).
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uct differentiation. Moreover, once the models’ nationalities are conditioned upon, the colored
lines of Figure 2.17 feature slopes with opposite signs to their black counterparts. These signs
are consistent with input production economies of scale. In sum, these panels emphasize a need
to isolate exogenous variation in output and prices - such as the GFC induced drop in sales -
to truly understand their relationship with supplier sharing.
Figure 2.17: Supplier Sharing vs Output & Price over 2008-16
The evolution of supplier sharing over time is summarized by columns 3-9 of Table 2.4.
As aforementioned, their odd-numbered rows cross-sectionally average the number of rivals a
model shares suppliers with, through each of its main suppliers. (So each 2008 model on average
shares its most important supplier with 21.93 own and rival firm models.) These statistics thus
gauge the average level of supplier sharing across years. These statistics can also be multiplied
by the total number of models with supply data (Column 1, Table 2.3), to obtain the total
number of models sharing a rival’s main supplier. (So there are approximately 855 models
in 2008 connected by two model-supplier links to a rival via the latter’s 10th main supplier).
These totals thus measure the total amount of supplier sharing occurring in each period.
Both measures of supplier sharing are plotted in Figure 2.18, with the total measure on
the LHS. Total supplier sharing oscillates but trends up, tracking the post-GFC recovery in
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sales. This is anticipated - as manufacturers become more profitable, Proposition 2.2.4 predicts
more supplier sharing. In contrast, when averaged over the number of models (with supply
data) operating per period, supplier sharing increases less markedly. This too, is unsurprising.
Corollary 2.9.3 predict a non-monotone relationship between this measure of supplier sharing
and the downstream market’s state. Intuitively, better market conditions allows models to
profitably operate without exploiting upstream market economies of scale.
Two additional features emerge from either panel of Figure 2.18. First, supplier sharing
increases as model-supplier relationships become more important. This is possibly due to rela-
tionship importance being measured by the number of contracts embodied within the sampled
relationships. Hence, higher relationship importance indicate wider supplier proficiency across
differing tasks, attracting more customers to the supplier. Second, average supplier sharing
trends less markedly for more important relationships. There are two possible explanations.
First, highly important suppliers can fulfill too many contracts, and operate past their most
efficient scales. These suppliers thus experience diseconomies of scale. Second, “high contract”
firm-to-firm relationships may reflect more complicated notions of inputs between firms. Since
such inputs are likely more differentiated, economies of scale are less applicable to their pro-
duction.
Finally, one should note the aforementioned trends still hold when the data is broken down
by assembly location, or when the data is disaggregated, and one focuses on powertrain, chassis
and exterior supplier sharing. The details behind these statements are in the appendix.
2.5 Identification
Let {pt,qt, gt,Ft,xt,wt, et, at}t≤T represent the data. For period t ≤ T ,
- gt graphs the collection of model-supplier production links, and defines the set of operating
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Figure 2.18: Supplier Sharing by Relationship Importance over 2008-16
models Mt and suppliers St,
- Ft partitions models in Mt by manufacturer producership,
- qt and pt correspond to quantities and prices across models in Mt,
- wt and xt contain cost and taste influencing attributes for models in Mt,
- et contains supplier-specific covariates,
- at conveys period-specific (or annual) information such as mean and median household in-
come.
Let Nt = Mt −Mt−1 denote the entrant models in period t. These are referred to as new
models, while their older counterparts are called old models. Also, for an arbitrary network g,
let s(m, g) denotes model m’s suppliers, and m(s, g) equal supplier s’s model-customers under
the network.
The rest of this paper aims to quantify inefficiencies analyzed in Section 2.2 in the auto
industry. This is done by estimating distortions to the firms’ relationship-forming incentives
caused by the inefficiencies. Doing so requires organizing data according to a micro-founded
model. When data on input prices are available, one can infer how input production marginal
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cost varies with output, through explicitly modeling input price determination. This helps
quantify economies of scale in input production, in addition to relationship-forming incentives.
Unfortunately, no publicly available dataset of input prices paid by each automaker exists.
Instead, auto part suppliers are chosen via idiosyncratic procurement auctions or customs. This
impedes inferring assembly and input costs for three reasons. First, the relationship between
each model manufacturer’s costs to each supplier’s quoted price is unknown, absent precise
knowledge on the manufacturer’s procurement customs. Hence, even if manufacturing marginal
costs are identified from downstream market data, upstream prices remain unknown. Second,
each supplier solves a complex optimization problem when quoting its price to a manufacturer.
Hence, even if the quoted prices are observed and stem from a known auction format, recovering
the suppliers’ costs from such prices is challenging. Last, each supplier’s optimal price likely
depends on its competitors’ attributes, in addition to its own. This invalidates using competing
product attributes as “BLP instruments” for quantities when tracing out supplier marginal
costs from input prices.
The aforementioned difficulties are circumvented by considering a feature of the network
data in the context of Section 2.2’s simpler model. In the data, automobile models are typically
linked to identical suppliers over successive periods after their launch date. This presumably re-
flects long-term contracts signed by manufacturers and suppliers during the model’s launch year.
I assume input prices for models in periods after their launch, are determined by Nash-in-Nash
bargaining between the models’ manufacturers and suppliers. To the extent that manufac-
turers are contractually prevented from replacing their older incumbent models’ suppliers, the
assumption is valid.
Under the above assumption, the slopes of assembly and input marginal costs are identified.
Estimating these cost functions allows measurement of economies of scale. The estimates also
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help quantify the firms’ relationship-forming incentives. As noted in Section 2.1, the true benefit
anticipated by a firm from forming new relationships is unidentified. However, proxies for these
benefits - the average increase in profit when the production network is altered, after firms have
already committed to prices and bids - are estimable. This allows even-handed empirical as-
sessment of whether manufacturer-supplier relationship formation suffers from overinvestment
or third party hold-up, inefficiencies highlighted by the simpler model.
Subsection 2.5.1 describes an empirical model of how firms form relationships with each
other in the auto industry. The model does not generalize its simpler counterpart in three
aspects:
i) Whilst input prices are determined after output prices are set, the former can depend on
bids submitted before downstream market prices are determined.
ii) Manufacturers never pull products from the market before Nash bargaining occurs and after
output prices are determined.
iii) Manufacturers pull their entire product line when failing to agree with any supplier during
Nash bargaining.
Subsection 2.5.1 also provides reasons for these departures. Subsection 2.9.4 in the appendix
states higher level assumptions needed to identify inefficiencies affecting relationship-formation
in the empirical model. Finally, Subsection 2.5.2 outlines how such inefficiencies are empirically
quantified.
2.5.1 Microfounded Emprical Model
Players: S denotes a set of suppliers. The suppliers produce inputs for assembling automobile
models,M. M is partitioned by F , a producership structure for various model manufacturers.
The models are also partitioned into new models N , and older incumbent models launched in
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previous periods. Finally, a unit continuum of households are single unit consumers of auto-
mobiles.
Sequence of Play: Firms start each period with a network of model-supplier relationships
inherited from the previous period, go. Let Mo denote go’s models. Players know go, Mo and
Mo’s producership structure, in addition to S, M, N and F .
The following sequence of play is then observed:
1. Nature draws a shock ωms to the cost of assembling inputs from each supplier s ∈ S into
each model m ∈M. Nature also determines a taste shock ξm to each model.
If denotes information disclosed to manufacturer f . Likewise, Is denotes supplier s’s in-
formation. These information sets across F ∪ S imply ξ, and ωms when s supplies m’s
manufacturer under go, are public information.
2. New models in N are matched to suppliers from S. This process reflects unmodeled choices
by manufacturers and suppliers to invest in relationships with each other33. These rela-
tionships, coupled with the older models’ past relationships in go, determines the current
relationship network gr.
3. Each supplier s ∈ S submits a bid bms to each new model m linked to it under the relationship
network. The bid indicates its desired price for inputs needed to assemble an output unit.
WLOG, let bms =∞ when m 6∈ N or (m, s) /∈ gr.
Because the bids are uncontingent on output levels chosen by manufacturers, input pricing is
necessarily linear. This may appear unnatural. However, Novak & Kilbanoff (2003) provide
some evidence of auto interior part prices being determined by piece rate bidding.
4. Each manufacturer f ∈ F announces a price pm > 0 for each of its models m ∈ f .
33. See Section 2.2’s description for examples of relationship-specific assets reflected by these relationships.
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Notice the order in which bids and prices are determined is reversed in comparison to the
simpler model. While unfortunate, this apparent contradiction is not necessarily important.
The new model’s sequence of play ensures prices remain optimal, even when all private
information is made public at the game’s end. Manufacturers thus never regret, as under
the simpler model’s solution concept.
Manufacturer f also chooses suppliers sm ⊆ S for each model m ∈ f .
i) When model m 6∈ N is old, it inherits its previous production network suppliers: sm =
s(m, go).
ii) When m ∈ N , its suppliers are chosen from its relationship network suppliers: sm ⊆
s(m, gr).
The collective supplier choices s determines the period’s production network, g.
In contrast to the simple model, products are never removed from the market. This is
because the new sequence of play ensures manufacturers correctly anticipate costs when
setting prices. It is thus implicitly assumed that models inM are sufficiently price inelastic
at high prices, allowing continual own price increments without demand vanishing.
5. Consumers choose models to consume while manufacturers pay suppliers for inputs.
i) Each consumer i ∈ [0, 1] purchases a model at its announced price, or consumes an outside
option, ci ∈M∪ {Outside Option}.
ii) Each manufacturer f ∈ F pays tms to supplier s for inputs needed to make each model
m ∈ f .
– Suppose m 6∈ N is an old model. Then s(m, g) = s(m, go) = s(m, gr), and m inherits
all of its past suppliers under the old production network go. Hence, when (m, s) lies
in the current network g, tms is determined by Nash (-in-Nash) bargaining between f
and s. If otherwise, assume tms = 0 WLOG.
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– Suppose m ∈ N is newly launched. Then s(m, g) ⊆ s(m, gr), and tms’s determina-
tion depends on whether supplier s and model m’s manufacturer f have previously
collaborated:
a) s is paid according to an exogenous payment rule tms = qmκ
ms(bm, g, g
r), when s
is completely new to f : (n, s) /∈ go for all n ∈ f o. The rule serves as a primitive
catering towards model-specific procurement customs.
Example 2.5.1. [First-Price Procurement Auction] Suppose model m ∈ N requires
new suppliers for R different inputs. For each input r ≤ R, let a(r, gr) denote the
suppliers in s(m, gr) capable of producing it. Then when
κms(bm, g, g
r) = {s ∈ s(m, g)}bms, s(m, g) = ∪r∈Rargmink∈a(r,gr)bkm,
the model’s suppliers are chosen and paid via first-price auctions.
More generally, tms can be non-zero even when (m, s) /∈ g. This could occur if m’s
suppliers were determined by all-pay auctions instead.
b) s Nash bargains with f if s previously supplied f : ∃n ∈ f o satisfying (n, s) ∈ go.
This is consistent with the existence of an equilibrium in the simpler model featuring
supplier sharing whenever a new manufacturer-supplier relationship is formed34.
Payoffs: Each consumer i ∈ [0, 1] obtains uim in utility from consuming model m ∈ M,
and 0 from not consuming. These utilities are drawn from a conditional cdf Fui|p,x,ξ,yi . Here,
x ∈ RM×X denotes observable model attributes, ξ ∈ RM are the Stage 1 taste shocks, and yi
is i’s type.
Example 2.5.2. [Random Coefficient Logit Utility] For each consumer i ∈ [0, 1] and model
34. If there exists another model n ∈ Mo also produced by f and supplied by s, then one can also show the





uim = β0 + xmβi −
α
yi
pm + ξm + εim
where εim is distributed type 1 Gumbel, βi is normally distributed with mean βx and variance
diag(σ2x), and yi is i’s income.
Assume the consumers’ types are independent of (p,x, ξ), and distributed according to Fy.
The implied distribution of utilities yields demand






for each model m ∈M when consumers maximize utility.











SCf is its cost effectively sunk by Stage 3. This cost potentially reflect entry barriers, but also
include relationship-forming expenses incurred in Stage 1. The cost of assembling inputs into q
units of output is cm(q). Assume cm(qm) = c(qm,wm), where wm ∈ RW denotes model-specific
covariates. Obviously, this is WLOG since wm can include model-specific dummies.
Example 2.5.3. [Quadratic Output Assembly] Suppose for each model m ∈M,
cm(q) = cm0 + c
m





where cm0 = c0, c
m
1 = γwwm, and c
m
2 = γq. Hence cross-model heterogeneity in fixed costs are
sunk by Stage 3. Moreover, assembly costs exhibit either economies or diseconomies of scale.
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(tms − ωmsqm)− Cs(Qs)− SCs.
SCs equals the sunk cost for supplier s in Stage 2. As before, these costs also reflect investments
in relationships allowing suppliers to acquire new customers. The cost of making inputs for Q
amount of output is Cs(Q). This equals Cs(Q, es) for supplier-specific covariates es ∈ RE.
Example 2.5.4. [Cubic Input Production] Suppose for each supplier s ∈ S,







Suppliers thus operate homogeneous technology. They also face economies or diseconomies of
scale, depending on their quantities.
Finally, suppliers also bear the match-specific cost shocks ωs. Notice however, when supplier
s knows ωs in Stage 2 and new suppliers are chosen via typical auctions, s can compensate for
higher ωs by bargaining or bidding higher input prices.
Strategies: Fix the relationship network gr, along with the information publicly disclosed
in Stage 1. The sequence of play yields well defined strategies for each player in the (improper)
subgame that follows. Each supplier s submits a vector of bids contingent on its private type:
bs(Is) = (bms(Is))m∈M ∈ R
M×supp(Is),
satisfying bms(Is) =∞ if m 6∈ N or (m, s) 6∈ gr. Given bids b and information If , manufacturer
f chooses prices





sf (b, If ) = (sm(b, If ))m∈f ⊆ s(m, g
r)|f |×(m,s)∈M×SR×supp(If )
for its models, satisfying sm(b, If ) = s(m, gr) when m 6∈ N . Finally, each consumer i chooses
not to consume or a model to purchase:
ci(p,b, s) ∈M∪ {Outside Option}.
Assume these decisions depend only on payoff relevant variables. Hence, write c(p,b, s) = c(p).
In what follows, let σ|go,gr,I denote the profile of these truncated strategies.
Nash Bargaining: The strategies σ|go,gr,I enumerated above pins down the surplus created
when a manufacturer and supplier combine to produce output for a model. Hence, the Nash

















t− ωmsqm + ∑
n∈f−m






for each model-supplier pair (m, s) ∈ f ×S that “bargain” according to the sequence of play35.
Observe manufacturer f enjoys equal bargaining power τf across each supplier. (2.11) also im-
plies f shuts down and removes all its models from the market if negotiations with a supplier
break down. Finally, f is excused from paying input prices for the deleted models’ remaining
suppliers.
35. Observe this problem admits multiple solutions, although it does pins down the total amount f pays s,∑
n∈f tns, for manufacturer-supplier pairs (f, s) that Nash bargain under the sequence of play
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The latter assumption arguably reflects renegotiation when products are removed. The for-
mer however, is slightly more controversial, since manufacturer f is unforced by technology to
discard models unsupplied by s, when negotiations with s fail36. One potential justification
recognizes the frequency of any two models m,n sharing a supplier, when assembled by the
same firm. Another recognizes models m and n can be complements absent further restrictions
on Fui|p,x,ξ,yi
37. Finally, altering a manufacturer’s product line at this stage may also inflict
severe disruption costs38. These links between manufacturer f ’s models, suggests f might delay
selling all its models until it can agree with each supplier in a future period.
Solution Concept: The strategies σ|go,gr,I , together with some system of beliefs, comprise
a WPBE from Stage 2 onwards. Given its private type Is, each supplier s submits bs(Is) to
maximize Eπs|Is in response to b−s(I−s), p(.,b−s(I−s),IF), s(.,b−s(I−s),IF)|Is’s distribu-
tion. For each manufacturer f , its profit is known up to its own actions, given b,p−f , s−f , and
the publicly known cost shocks ωms. So f chooses pf (b(IS), Ipublic) and sf (b(IS), Ipublic) in
response to maximize πf .
2.5.2 Identification Strategy
Let s(m) abbreviate model m’s suppliers s(m, g), when g is the equilibrium production network.
Let nb(f, g, go) denote the suppliers manufacturer f Nash bargains with under the sequence of
play, when the current and past production networks equal g and go respectively. These sup-
pliers are abbreviated by nb(f), when it is understood (g, go) lie on the equilibrium path. Let
Qsf =
∑
m∈m(s,g)∩f qm and Qs−f = Qs −Qsf denote the quantities supplier s sells to manufac-
turer f and f ’s rivals respectively. Finally, let κms = κ
ms(bm, g, g
r) for any model-supplier pair
36. Although a brief perusal of the Ford and General Motors websites shows these companies house firmwide
procurement divisions, providing circumstantial evidence for firm-level bargaining over input prices.
37. My belief is Compiani (2017) points this out.
38. This would be captured in the model by incorporating alterations to f ’s product lineup as a variable in
wm
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(m, s) denote the “auction payment” made by m’s manufacturer to s, under the payment rule
κms.
To assess how product differentiation affects automobile demand, one typically estimates
demand elasticities implied by the model’s demand schedules q(p,x, ξ). Berry & Haile (2015)
discuss conditions under which these functions are non-parametrically identified. Assessing how
economies of scale affects input production requires knowing how supplier marginal costs vary
with production levels. Traditionally, the manufacturers’ first-order conditions are manipulated
to recover their marginal costs from downstream demand. However, retrieving information on
the suppliers’ costs from the manufacturers’ marginal costs is complicated.




qf + pf =




















39The above equality’s LHS equals f ’s marginal revenues. It is identified from downstream data.
Ideally, one also identifies cmqq and C
S
QQ from variation in own model and supplier quantities,
qm,Qs(m). However, these quantities are endogenous and correlate with the unobserved residuals
ωf ,κf . Typically, rival product attributes (w−f ,x−f ) are used as “BLP instruments”. Unfortu-
nately, these instruments are invalid for two reasons. First, the residuals κf represent payments
made by manufacturer f to new suppliers. These payments thus depend on bids submitted by
suppliers informed of rival model attributes. Second, the residuals ωf comprise of cost shocks for
suppliers chosen in response to the same information. For these reasons, the BLP IVs are likely















However, when one focuses on the subset of incumbent model-years, a different picture


















Because these models exogenously inherit their previous period’s suppliers, their input prices are







The residual thus comprises of supplier-specific cost shocks for predetermined suppliers. Hence,
BLP IVs are valid instruments for the endogenous variables in (2.12): own-model quantities
qm, relevant supplier quantities Q(sm)∪nb(f), quantities sold by relevant suppliers to m’s manu-




When cm and Cs satisfy examples 2.5.3 and 2.5.4, average variable costs






















Example 2.5.5. [Quadratic and Cubic Costs Revisited] Suppose examples 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 hold.
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Then for each incumbent model m ∈M−N , its marginal revenue equals



























Thus, γ, c1, c2 and c3 are identified when the RHS random variables are non-collinear.
However, even absent parametric restrictions, the curvatures of assembly costs for each
model cmqq and those of their suppliers c
s
QQ, are identified under conditions (See appendix for
details). These identification results serve the paper’s aims in two ways. First, they capture
how economies of scale affects input production and model assembly costs. Second, they help
quantify inefficiencies in firm-to-firm relationship formation, spotlighted by the simpler model.
The rest of this subsection explains how the latter is done.
Let N o denote the set of new models in N with previous edition suppliers from go. Consider
a manufacturer f of such a model m ∈ N o. Its expected benefit from forming m’s chosen
relationships in Stage 2, holding the remaining relationships fixed is
E[πf |If , gr]− E[πf |If , gr−m + gom]. (2.14)
Observe the RHS term is f ’s expected profit when m’s related suppliers are only its past
suppliers in go, rather than also containing suppliers chosen by f . Likewise, for each supplier s
of m, one can similarly define its expected benefit from forming a relationship to m:
E[πs|Is, gr]− E[πs|Is, gr−m + gom]. (2.15)
Understanding how the model’s parameters affect the returns in (2.14) and (2.15) are of interest.
These comparative statics clarify how the returns are distorted by inefficiencies. Unfortunately,
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the incomplete description of the model in Subsection 2.5.1 leaves information sets If and Is
unspecified. Moreover, the relationship network gr and its counterfactual gr−m + g
o
m are unob-
served in the data. Finally, the profits also depend on residuals κ and ω, whose distribution
under the counterfactual network gr−m + g
o
m does not equal its distribution given g
r. In partic-
ular, when manufacturers choose suppliers via procurement auctions, altering the relationship
network causes suppliers to bid differently, changing the values of κ. For these reasons, (2.14)
and (2.15) are unidentified.
Hence, instead of the expected relationship-forming benefits in (2.14) and (2.15), the re-
mainder of this section analyses the change in profits when a model’s suppliers are altered,
after equilibrium prices and quantities are determined. Let
∆πaf,m = πf − πf |g−m+gom (2.16)
equal manufacturer f ’s Stage 4 payoff from replacing model m’s past production network sup-
pliers with their equilibrium ones, holding the rest of the network g−m fixed at equilibrium
values. In contrast to (2.14), (2.16) ignores variation in equilibrium quantities q or auction
payments to new suppliers κ, caused by the relationship network changing when m’s suppliers
are replaced.
(2.16) admits a decomposition capturing how downstream oligopoly rents inefficiently en-








τ f (g)− τ f (g−m + gom, go)
]
πnbf
←−−−− overinvestment incentive −−−−→





+ SC(qm,wm,Qs(m), es(m))− SC(qm,wm,Qs(mo,go) + {s 6∈ s(m)}qm, es(mo,go))













The first term on (2.17)’s RHS captures manufacturer f ’s incentive to inefficiently overinvest
in relationships. As in the simpler model, f pits suppliers against each other when awarding
procurement contracts, by forming relationships to new suppliers. This reduces the number of
suppliers f bilaterally bargains with. Thus, fewer suppliers extract f ’s oligopoly rent during















in the first term, is simply the profit f shares with its bargaining counterparties. The following
term contains
πms = κmsqm − Cs(Qs) + Cs(Qs − qm)− ωmsqm,
the immediate increase in supplier s’s profit from supplying model m. When m’s suppliers are
chosen via auctions, πms is also interpretable as s’s information rent. Such rents discourage f
from investing in relationships, unless f is compensated by its co-investors as in the simpler
model. Finally, the remaining terms sum to the societal cost of altering m’s suppliers, holding
the rest of the production network g−m and quantities q fixed. This arises from m relying on
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different suppliers with different cost structures and market shares. It should be noted
SC(qm,wm,Qs(m), es(m)) = c(qm,wm)− c(0,wm) +
∑
s∈s(m)
[C(Qs, es)− C(Qs − qm, es)]
here, is the cost to society from producing and assembling inputs into model m’s output.
Under formal assumptions stated in the appendix, both the ex-post relationship-forming
benefit, and its distortion due to oligopoly rents causing overinvestment in relationships, are
identified up to the manufacturers’ bargaining parameters and mean zero cost shocks.
Proposition 2.5.1. Suppose assumptions 2.9.1 to 2.9.9 hold. Let m ∈ N o ∩ f . The change
in manufacturer f ’s profit from replacing model m’s old suppliers s(mo, go) with its equilibrium
ones s(m), combined with m’s residual production costs under s(mo, go)
∆πaf,m + τ







is degenerate given the data D, and identified on D’s support up to τf ∈ (0, 1). The distortion
of the above due to f bilaterally bargaining with fewer suppliers when s(mo, go) is replaced by
s(m) [
τ f (g)− τ f (g−m + gom, go)
]
πnbf ,
is also degenerate given D, and identified on D’s support up to τf ∈ (0, 1).
These results help quantify inefficient overinvestment in relationships. Let Fπ,f,m|N o denote




set of new models with previous editions N o. Also, let F∆π,f,m|N o equal the distribution of
∆πaf,m
qm
- manufacturer f ’s per output ex-post relationship-forming benefit - conditional on N o.
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is estimable from the data. The extent to which the manufacturers’ relationship-forming in-
centives are distorted by overinvestment associated inefficiencies is thus quantifiable, in this
manner.
Next, consider supplier s’s ex-post benefit when model m’s production network suppliers
are altered from s(mo, go) to s(m, g)
∆πas,m = πs − πs|g−m+gom , (2.20)
holding prices and the rest of the network fixed at equilibrium values. When s is a new supplier
114









hs(Qs − qm, Qsl, qm)







hk(Qk − qm, Qkl, qm)








←increase in cost of supplying l by k→
.
(2.21)
The first term πms is the rent paid to s by m’s manufacturer. While this rent reduces the
manufacturer’s incentive to form a relationship, it enlarges s’s incentive. The second term
equals the reduction in input prices negotiated by s with other manufacturers l 6= f , due to
economies of scale in input production. Here, nb(s) = {l ∈ F : s ∈ nb(l)} consists of customers
such as l that bargain with s. Also, τ ls(g) = 1−τ
l(g)
|nb(l,g)| is s’s share of the surplus split between l
and l’s suppliers under such bargaining. Finally,
hs(Qs, Qsl, qm) = C
s(Qs)− Cs(Qs −Qsl)− Cs(Qs + qm) + Cs(Qs + qm −Qsl)
is the reduction in s’s cost of producing Qsl additional units, when it supplies model m in
addition to l. As the following paragraph will explain, absent shape restrictions on Cs(Q),
the second term distorts s’s relationship-forming incentive in either direction. The remaining
terms consists of changes in s’s revenues, resulting from its customers negotiating differing in-
put prices with rival suppliers k 6= s when the production network is altered. These terms also
distort s’s incentive in either direction.
Now, the second term in (2.21) captures the hold-up inefficiency illustrated by the simpler
model, but in a more general way. Observe if Cs(Q) is concave, hs(Qs − qm, Qsl, qm) is non-
negative, and reduces s’s incentive to form a new relationship with m. Third-party firms like
l thus hold up relationship formation. However, when Cs(Q) is convex, hs(Qs − qm, Qsl, qm)
is non-positive and encourages s to form new relationships. The hold-up force then acts in
115
reverse. It would thus be desirable to identify ∆πas,m and the second term in its decomposition
separately. Unfortunately, no result analogous to Proposition 2.5.1 for ∆πas,m exists. Hence,
no ratio analogous to (2.19) is usable for quantifying this hold-up inefficiency. However, under
plausible restrictions, an upper bound for such a ratio is estimable. This statement’s basis is
the following result.
Proposition 2.5.2. Suppose assumptions 2.9.1 to 2.9.9 hold. Let m ∈ N o ∩ f . The change in
combined profits for model m’s new suppliers s(m) − nb(f) from replacing m’s old production







is degenerate given the data D, and identified on D’s support up to τ ∈ (0, 1)F . The distortion
of the above due to supplier s ∈ s(m)−nb(f) bilaterally negotiating a different input price with






hs(Qs − qm, Qsl, qm),
is also degenerate given D, and identified on D’s support up to τl ∈ (0, 1).






, across all new models m with predecessors, in similar fashion
to (2.18). Let F∆π,S denote this distribution. Likewise, one can also construct the distri-






hs(Qs− qm, Qsl, qm), across the same set of models. Let Fh denote
this distribution. Finally, one can also define the distribution of the residual marginal costs
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hs(Qs − qm, Qsl, qm)

as T →∞. Observe each term on the LHS is effectively identified by Proposition 2.5.2.





is unlikely to equal zero. However, when manufacturers
choose suppliers via procurement auctions, it is reasonable to assume their auctions are won by
atypically efficient producers. Likewise, when manufacturers and suppliers form relationships, it
















an upper bound exists for the proportion of the suppliers’ relationship-forming incentives dis-





























































equal probability limits of terms identified by Proposition 2.5.2.
2.6 Estimation Results
Consumer utility in the estimated model is given by Example 2.5.2. Consumer types have a
log-normal distribution, calibrated according to U.S. household income, hht
40. Assembly and
input production costs satisfy examples 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 respectively. Finally, manufacturers
enjoy identical bargaining power across all suppliers, so that τf = τ for all f ∈ F .
Estimation is summarized by the following steps.
1. Recover the taste coefficients (β,σx, α) by implementing BLP on the entire sample of down-
stream data (p,q,x,hh). This requires instrumenting prices p by BLP IVs zdm satisfying
Eεm|zdm = 0. Notice the random and price coefficients (σx, α) allow diversion ratios between











to be constructed for the subsample of model-years with available supplier data.
40. More specifically, the mean and median household income in each year was used to calibrate Fy.
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2. Estimate the cost function parameters γ, c by regressing






























3. Use previous estimates to construct empirical analogues of (2.19) and (2.22) across new
models with predecessors ∪tN ot .
In practice, the estimation procedure introduced by Berry et al. (1995) allows steps 1 and 2 to
be completed simultaneously. Optimally-weighted GMM can thus be applied on the moments
0 = E[ξmzdm] = E[ωmzcm|m ∈M−N ],
to estimate β, σx, γ, and c
42.
Now, standard errors must be adjusted to account for i) the fewer number of incumbent
model-year observations used to construct the cost residual moments above, and ii) the depen-
dence of the regressors in Step 2 on the price and random coefficients α,σx
43. The estimates to
41. Observe s(m) ⊆ nb(f) when m is an incumbent model.
42. The precise optimization algorithm used was based on Chris Conlon’s MATLAB BLP code found at
https://github.com/chrisconlon. In the absence of commercial KNITRO software, this in turn depends on
Matlab’s built in function minimizer ‘fmincon’.
43. The former was accomplished by assuming the ratio λ of the number of incumbent model year observations
nc =
∑
m,t{m ∈ Mt −Nt} to the total number of observations n is held constant as n, nc → ∞, and deriving















where θ = (β,σ,γ, c) (See Lynch & Wachter (2013) formulae (3) and (7)). This asymptotic variance can
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be presented reflect these adjustments. In principle, the standard errors should also be adjusted
to account for simulation error involved in approximating each period’s random coefficient and
income distribution with a finite number of draws {βi,t, yi,t}i≤ns. In particular, consumer het-
erogeneity is approximated with 23 × 1000 period-consumer types in the estimated model44.
The estimates presented do not account for this error.
2.6.1 Parameter Estimates
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 display the taste and cost coefficient estimates respectively. Column 1 of both
tables present estimates when the network data is formed from the models’ main 10 suppliers
over all input types. While utility is insignificantly falling in hpw/wgt, the remaining coeffi-
cients have anticipated signs. Demand for automobiles is significantly increasing in size, while
significantly decreasing in price and during the GFC (2007-2009). Marginal costs are signifi-
cantly higher for more voluminous or powerful vehicles, or for models produced during the GFC.
Models produced further (great-circle) distances from Detroit are significantly more costly
to build. This is consistent with shipping costs affecting imported model production. Assembly
costs are also (significantly) rising in proximity to Bavaria or Nagoya, the remaining auto man-
ufacturing clusters in the data. This is inconsistent with location-specific externalities arising
from knowledge spillovers. Finally, while the marginal cost of assembling automobiles signifi-
cantly rises in own-model quantities, the suppliers’ marginal costs are u-shaped. Moreover, each
input production cost coefficient is significant. Economies of scale thus affect input production
at low quantities, but not their assembly into automobiles.
The remaining columns tabulate the estimates when the network data stem from the mod-
then be plugged into the usual GMM formula to derive the desired standard errors. The latter adjustment is




44. Naive Monte Carlo integration was used to simulate market shares for given parameters θ.
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els’ main suppliers, per input type. In principle, since the downstream market associated with
each input type is unchanged, the taste coefficients should equal those in the first column45.
In practice, cross input type differences in the network data fed into the estimating model’s
supply-side imply differing taste coefficient estimates. The slightness of the differences in Table
2.5’s columns is hence reassuring.
Aside from a handful of coefficients, the estimates for the exogenous cost coefficients have
similar signs and significance to their Column 1 counterparts too. The differences in estimates
lie mainly in the supplier cost function estimates. While chassis, exterior and interior suppliers
exhibit u-shaped marginal cost curves, the shapes for the remaining suppliers’ cost curves
are inverted. Powertrain and electrical suppliers experience falling marginal costs - and thus
economies of scale - only at high output levels. A cause for concern is also ĉ1’s sign under the
powertrain and electrical data. These estimates imply significantly negative marginal costs at
low production levels. More sophisticated parameterizations of input production costs might
resolve this issue.
2.6.2 Demand Elasticities & Average Variable Costs
To quantify product differentiation in the downstream market, average price elasticities were
computed across separate timeframes. Table 2.7 displays these own and cross price elasticities
in odd and even numbered rows respectively. Absent product differentiation, manufacturers’
demand schedules are stepwise in price, implying zero variable manufacturing profit. The esti-
mates in Table 2.7 imply manufacturers enjoy significant market power, that increases over time.
To understand how Table 2.6’s estimates translate into economies of scale, Table 2.8 displays
the mean derivatives of average variable input production costs across all operating suppliers46.
45. Hence, one could estimate the estimating model described above jointly for all five separate input cate-
gories, and restrict their taste coefficients to equal each other.
46. See (2.13) for their formulae. Units adjusted so that the derivatives measure the effect of 1000 vehicles
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Table 2.5: BLP Taste Coefficient Estimates
Combined Power Electric Chassis Exterior Interior
Constant -11.232 -11.268 -11.008 -11.348 -11.165 -11.224
β0 0.329 0.290 0.323 0.275 0.269 0.257
Size 0.355 0.359 0.307 0.353 0.347 0.346
βsize 0.016 0.017 0.066 0.039 0.044 0.029
Hpw/Wgt -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.000
βhpw 0.010 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.002
MPD 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.044 0.042 0.041
βMPD 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.004
GFC -0.080 -0.112 -0.086 -0.046 0.009 -0.085
βGFC 0.059 0.064 0.060 0.080 0.070 0.060
Price -4.985 -5.364 -4.890 -5.048 -5.324 -4.899
−α 0.678 0.685 0.605 0.601 0.609 0.586
Size 0.000 0.004 0.069 0.020 0.036 0.025
σsize 0.064 0.052 0.050 0.084 0.058 0.042
Hpw/Wgt 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.000
σhpw 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.014
MPD 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.000
σMPD 0.040 0.040 0.033 0.043 0.039 0.039
n 2971.000 2971.000 2971.000 2971.000 2971.000 2971.000
nc 704.000 678.000 685.000 685.000 675.000 688.000
ns 1000.000 1000.000 1000.000 1000.000 1000.000 1000.000
σ
(0)
size × Size 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
σ
(0)
hpw ×Hpw/Wgt 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
σ
(0)
MPD ×MPD 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
α(0) × p 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
Objectivea b 0.763 0.669 0.714 0.679 0.689 0.731
a. nc denotes the number of model-years used to construct the conditional moments E[ωmzcm|m ∈M−N ]
b. ns denotes number of simulations
Standard errors are provided in even numbered rows. On average, main suppliers for the
combined category experience significant economies of scale, during and after the GFC. The
same is true when the data is disaggregated to encompass only chassis or exterior suppliers.
However, powertrain and electrical suppliers on average, experience significant diseconomies of
scale, ignoring fixed costs. Finally, the units in which costs and quantities are measured in
imply economies of scale are slight, even if statistically significant. For example, producing
an additional 1000 vehicles imply a decline of 0.018US$ in average variable costs, across main
on 1US$.
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Table 2.6: BLP Cost Coefficient Estimates
Combined Power Electric Chassis Exterior Interior
Constant -1.697 -1.675 -1.864 -1.728 -1.475 -1.781
γ0 0.142 0.126 0.162 0.138 0.120 0.130
Volume 1.193 1.440 1.429 1.358 1.262 1.305
γvol 0.121 0.111 0.146 0.129 0.125 0.119
Hpw/Wgt 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.014
γhpw 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
US 0.197 0.054 0.285 0.290 0.106 0.106
γUS 0.040 0.033 0.052 0.051 0.039 0.039
EU 0.366 0.300 0.521 0.499 0.336 0.303
γEU 0.038 0.037 0.058 0.054 0.042 0.042
Japan 0.078 0.084 0.102 0.166 0.075 0.088
γJpn 0.028 0.024 0.033 0.032 0.025 0.029
Detroit 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003
γDet 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Bavaria -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
γBav 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nagoya -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
γNgy 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
GFC 0.103 0.056 0.147 0.192 0.125 0.125
γGFC 0.030 0.036 0.027 0.033 0.023 0.023
Qty 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
γq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Supply Qty 0.026 -0.034 -0.038 0.006 -0.007 0.013
c1 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007
Supply Qty2 -0.040 0.059 0.024 -0.084 -0.034 -0.013
c2 0.015 0.013 0.020 0.023 0.018 0.020
Supply Qty3 0.009 -0.015 -0.003 0.035 0.015 0.003
c3 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.009
n 2971.000 2971.000 2971.000 2971.000 2971.000 2971.000
nc 704.000 678.000 685.000 685.000 675.000 688.000
ns 1000.000 1000.000 1000.000 1000.000 1000.000 1000.000
σ
(0)
size × Size 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
σ
(0)
hpw ×Hpw/Wgt 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
σ
(0)
MPD ×MPD 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
α(0) × p 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
Objectivea b c 0.763 0.669 0.714 0.679 0.689 0.731
a. nc denotes the number of model-years used to construct the conditional moments E[ωmzcm|m ∈M−N ]
b. ns denotes number of simulations
c. Supplier quantities and supplier quantities squared measured in 1K and 1mil units repsectively.
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suppliers for the combined category.
Obviously, when fixed input production costs are present, Table 2.8’s numbers underestimate
the slopes of average costs. However, these numbers can be compared to the slope of average
variable cost for assembling vehicles. The latter are given by dividing γ̂q in Table 2.6 by 2.
Observe γ̂q is negative only for the powertrain data, and by an insignificant magnitude. The
estimate is significantly positive when combined, electrical or chassis supplier data is used in
estimation. Hence, there is little evidence of economies of scale in automobile assembly activity,
ignoring fixed costs. In comparison, economies of scale affect upstream producers rather than
downstream manufacturers.
Table 2.7: Own & Cross-Price Demand Elasticities
Combined Power Electric Chassis Exterior Interior
Pre-GFC -1.510 -1.534 -1.513 -1.506 -1.555 -1.501
1994-2006 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
GFC -1.392 -1.403 -1.435 -1.414 -1.492 -1.382
2007-09 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Post-GFC -1.378 -1.434 -1.409 -1.374 -1.455 -1.364
2010-16 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
All -1.454 -1.487 -1.471 -1.454 -1.516 -1.444
1994-2016 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Table 2.8: Average Variable Input Production Cost Slopes
Combined Power Electric Chassis Exterior Interior
GFC -0.019 0.027 0.012 -0.037 -0.014 -0.006
2008-09 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009
Post-GFC -0.018 0.026 0.012 -0.034 -0.013 -0.006
2010-16 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008
All -0.018 0.026 0.012 -0.035 -0.014 -0.006
2008-16 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008
2.6.3 Overinvestment & Hold-up in Relationships
Table 2.9 displays the portion of the manufacturers’ benefits from forming relationships, la-
beled as overinvestment in (2.17). (Returns measured in millions of 92US$, standard errors
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located in even-numbered rows.) Recall when manufacturers form new relationships, old and
new suppliers are pitted against each other, protecting the manufacturers’ oligopoly rents. The
manufacturers’ relationship-forming incentives are thus enlarged. This distortion is identified
up to the manufacturers’ common bargaining power, τ . Hence, Table 2.9’s rows display the
distortion implied by various values of τ .
Observe this distortion differs significantly from zero, across input categories and bargain-
ing powers. Moreover, higher manufacturer bargaining power implies greater overinvestment
inducing incentive distortions. Finally, the overinvestment distortions are unambiguously large
for high values of τ . In particular, when τ = 0.9, the overinvestment inefficiency increases an
average manufacturer’s incentive to form relationships with suppliers of combined inputs by
US$95 million.
Table 2.10 displays the portion of the suppliers’ relationship-forming benefits, labeled as
hold-up in (2.21). Recall when suppliers acquire new model customers, they experience economies
or diseconomies of scale. This allows competing customers to negotiate lower or higher input
prices with them, respectively. As with the overinvestment distortion, hold-up in supplier rela-
tionship investment is identified up to the manufacturers’ bargaining parameter.
Observe hold-up is significantly positive only for powertrain suppliers. In contrast, hold-up
is significantly negative for chassis and exterior suppliers. The latter is due to chassis and exte-
rior suppliers possessing convex, asymptotically upwards sloping marginal cost curves. Hence
whilst these suppliers experience economies of scale at the margin according to Table 2.8, their
average costs increase significantly from supplying entire quantities of new models in equilib-
rium. Also, the hold-up distortions are amplified when manufacturers enjoy greater bargaining
power. Intuitively, when their bargaining power is higher, manufacturers extract greater shares
of the benefits (costs) from their suppliers experiencing (dis)economies of scale by supplying
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rival manufacturers. This discourages (encourages) suppliers from forming new relationships
when experiencing (dis)economies of scale.
However, when directly compared to overinvestment, hold-up of relationship investment ap-
pears a smaller source of inefficiency. Table 2.11 divides the values in Table 2.9 by those in
Table 2.10. For nearly all non-powertrain entries, this ratio exceeds one or is negative. Hence
for non-powertrain suppliers, hold-up of relationship investment is either smaller than overin-
vestment in relationships, or acts in reverse to encourage relationship formation. Moreover,
across all input categories, the importance of overinvestment in outside option relationships as
an inefficiency grows as the manufacturers’ bargaining power rises. Intuitively, this is connected
to the slightness of the input production cost curvatures displayed in Table 2.8, compared to
the departures of the demand elasticities in Table 2.7 from infinity.
Now, the ratios in Table 2.11 feature selection bias in that they apply only to model-supplier
relationships actually formed in the data. These equilibrium relationships are likely excessively
affected by overinvestment, while experiencing smaller or negative hold-up, compared to un-
formed relationships. Hence, that the ratios in Table 2.11 are small or negative is unsurprising.
To measure inefficient overinvestment in model-supplier relationships, Table 2.12 tabulates
(2.19) instead. This ratio measures the proportion of average manufacturers’ ex-post benefit
from forming relationships for their new models, per unit of output, attributable as causing
overinvestment. When positive, the ratio exceeds one across nearly all input types and val-
ues for τ . Hence, unless suppliers compensate their co-investing manufacturers when forming
new relationships, the average model-supplier relationship in the sample would not be formed
without overinvestment inducing distortions. Instead, on average, manufacturers would prefer
retaining their models’ past suppliers when new model editions are launched. From this view-
point, overinvestment is an important driver of model-supplier relationship formation.
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Likewise, to evaluate the importance of hold-up in affecting model-supplier relationships, Ta-
ble 2.13 tabulates (2.22). Observe these share the same signs as their numerators in Table 2.10.






in (2.22) is positive. Thus, as explained in Subsection 2.5.2, Table 2.10’s numbers’ magnitudes
are upper bounds for the proportion of the suppliers’ relationship-forming benefits, per unit of
output, distorted by third-party manufacturer hold-up. Across all values of τ , this upper bound
is smaller than 1. The ratios also do not differ significantly from zero. From this viewpoint,
hold-up is a smaller source of inefficiency compared to overinvestment.
In sum, estimates of the firms’ relationship-forming incentives suggest too many model-
supplier relationships are formed. Yet Section 2.2’s comparative statics imply the frequency
of relationship investment increases in willingness-to-pay for downstream output (Proposition
2.2.3). Hence, when viewed alongside theoretical results, the estimates suggest subsidies that
increase automobile demand only serve to push model-supplier relationship formation towards
more inefficient levels.
Table 2.9: Overinvestment Incentive Distortion
τ Combined Power Electric Chassis Exterior Interior
0.100 5.667 5.873 6.906 2.728 3.628 2.725
0.000 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.006 0.009 0.006
0.250 8.969 9.696 12.779 8.013 8.683 7.939
0.000 0.030 0.029 0.033 0.017 0.018 0.017
0.500 18.614 21.061 29.061 22.620 22.695 22.032
0.000 0.055 0.051 0.066 0.049 0.046 0.047
0.750 44.207 50.439 66.327 57.624 55.951 54.788
0.000 0.122 0.113 0.147 0.127 0.113 0.119
0.900 95.017 103.294 121.369 117.099 110.822 109.069
0.000 0.255 0.227 0.274 0.261 0.231 0.244
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Table 2.10: Hold-Up Incentive Distortion
τ Combined Power Electric Chassis Exterior Interior
0.100 6.589 27.472 -10.253 -23.206 -21.419 2.068
0.000 4.486 8.556 6.518 10.388 7.101 6.552
0.250 6.590 27.488 -10.260 -23.226 -21.437 2.069
0.000 4.487 8.561 6.524 10.395 7.107 6.556
0.500 6.595 27.533 -10.278 -23.283 -21.487 2.072
0.000 4.491 8.574 6.541 10.417 7.124 6.569
0.750 6.609 27.652 -10.325 -23.417 -21.604 2.078
0.000 4.500 8.609 6.581 10.469 7.164 6.597
0.900 6.639 27.900 -10.415 -23.663 -21.816 2.090
0.000 4.522 8.681 6.656 10.567 7.236 6.650
Table 2.11: Overinvestment to Hold Up Ratio
τ Combined Power Electric Chassis Exterior Interior
0.100 0.860 0.214 -0.674 -0.118 -0.169 1.318
0.000 0.571 0.065 0.432 0.054 0.057 4.186
0.250 1.361 0.353 -1.246 -0.345 -0.405 3.840
0.000 0.905 0.107 0.799 0.159 0.137 12.205
0.500 2.825 0.767 -2.834 -0.975 -1.060 10.655
0.000 1.880 0.234 1.820 0.449 0.360 33.931
0.750 6.710 1.836 -6.469 -2.483 -2.612 26.497
0.000 4.477 0.564 4.179 1.149 0.892 84.734
0.900 14.421 3.760 -11.838 -5.046 -5.174 52.748
0.000 9.668 1.165 7.734 2.355 1.786 170.016
Table 2.12: Overinvestment to Manufacturer Benefit Ratio
τ Combined Power Electric Chassis Exterior Interior
0.100 4.688 1.896 4.146 -0.756 -1.270 -0.561
0.000 3.408 0.364 2.147 0.236 0.398 0.175
0.250 2.807 1.835 2.366 19.025 74.727 -7.337
0.000 0.995 0.314 0.548 61.296 772.354 12.402
0.500 1.960 1.727 1.722 1.978 2.372 2.465
0.000 0.371 0.241 0.221 0.349 0.475 0.744
0.750 1.666 1.670 1.542 1.559 1.768 1.761
0.000 0.221 0.203 0.152 0.159 0.205 0.278
0.900 1.654 1.786 1.613 1.552 1.774 1.748
0.000 0.218 0.248 0.179 0.156 0.210 0.269
2.7 Conclusion
This paper studies how downstream market product differentiation and upstream economies
of scale affect manufacturer-supplier relationship formation. The question is motivated by the
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Table 2.13: Upper Bounds for Hold-Up to Supplier Benefit Ratio
τ Combined Power Electric Chassis Exterior Interior
0.100 0.015 0.107 -0.031 -0.075 -0.070 0.006
0.000 0.056 0.041 0.040 0.042 0.030 0.048
0.250 0.015 0.107 -0.031 -0.075 -0.070 0.006
0.000 0.056 0.042 0.040 0.043 0.030 0.048
0.500 0.015 0.108 -0.031 -0.075 -0.070 0.006
0.000 0.056 0.042 0.040 0.043 0.030 0.048
0.750 0.015 0.109 -0.031 -0.075 -0.070 0.006
0.000 0.056 0.043 0.040 0.043 0.030 0.048
0.900 0.015 0.112 -0.031 -0.075 -0.071 0.006
0.000 0.056 0.045 0.040 0.043 0.030 0.048
2008 bailouts of General Motors and Chrysler. Based on surveys of the US automobile industry,
I construct and analyze a simple model of manufacturer-supplier relationship formation. The
model captures how product differentiation and economies of scale cause inefficient relationship
formation in two different ways. These inefficiencies are overinvestment in relationships in ser-
vice of protecting downstream manufacturers’ rents, and hold-up of relationship investment by
neigbor manufacturers due to upstream economies of scale. The model also implies shocks to
individual firms have disproportionately smaller welfare consequences vis-a-vis ex-ante market
shares when the network is ex-ante inefficiently over connected, as opposed to being too sparse.
Finally, the model is qualitatively consistent with supplier sharing patterns exhibited by US
marketed automobile producers over 2008-16.
To quantify the effects of the aforementioned inefficiencies on auto manufacturer-supplier re-
lationships, I also estimate a micro-founded model of manufacturer-supplier network formation
from product-supplier network data for 2008-16 US automobile varieties. The empirical model
incorporates the theoretical model’s key features. The estimates imply downstream oligopoly
rents substantially enlarge relationship-forming benefits for auto manufacturers ex-post, likely
contributing to overinvestment in relationships. In contrast, hold-up of relationship investment
by neighbor manufacturers is less significant in affecting incentives. Moreover, for certain suppli-
ers, the hold-up distortion even acts in reverse to reinforce overinvestment in relationships, due
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to input marginal cost nonlinearities. These estimates in conjunction with the simpler model’s
results, should give pause when considering arguments for bailing out future automakers, based




Proof of Proposition 1.2.3. Assume the model under the null and alternative hypotheses is









a quantity independent of s, a.s. Assume the model under the null is given by (1.7), while the
model under the alternate is given by (1.1). Under the null, expected difference in outcomes
caused by changes in xj for zero interaction individuals for any distinct pair of peer groups
s, s,′≤ S
E[y|x, s]− E[y|x, s′] = E[y|s]− E[y|s′].
Proof of Proposition 1.2.4. Replace m(E[y|s],x) by mg(s,x) in Proposition 1.2.1. Proceed as
in the proof of that proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1.2.5. Let w ≡ (c,d) ≡ (x, s) ∈ supp(x, s), where c and d are the con-










































Let f(di) denote the probability mass of di for each i ≤ I. (This doesn’t depend on i since
observations are i.i.d.) Since (c,d) ∈ supp(ci,di), so equivalently, c ∈ supp(ci|di = d) and
d ∈ supp(di). The proposition is proved in parts.
Sub Claim: â(w) L2−→ a(w) as Ib
c →∞, bc → 0.
Proof. The sub claim is true if Ea(w)→ a(w) and Vâ(w)→ 0. I need to show shrinking bias

























































































as Ibc →∞ and bc → 0, via DCT, Assumption 1.2.7 and 1.2.6.
Sub Claim: b̂(w) L2−→ b(w) as Ib
c →∞, bc → 0.



















































as Ibc →∞, b→ 0 via DCT, Assumption 1.2.7 and 1.2.6.
Sub Claim: l̂(w) is consistent for l(w).
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Proof. Since w ∈ supp(x, s), b(w) = f(c,d) 6= 0. Mean square convergence implies convergence










yf(y|c,d)dy = E[y|x, s]
as Ibc →∞ and bc → 0.
Sub Claim: µ̂(s) is consistent for µ(s).
Proof. By assumptions 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.4 and 1.2.11,
yi = m(E[y|s = si],x−ji ) + εi = εi ⇒ E[y|0, s] = E[ε|0, s] = µ(s).










){di = (0, s)}
p
−→ E[y|0, s]
as Ibc → ∞ and b → 0. But this follows from the 1st subclaim, since (0, s) = (x, s) ∈
supp(xi, si) by assumptions 1.2.2, 1.2.4 and 1.2.11, and recognizing f(c,d) > 0⇒ f(d) > 0⇒
f(s) > 0.
Applying Slutsky one more time:
ĥ(x, s) = l̂(x, s)− µ̂(s) p−→ E[y|x, s]− µ(s) = m(E[y|s],x)
as Ibc →∞ and b→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.2.6. The proof is done in several steps. First, define l(x, s) ≡ h(x, s) +
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{di = d}ηi, E[η|c,d] = 0,
where ηi ≡ yi − l(xi, si). From the definitions, it follows,















































{di = d}. Fix (c,d) = (x, s) ∈ supp(x, s). The
proof adapts Hansen’s notes on assymptotic normality of Nadaraya-Watson estimation.













{di = (0, s)}ηi
 d−→ N (0,Σ);
Σ ≡
 RKσ2(x, s)f(x, s) {x = 0}RKσ2(0, s)f(0, s)
{x = 0}RKσ2(0, s)f(0, s) RKf(0, s)
 .























0, α2(RKσ2f)(x, s) + β2(RKσ2fs)(0, s)− 2αβ{x = 0}(RKσ2f)(0, s)
)
as Ibc → ∞, bc → 0, and recognizing the above is distribution of αz1 + βz2, where z ∼
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N (0,Σ).

















3. Recognize that we then have
√
Ibc
 (l̂ − l)(x, s)− b2B(x, s)
(µ̂− µ)(x, s)− b2B(0, s)
 = √Ibc
(l̂ − l)(x, s)− b2B(x, s)







N (0,Σ) + 0
as Ibc →∞, bc → 0.
4. Recognize
√
Ibc(ĥ − h)(x, s) =
√
Ibc(l̂ − l)(x, s) −
√














{di = (0, s)}ηi
 d−→ N (0,Σ) as Ibc →∞ and bc → 0.














 ∼ N (0,Σ).









∼ αz1 + βz2. First, observe
{αg1bi + βg2bi}i≤I produces an independently distributed triangular array as (I, b) → (∞, 0).





E[αg1bi + βg2bi]2 = αE[g1bi]2 + βE[g2bi]2 + 2αβE[g1big2bi]. (2.23)
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K (u)2 σ2(c + bu,d)f(c + bu,d)du
→
∫
K (u)2 duσ2(c,d)f(c,d) = RKσ2(c,d)f(c,d)
as b→ 0. Examing the second term in (2.23),
E[g2bi]2 → RKσ2(0, s)f(0, s).
Examining the final term of (2.23), we see that there are two cases to consider. In the first



































K (u)K (∞) {c 6= 0}σ2(c,0, s)f(c,0, s)du
+RKσ2(c,0, s)f(c,0, s){c = 0} = RKσ2(0, s)f(0, s){c = 0}.
via DCT, 1.2.7 and 1.2.6. In the second case, (where {di = d}{di = (0, s)} = 0⇔ d 6= (0, s)),





E[αg1bi+βg2bi]2 → α2RKσ2(x, s)f(x, s)+β2RKσ2(0, s)f(0, s)+2αβRKσ2(0, s)f(0, s){x = 0}.





∣∣∣2+δ → ∞ as Ibc → ∞ and
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∣∣∣∣2+δ = IE [( 1√I














































where A and B have been appropriately defined. Observe,
A =
∫ ∫ ∣∣∣ α
bc/2
∣∣∣2+δ ∣∣∣∣K (ci − cb



































K(u)2+δE[η2+δi |c,d]f(c,d)du = 0
as Ibc →∞, b→ 0 using DCT and assumptions 1.2.8 to 1.2.10. Also observe,
B =
∫ ∫ ∣∣∣∣ βbc/2































K(u)2+δE[η2+δi |0, s]f(0, s)du = 0






0 as Ibc → ∞ and b → 0. Since all conditions for Lyapunov holds, so by Cramer-Wald, claim
also holds.

















as Ibc →∞ and b→ 0.


























































































{di = d} (l(xi, si)− l(x, s))
]
= 0 + b2B(x, s) +O(b3).
But since Bias2(O(b3)) = O(b9), so MSE(
√












































































































{di = d} (l(xi, si)− l(x, s))
]
= O(b2)→ 0



















as Ibc →∞ and b→ 0.






Proof. By Assumption 1.2.10, 1.2.8 and the standard argument provided in my Econometrics
III lecture notes, the claim holds.
Sub Claim: There exists a function k(x, s) such that
√
Ibc
 (l̂ − l)(x, s)− b2k(x, s)






as Ibc →∞, bc → 0.
Proof. Since (x, s), (0, s) ∈ supp(x, s), f(0, s), f(x, s) > 0. Let k(x, s) = B(x,s)
f(x,s)
and likewise for












 (l̂ − l)(x, s)− b2k(x, s)



















{di = (0, s)}ηi/f̂(0, s)
 .




































which proves the sub claim.
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 Rkσ2(x, s)f(x, s) {x = 0}RKσ2(x, s)f(0, s)














is the (assymptotic) variance-covariance matrix of
√
Ibc
l̂(x, s)− l(x, s) + b2k(x, s)











































as Ibc →∞ and b→ 0.
Because B(x, s) and B(0, s) are integrals of the remainder of a Taylor series expansion of
C2 functions, so by FTC, these are C3. Define c(x, s) appropriately so that the proposition
holds.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2. Fix θ and θ′ as the two distinct parameters. Assume m, µ and θ
represent the true model parameters. Condition i) ensures the pre-images of Lθ partition the
support of it’s arguments in a way that exactly aligns with the pre-images of each map Lθ′ .
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Define m′ : RK+1 → R by


















; r = L (e;θ′)
= m (L(e;θ),x) ,
for all (e,x) ∈ R2l+1+K . It follows the model
yi,t = m
′ (L (ys,t−l≤r<t,E [yt+l≥r≥t|yrs,xr−1s , s] ,θ′) ,xi,t)+ εi,t
where s = si, is observationally equivalent to the original model.
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2.9 Appendix II
Proofs of results employ extra notation. In keeping with convention, Γ(a), Γ(a,p) and Γ(a,p,b)
denotes the subgames initiated by investments equaling a, output prices p, and bids b. For
clarity, I also use ci(s,p) in place of σi(s,p) (as in the main text) to denote consumer i’s de-
cision, when the manufacturers’ supplier-or-quit choices and prices are given by (s,p). Hence,
c(s,p) denotes the family of consumption choices {ci(s,p) : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1}. Last, for brevity, the
manufacturers’ Stage 5 choices, “Operate” and “Shut Down” are abbreviated by Op and SD.
Also, certain actions are termed incentive compatible in the proofs. Incentive compatibility
acquires subtly different meanings in differing contexts. In this paper, a player’s action is incen-
tive compatible iff no profitable alternative action exist. So for example, ci(s,p) = 1 is IC (in
Γ(a,p,b, s)) only if consumer i cannot increase his payoff by shopping from a different manufac-
turer or consuming the outside option. More colloquially, demand functions (qm(s−m,p))m≤2
are termed as “incentive compatible” only if consumption rules c(s,p) used to define them via
(2.2) are likewise IC.
Finally let ∆C(q,Q) ≡ C(q+Q)−C(Q)
q
be the marginal cost of going from Q to Q + q output
units of input. Notice ∆C(q,Q) < AC(q) by strict concavity of C(Q).
2.9.1 Proofs for Results under Assumption 2.2.1
In what follows, ∗ is used to distinguish equilibrium variable values from ordinary values. So
equilibrium prices notated by p in the main text are denoted by p∗ in the proofs. Similarly,
equilibrium path quantities q(p∗) = q(s(p∗,b(p∗)),p∗) when prices equal p∗ are denoted by
q∗.
The following lemmas apply when a 6= (1, 1) (when the relationship network is disconnected).
Lemma 2.9.1. Suppose Assumption 2.2.1 holds. When v > AC(1), both manufacturers’ output
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prices are
p1 = p2 = AC(1)
while their market share satisfy
q ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}
in the Nash equilibria of the subgame initiated by a when a 6= I in Stage 2.
Proof of Lemma 2.9.1. This is proved via a sequence of sub claims.
Claim: v ≥ p∗m for at least one m ≤ 2.
Proof. Assume otherwise. Neither manufacturer attracts customers in equilibrium (So q∗ = 0.).
So neither would make a profit. Either manufacturer m ≤ 2 can strictly increase its payoff by
v − AC(1) > 0
by defecting to p∗m = v.
Claim: p∗ >> AC(1)(1, 1) implies p∗1 = p
∗
2.
Proof. Without loss of generality (WLOG), assume p∗1 > p
∗
2 > AC(1). Then the previous claim
implies v ≥ p∗2. Then manufacturer 1 can strictly increase its payoff by
β1(p
∗
2 − AC(1)− ε) > 0
by defecting to a new price p1 = p
∗
2 − ε for ε > 0 sufficiently small.
Claim: p∗ ≥ AC(1)(1, 1) implies p∗m = AC(1) for some m ≤ 2.
Proof. Observe if p∗ >> AC(1)(1, 1), then v ≥ p∗1 = p∗2 by prior sub claims. But then each
manufacturer m can strictly increase its payoff by
βm(p
∗ − AC(1)− ε) > 0
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by defecting to pm = p
∗ − ε (where p∗ obviously notates the common value of p∗), for ε > 0
sufficiently small. So we must have that p∗m = AC(1) for some m ≤ 2.
Claim: p∗ ≥ AC(1)(1, 1) implies p∗m = AC(1) for both m ≤ 2.
Proof. By prior claims, one can assume p∗1 ∧ v ≥ p∗2 = AC(1) WLOG. Observe p1 > p2 implies
manufacturer 2 can strictly improve profits by
β2(p
∗
1 ∧ v − p∗2 − ε) > 0
by increasing its price by that same amount, for ε sufficiently small.
Notice that p1 = p2 = AC(1), q
∗ ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)} is clearly an NE outcome - neither manu-
facturer has a profitable deviation, and consumers are indifferent between either manufacturer
when prices are equal. I proceed to show that it is the only NE in Γ(a).
Claim: p∗1 = p
∗
2 = AC(1) implies q
∗ ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}.
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then there exists some manufacturer m ≤ 2 such that
qm ∈ (0, 1)⇒ p∗m < AC(qm)⇒ πMm = βm(p∗m − AC(qm)) < 0.
Manufacturer m can strictly improve its payoff by increasing pm so that it effectively shuts
down.
Claim: p∗1 = p
∗
2 = AC(1) is the unique NE in Γ(a).
Proof. From a previous claim,
p∗ ≥ AC(1)(1, 1)⇒ p∗1 = p∗2 = AC(1).
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So if an alternate p∗ exists, there exists some manufacturer m ≤ 2 whose price satisfies p∗m <
AC(1) ≤ AC(qm). But that would imply input price tm is undefined. So
sm(p
∗) = Shut Down, p∗−m = v
by profit maximization by its supplier and rival. But this is not an NE since manufacturer
m can strictly increase its profit by βm(v − AC(1) − ε) by defecting to pm = v − ε, for ε > 0
sufficiently small.
As an aside, observe the statement “p1 = p2 = AC(1), q
∗ ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)} is an NE
outcome” in the proof implies an NE exists. Hence, Lemma 2.9.1 is not vacuous. Also, Lemma
2.9.1 implies firms make no profit in Γ(a)’s NE when a 6= I - πMm = πSs = 0 ∀(m, s) ∈ N≤2×N≤2.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.1. To see why, first suppose v ≤ AC(1). Then a maximum of only one
manufacturer operates since
0 < qm(s−m(p),p) < 1⇒ pm ≤ v ≤ AC(1) < AC(qm(s−m(p),p))⇒ sm = Shut Down.
But then AC(1) < p−m ≤ v ≤ AC(1) must occur for the operating manufacturer −m to make
any profit. Next, assume AC(1) < v. Then Lemma 2.9.1 implies the result.
The following lemmas apply when a 6= (1, 1), or when the relationship network is discon-
nected.
Lemma 2.9.2. Suppose AC(1) < p2. Consider the game played by suppliers when they
bid, defined by the subgame Γ(I,p), and incentive compatible truncated strategies σ|I,p,b =
(s(p,b), c(s,p)) satisfying q2(s1,p) = 1 for all s1 ∈ {Op, SD}. Both suppliers bid bs = AC(1)
for s ≤ 2 in its NE.
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Proof. (As an aside, because c(s,p) is IC, we know p2 ≤ v ∧ p1.) Observe q2(s1,p) = 1 implies
manufacturer 1 has zero market share while manufacturer 2’s output is 1, if the latter operates.
Moreover, manufacturer 2’s variable profit is proportional to p2 − {s2 = 1}b1 − {s2 = 2}b2




1 if b1 < b2 ∧ p2
2 if b2 < b1 ∧ p2
SD if b2 ∧ b1 > p2
. (2.24)
Sub Claim: b∗1 = b
∗
2 = AC(1) is an NE.
Proof. Observe AC(1) < p2 implies s2(p,b) 6= SD by incentive compatibility (2.24). So
q(s(p,b∗),p) = (0, 1) by q2(s1,p) = 1 being hypothesized. Supplier 1’s variable profit is
thus zero since manufacturer 1 has zero market share while manufacturer 2 operates:
πS1 = {s2(p,b∗) = 1}q2(s(p,b∗),p)(b∗1 − AC(q2(s(p,b∗),p))) + T21 − F (by q1(s(p,b∗),p) = 0)
= {s2(p,b∗) = 1}(b∗1 − AC(1)) + T21 − F (by q2(s1,p) = 1)
= T21 − F (by b∗1 = AC(1)).
If supplier 1 bids b1 > b
∗
1, it loses the auction by (2.24) and still makes zero variable profit since
b∗2 < p2 means manufacturer 2 still operates by (2.24), and q2(s1,p) = 1 implies q1(s(p, b1, b
∗
2),p) =
0. If supplier 1 defects to b1 < b
∗
1, it wins the auction by (2.24), but its payoff is now strictly
decreased:
πS1 = {s2(p, b1, b∗2) = 1}q2(s(p, b1, b∗2),p)(b1 − AC(q2(s(p, b1, b∗2),p))) + T21 − F (by b∗2 ≤ p2)
= {s2(p, b1, b∗2) = 1}(b1 − AC(1)) + T21 − F (by q2(s1,p) = 1)
= b1 − AC(1) + T21 − F (by (2.24))
< T21 − F.
148
Supplier 2’s profit is likewise zero:
πS2 = {s2(p,b∗) = 2}q2(s(p,b∗),p)(b∗2 − AC(q2(s(p,b∗),p)))
= 0 (by q2(s1,p) = 1 and b
∗
2 = AC(1)).
Bidding b2 > b
∗
2 implies it loses the auction via (2.24), and makes no profit. Defecting to b2 < b
∗
2
implies it wins the auction by (2.24), but its payoff is now strictly decreased:
πS2 = {s2(p, b∗1, b2) = 2}q2(s(p, b∗1, b2),p)(b2 − AC(q2(s(p, b∗1, b2),p)))
= b2 − AC(1) < 0 (by q2(s1,p) = 1 and (2.24)).
So neither supplier has a profitable deviation.
Sub Claim: b∗1 = b
∗
2 = AC(1) in any NE.
Proof. Suppose b∗ >> p. From (2.24), supplier 2 makes no profit. Under q2(s1,p) = 1 and
(2.24), it can increase its profit by
p− AC(1) > 0
by bidding b2 = p. So at least one bid, must lie weakly below manufacturer 2’s price in an NE
- b∗1 ∧ b∗2 ≤ p2.
Suppose ∃s ≤ 2 such that b∗s < AC(1). WLOG, assume b∗s < b∗−s. There are two possibilities.
- Suppose s = 1. Then (2.24) implies s2(p,b
∗) = 1. Moreover, q2(s1,p) = 1 by hypothesis,
implying q(s(p,b∗),p) = (0, 1). Hence supplier 1’s profit is
πS1 = {s2(p,b∗) = 1}q2(s(p,b∗),p)(b∗1 − AC(q2(s(p,b∗)) + T21 − F (by q1(s(p,b∗),p) = 0)
= b∗1 − AC(1) + T21 − F < T21 − F.
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Supplier 1 can avoid its loss by bidding in excess of p2:
b1 > p2 ⇒ s2(p, b1, b∗2) 6= 1 (via (2.24))
⇒ πS1 = {s1(p, b1, b∗2) = Op}(1− β1)q1(s(p, b1, b∗2),p)(p1 −∆C(q(s(p, b1, b∗2),p)))
+ {s2(p, b1, b∗2) = 1}q2(s(p, b1, b∗2),p)(b1 − AC(q2(s(p, b1, b∗2),p))) + T21 − F
= (1− β1)q1(s(p, b1, b∗2),p)(p1 − AC(q1(s(p, b1, b∗2),p))) ∨ 0
+ {s2(p, b1, b∗2) = 1}(b1 − AC(1)) + T21 − F
≥ T21 − F.
Note the second equality holds because s1(p,b) is IC and s2(p, b1, b
∗






- Suppose s = 2. Then (2.24) implies s2(p,b
∗) = 2. Moreover, the hypothesis still implies
q(s(p,b∗),p) = (0, 1). Hence supplier 2’s profit is
πS2 = {s2(p,b∗) = 2}q2(s(p,b∗),p)(b∗2 − AC(q2(s(p,b∗),p))) = b∗2 − AC(1) < 0.
Supplier 2 can avoid its loss by bidding in excess of p2:
b2 > p2 ⇒ s2(p, b∗1, b2) 6= 2 (via (2.24))
⇒ πS2 = {s2(p, b∗1, b2) = 2}q2(s(p, b∗1, b2),p)(b2 − AC(q2(s(p, b∗1, b2),p))) = 0.
It follows b∗ ≥ AC(1).
Observe if b∗2 > p2, (2.24) implies s2(p,b
∗) 6= 2 and hence supplier 2 makes no profit. By
defecting to b2 = b
∗
1 ∧ p2 − ε where ε > 0, supplier 2 can assure itself of victory in the auction
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by (2.24). Its profit is thus
πS2 = q2(s(p, b
∗
1, b2),p)(b2 − AC(q2(s(p, b∗1, b2),p)))
= b2 − AC(1) (by q2(s1,p) = 1)
= b∗1 ∧ p2 − AC(1)− ε > 0
for ε sufficiently small, unless b∗1 = AC(1). But if b
∗
1 ≤ p2 < b∗2, then since supplier 1 wins the
auction by (2.24), its profit is
πS1 = {s1(p,b∗) = Op}(1− β1)q1(s(p,b∗),p)(p1 −∆C(q(s(p,b∗),p)))
+ {s2(p,b∗) = 1}q2(s(p,b∗),p)(b∗1 − AC(q2(s(p,b∗),p))) + T21 − F
= b∗1 − AC(1) + T21 − F (by (2.24) and q2(s1,p) = 1).
Bidding AC(1) is strictly dominated by bidding p2, implying b
∗ are not best responses. The
contradiction implies b∗2 ≤ p2. Hence, for any b1 ≥ 0,
s2(p, b1, b
∗
2) 6= SD q(s(p, b1, b∗2),p) = (0, 1). (2.25)
The final equality holds by q2(s1,p) = 1 being assumed in the hypothesis.
Suppose b∗1 > p2 instead. Then (2.24) implies s2(p,b
∗) 6= 1. Moreover, (2.25) implies
supplier 1 doesn’t supply manufacturer 1 either. Supplier 1’s variable profit is thus zero
πS1 = T21 − F.
Observe by defecting to b1 = p2∧b∗2−ε where ε > 0, (2.24) implies it wins the auction. Moreover,
(2.25) implies its profit is increased
πS1 = p2 ∧ b∗2 − AC(1)− ε+ T21 − F > T21 − F,
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for ε sufficiently small, unless b∗2 = AC(1). But if b
∗
2 ≤ p2 < b∗1, then since supplier 2 wins the
auction by (2.24), its profit is
πS2 = b
∗
2 − AC(1) (by (2.24) and q2(s1,p) = 1).
Bidding AC(1) is strictly dominated by bidding p2 for supplier 2, implying b
∗ are not best
responses. The contradiction implies b∗1 ≤ p2.




2),p) = q(s(p, b
∗
1, b2),p) = (0, 1). (2.26)
Hence for either supplier s ≤ 2, its profit equals
πSs (bs, b
∗
−s) = {s2(p, bs, b∗−s) = s}(bs − AC(1)) + {s = 1}(T21 − F ),
as a function of its own bid when its rival submits the equilibrium bid. We thus have the
following.
- Suppose b∗1 > AC(1). If s2(p,b
∗) = 1, then πS2 (b2, b
∗
1) and (2.24) implies supplier 2’s best
response to b∗1 is empty. If s2(p,b
∗) = 2, then supplier 2’s best response is to set b2 = b
∗
1 >
AC(1). Hence b∗2 = b
∗




2) and (2.24) implies supplier 1’s best
response to b∗2 is empty.
- Suppose b∗2 > AC(1). A symmetrical argument shows this produces a contradiction.
It follows b∗1 = b
∗
2 = AC(1).
Notice in the bidding game induced by Γ(I,p) and σ|I,p,b = (s(p,b), c(s,p)), prices p are
fixed. Hence restricting q2(s1,p) = 1 for all s1 ∈ {Op, SD} has the same effect on the suppliers’
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payoffs as assuming q2(s1(p,b),p) is constantly equal to 1 for all b ≥ 0. This implies the
following result.
Corrollary 2.9.1. Suppose AC(1) < p2. Consider the game played by suppliers when they
bid, defined by the sub game Γ(I,p), and incentive compatible truncated strategies σ|I,p,b =
(s(p,b), c(s,p)) satisfying q2(s1(p,b),p) = 1 for all b ≥ 0. Both suppliers bid bs = AC(1) for
s ≤ 2 in its NE.
It also follows from Lemma 2.9.2 that neither manufacturer makes any variable profit when
a = I.
Lemma 2.9.3. Suppose Assumption 2.2.1 holds. If v > AC(1), the firms’ output prices satisfy
p ≤ (AC(1), AC(1))
while no firm makes any variable profit
πM1 = 0, π
M
2 = −T21, πS1 = T21 − F, πS2 = 0
in any Nash equilibrium of the subgame initiated when a = I in Stage 2.
Proof of Lemma 2.9.3. The lemma is proved in a sequence of claims. The first two verify
manufacturer m’s stage 3 profit, as a function of prices p and the truncated players’ strategies
σp,I, satisfy
{m = 2}T21 + πMm (p) =

({m = 1}β1 + {m = 2}) (pm − AC(1)) ∨ 0 if pm ≤ v
0 if otherwise,
(2.27)
for two configurations of p. The reader should feel free to check how the 1st two claims prove
the remaining claims before returning to the proofs of the original two claims.
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Claim: For any m ≤ 2, p∗−m > v implies manufacturer m’s stage 3 profit as a function of p
and σ|p,I satisfies (2.27), implying its best response is pm = v.
Proof. Sub Claim: Claim true when m = 1.
Proof. Observe
p2 > v ⇒ q2(s,p) = 0 ∀s ∈ {Op, SD} × {SD, 1, 2}
⇒ q1(s2,p) = {p1 ≤ v}
⇒ πM1 (p) =

β1(p1 − AC(1)) ∨ 0 if p1 ≤ v
0 if otherwise.
Compare expressions in the final rows displayed above with those in the lemma to complete
the proof.
Sub Claim: Claim true when m = 2.
Proof. Observe
p1 > v ⇒ q1(s,p) = 0 ∀s ∈ {Op, SD} × {SD, 1, 2}
⇒ q2(s1,p) = {p2 ≤ v}.
So πM2 (p) = −T21 when p2 > v. When AC(1) < p2 ≤ v, Lemma 2.9.2 implies b(p) =
AC(1)(1, 1). Finally, when p2 ≤ AC(1) < v, observe each supplier’s profit is
bs − AC(1) + {s = 1}(T21 − F ) < {s = 1}(T21 − F )
from bidding any bid bs < p2 ∧ b−s that wins it the auction. Hence,
πM2 (p) =

(p2 − AC(1)) ∨ 0− T21 if p2 ≤ v
−T21 if otherwise.
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Compare expressions in the final rows above with those in the lemma to complete the proof.
Verify that pm = v maximizes π
M
m (p) to complete the proof.
Claim: For any m ≤ 2, pm < p−m implies manufacturer m’s Stage 3 profit as a function of
p and σ|p,I satisfies (2.27).
Proof. Sub Claim: Claim true when m = 1.
Proof. Utility maximization by consumers imply
p1 < p2 ⇒ q2(Op,p) = q2(Op, s2,p) = 0
⇒ q1(s2,p) = {p1 ≤ v} ∀s2 ∈ {SD, 1, 2}.
It follows πM1 (p) = β1{p1 ≤ v}(p1 − AC(1)) ∨ 0.
Sub Claim: Claim true when m = 2.
Proof. Utility maximization by consumers imply
p2 < p1 ⇒ q1(Operate,p) = q1(Op, s2,p) = 0
⇒ q2(s1,p) = {p2 ≤ v}
for all s1 ∈ {Op, SD}. It follows πM2 (p) = −T21 when p2 > v, partly verifying the claim.
Suppose AC(1) < p2 ≤ v. Then Lemma 2.9.2 implies b(p) = AC(1)(1, 1). Now suppose
p2 ≤ AC(1) instead. Either supplier incurs a loss in payoff equal to
bs − AC(1) ≤ p2 − AC(1) < 0,
from bidding bs < p2 ∧ b−s. So
p2 ≤ AC(1)⇒ b1(p) ∧ b2(p) ≥ p2. (2.28)
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It follows πM2 (p) equals (p2 − AC(1)) ∨ 0− T21 if p2 ≤ v from (2.28).
Claim: p∗m ≤ v for m ≤ 2.
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then either i) p∗1 > v or ii) p
∗
2 > v must occur. Suppose i) holds.
Then
p∗1 > v ⇒ p∗2 = v > AC(1)
since manufacturer 2 maximizes its profit at p2 = v when p1 > v. Then manufacturer 1 can
strictly increase its profit by
β1(p
∗
2 − AC(1)− ε) > 0
for ε > 0 sufficiently small, by defecting to p1 = p
∗
2 − ε. Suppose ii) holds. Then
p∗2 > v ⇒ p∗1 = v > AC(1)
since manufacturer 1 maximizes its profit at p1 = v when p2 > v. Manufacturer 2 can then
strictly increase its profit by
p∗1 − AC(1)− ε > 0
by defecting to p2 = p
∗
1 − ε for ε > 0 sufficiently small.
Claim: Suppose p∗m > AC(1) for some m ≤ 2. Then p∗1 = p∗2 = p∗.
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then either i) AC(1) < p∗m < p
∗
−m or ii) AC(1)∧p∗−m < p∗m. Suppose
i) holds. Previous claim implies p∗−m ≤ v. So manufacturer m can strictly increase its profit by
({m = 1}β1 + {m = 2})
(
p∗−m − AC(1)− ε
)
> 0
for ε > 0 sufficiently small, by defecting to pm = p
∗
−m− ε. Suppose ii) holds instead. Then −m
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can strictly increase its profit by
({m = 2}β1 + {m = 1}) (p∗m − AC(1)− ε) > 0
for ε > 0 sufficiently small, by defecting to p−m = p
∗
m − ε.
Claim: Suppose p∗m ≥ AC(1) for some m ≤ 2. Then p∗m = AC(1).
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then from the previous claim,
p∗m > AC(1)⇒ p∗m = p∗−m = p∗ > AC(1).
Observe p∗ in the expression above, denotes the common value of p∗ implied by the previous
claim. From the 3rd claim in this lemma’s proof, AC(1) < p∗ ≤ v. Observes manufacturer 2
can attain at least p∗−AC(1)− ε−T21 by defecting to p2 = p∗− ε. So on the equilibrium path,
πM2 ≥ p∗ − AC(1)− ε− T21 ∀ε > 0.
Sending ε → 0 obtains a lower bound for manufacturer 2’s payoff, πM2 ≥ p∗ − AC(1) − T21, in
equilibrium. Observe also:
i) Manufacturer 1 can attain at least 0 from defecting to p1 > v, so π
M
1 ≥ 0 in equilibrium.
ii) Supplier 1 can attain strictly more than T21 − F from defecting to b1 > p2 - its payoff from
such a defection satisfies
πS1 ≥ (1− β1)(p∗ − AC(1)) + T21 − F > T21 − F.
So πS1 > T21 − F in equilibrium.
iii) Supplier 2 can attain at least 0 from defecting to b2 > p2, so π
S
2 ≥ 0 in equilibrium.
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Finally, the social planner’s attained surplus implies total surplus generated by equilibrium play
is bounded from above by
TS ≤ v − C(1)− F = v − AC(1)− F.







2 = TS − CS ≤ v − AC(1)− F − (v − p∗) = p∗ − AC(1)− F.
But the lower bounds in i) to iii) and for πM2 imply
p∗ − AC(1)− T21 ≤ πM2 < p∗ − AC(1)− F − T21 + F = p∗ − AC(1)− T21,
a contradiction. So we must have p∗m = AC(1).
Claim: q∗m ∈ (0, 1)⇒ q∗−m = 1− q∗m > 0 for m ≤ 2.
Proof. As stated in Section 2.2, consumers consume when indifferent between m’s product and
its outside option in equilibrium.
Claim: πM1 ≥ 0, πM2 ≥ −T21, πS1 ≥ T2 − F, πS2 ≥ 0 on the equilibrium path.
Proof. Manufacturer m ≤ 2 can guarantee itself a payoff of −{m = 2}T21 from setting pm to
any number strictly bigger than v. Thus
πM1 ≥ 0 πM2 ≥ −T21.
Because s1(p,b) is IC, supplier 1 can guarantee itself a payoff of
(1− β1)q1(s(p∗, b1, b∗2),p∗)(p∗1 − AC(q1(s(p∗, b1, b∗2),p∗))) ∨ 0 + T21 − F ≥ T21 − F
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1 ≥ T21−F . Supplier 2 can guarantee





Claim: πM1 = 0, π
M
2 = −T21, πS1 = T21 − F, πS2 = 0 on the equilibrium path when
p∗ ≤ AC(1)(1, 1).
Proof. Observe p∗ ≤ AC(1)(1, 1) implies consumer surplus satisfies
CS = v − p∗1 ∧ p∗2 ≥ v − AC(1) ≥ 0.







2 = TS − CS ≤ −F.
But from the previous claim,
πM1 ≥ 0 πS2 ≥ 0
⇒ πM2 + πS1 ≤ −F − πM1 − πS2 ≤ −F.
But from the previous claim,
πM2 ≥ −T21, πS1 ≥ T21 − F ⇒ πM2 + πS1 ≥ −F.
Combining both inequalities thus yields πM2 + π
S
1 = −F . But from the previous claim again,
and the equality above,
πM2 ≥ −T21, T21 − F ≤ πS1 = −F − πM2 ≤ T21 − F,




2 ≤ TS − CS − πM2 − πS1 ≤ F − (−F ) = 0.
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But the previous claim implies both πM1 and π
S
2 are non-negative.
The lemma holds from combining the fifth and final claims of its proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.2. Suppose v ≤ AC(1). Then because total surplus under the social plan-













πS1 + F − T21
)
+ πS2 ≤ 0.
But each manufacturer can ensure itself zero variable profit by setting an unreasonably high
output price. Because s(p,b) is IC, each supplier can ensure itself at least zero variable profit




2 = 0, π
M
2 = −T21, πS1 = T21 − F.
Then suppose v > AC(1). Lemma 2.9.3 completes the argument.
It remains to show the existence of a (subgame perfect) BNE. I claim such a BNE exists when
v > AC (1), or equivalently, there is surplus to be made from producing inputs and assembling
them into output. As aforementioned, Lemma 2.9.1’s proof establishes p1 = p2 = AC(1),
q∗ ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)} as NE outcomes for Γ(a) when a 6= I. Example 2.9.1 is exhibited as an NE
outcome, when a = I.
Example 2.9.1. [Monopoly Equilibrium] If v > AC(1), then there exists subgame perfect
equilibria in the subgame initiated when manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 invest, such that output
prices and downstream market shares satisfy
p = (AC(1), AC(1)), q ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}
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on the equilibrium path.
The following lemma proves this.
Lemma 2.9.4. There exists an NE for the subgame Γ(a) when a = I and AC(1) < v. Prices
and quantities on its equilibrium path are specified by Example 2.9.1.
Proof. The lemma is proved in 3 claims, the first of which formalizes the trivial.
Claim: Γ(I,p,b) admits an SPNE in supplier-or-quit and consumption choices, (s(p,b),
c(s,p)).
Proof. Each consumer chooses from discrete sets. His payoff is independent of rival consumers’
choices. Existence of incentive compatible c(s,p) follows trivially ∀s ∈ {Operate, Shut Down}×
{Operate, 1, 2}.
Set manufacturer 2’s supplier-or-quit choice to
s2(p,b) ∈

argminsbs if b1 ∧ b2 ≤ p2
Shut Down if otherwise.
Observe s2(p,b) is incentive compatible. Observe manufacturer 1’s BR to s2(p,b) is chosen
from a discrete set and is hence non-empty. The BR is trivially incentive compatible too.




Operate if p ≥ AC(1)
Shut Down if otherwise




argminsbs if b1 ∧ b2 ≤ p2, b1 6= b2
1 if b1 ∧ b2 ≤ p2, b1 = b2
Shut Down if otherwise
∀(p,b) ∈ R2≥0, (2.30)
and the following equalities that define demands when prices are equal
q1(s2, p, p) =

0 if s2 = Operate
{p ≤ v} if otherwise
q2(s2, p, p) ={p ≤ v} ∀s1 ∈ {Operate, Shut Down}.
(2.31)
q1(s2, p, p) ={p ≤ v} ∀s2 ∈ {1, 2, Shut Down}
q2(s1, p, p) =

0 if s1 = Operate
{p ≤ v} if otherwise.
(2.32)
Finally, the following claims also denote the demand functions (qm(s−m,p))m≤2 by q(s,p).
Their statements are as follows.
Claims: Fix δ > 0. Fix q ∈ {0, 1} ∩∆ for the second bullet.
• Suppose p1 6= p2. ∀(∃) supplier-or-quit and consumption choices (s(p,b), c(s,p)) forming a
SPNE in Γ(I,p,b) for all b ∈ R2≥0, ∃ bids b(p) satisfying
b1 = b2 = AC(q2(s1(p, b1, b2),p)) ∧ (v + δ) (2.33)
that together with (s(p,b), c(s,p)), form a SPNE in Γ(p,b).
• Suppose p1 = p2. Then ∃(∀) supplier-or-quit and consumption choices (s(p,b), c(s,p)) (that
form a SPNE of Γ(I,p,b) while satisfying (2.30) and (2.31) if q = (0, 1), and (2.29), (2.30)
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and (2.32) if q = (1, 0) for all b ∈ R2≥0), and ∃ bids b(p) such that
v < p1 = p2 ⇒ b1(p) = b2(p) = AC(0) ∧ (v + δ), q(s,p) = q(s(p,b(p)),p)
p1 = p2 ≤ v ⇒ b1(p) = b2(p) = AC(q2(s1(p,b(p)),p)) ∧ (v + δ)
AC(1) ≤ p1 = p2 ≤ v ⇒ q(s(p,b(p)),p) = q(s(p,b(p)),p) = q
(2.34)
hold, that (together with (s(p,b), c(s,p))) form an SPNE of Γ(I,p).
These claims are proved together in what follows.
Proof of the two above claims. Denote s2 ∈ {1, 2} by s2 = Operate.
Sub Claim: If p1 < p2, ∀ SPNEs (s(p,b), c(p,b)) in Γ(I,p,b), ∃ b(p) ≥ 0 satisfying
(2.33).
Proof. Fix SPNE (s(p,b), c(p,b)). Suppose p1 ≤ v. Then since p1 < p2,
q1(s2,p) = 1, q2(Op,p) = 0 ∀s2 ∈ {Op, SD}
via consumer incentive compatibility. Manufacturer incentive compatibility implies
s1(p,b) ∈

Op if p1 > AC(1)
{Op, SD} if p1 = AC(1)
SD if p1 < AC(1).
s1(p,b) is thus independent of b ∈ R2≥0. Write s1(p,b) = s1(p1). Thus there trivially exists
b ≥ 0 satisfying b = AC(q2(s1(p, b, b),p))∧(v+δ). Suppose p1 > v instead. Then since p1 < p2,
v < p1 < p2 ⇒ q2(s1,p) = 0 ∀s1 ∈ {Op, SD}.
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Set b = AC(0)∧(v+δ) to see the existence of b ≥ 0 satisfying b = AC(q2(s1(p, b, b),p))∧(v+δ).
Set b(p) = b(1, 1) to complete the proof.
Sub Claim: If p1 < p2, then b1(p) = b2(p) = b(p) as defined by the previous subgame,
together with IC (s(p,b), c(s,p)) in Γ(I,p,b) constitute an SPNE.
Proof. The sub claim’s proof reduces to showing b(p) are incentive compatible for the suppliers.
Suppose p1 ≤ v. The previous sub claim’s proof shows s1(p,b) = s1(p1) and q1(s2,p) = 1.
Therefore
s1(p1) = Op⇒ q2(s1(p,b),p) = 0 ∀b ∈ R2≥0.
Hence s1(p1) = Op implies both suppliers are indifferent between winning and losing the auction,
and thus indifferent between any bid:
- For s = 2, this is because q2(s1(p,b),p) = 0 for all b ∈ R2≥0.
- For s = 1, this is because q2(s1(p,b),p) = 0, but also because
s1(p,b) = Op, q1(s2,p) = 1 ∀s2 ∈ {1, 2, SD} ⇒ q1(s(p,b),p) = 1 ∀b ≥ 0.
Hence, the sub claim holds for all p1 ≥ 0 satisfying s1(p1) = Op. Also,
s1(p1) = SD ⇒ q2(s1(p,b),p) = q2(SD,p) = {p2 ≤ v}.
So when s1(p1) = SD, if:
- p2 ≤ v, q2(s1(p,b),p) = 1 for all b ∈ R2≥0. So if
- AC(1) < p2 < v, then the usual FPA argument from Corollary 2.9.1 applies and b1(p) =
b2(p) = AC(1) = b(p) in the unique bidding NE.
- p2 ≤ AC(1) < v, neither supplier can submit a bid acceptable to manufacturer 2 without
incurring non-positive variable profit from winning. Bidding b(p) as defined in the previous
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sub claim ensures the bid covers both suppliers’ costs, or is rejected for exceeding v and
thus p2. So b = b(p)(1, 1) is an NE.
- p2 > v, q2(s1(p,b),p) = 0 for all b ∈ R2≥0. Since s1(p1) = SD, so both suppliers are
indifferent between any bid in R≥0. Hence b(p) = b(p)(1, 1) is also an NE.
Hence, the sub claim holds for all p1 ≥ 0 satisfying s1(p1) = SD.
Suppose p1 > v. Then q1(s2,p) = 0 for all s2 ∈ {1, 2, SD}. Moreover,
p2 > p1 > v ⇒ q2(s1,p) = 0 ∀s1 ∈ {SD,Op}.
It follows that both suppliers are indifferent between submitting any bid since neither manu-
facturer has any market share regardless of the bids - qm(s−m(p,b),p) = 0 for all b ∈ R2≥0 and
m ≤ 2. So setting both bids to equal
b(p) = AC(q2(s1(p, b(p), b(p)),p)) ∧ (v + δ) = AC(0) ∧ (v + δ)
as implicitly defined by the previous sub claim trivially yields NE bids.
Main claim thus holds when p1 < p2. In what follows, the claim is verified when p2 < p1.
Sub Claim: If p2 < p1, for any IC (qm(s−m,p))m≤2 and s(p,b) in Γ(I,p,b), ∃b(p) satisfying
(2.33).
Proof. Observe p2 < p1 implies q2(s1,p) = {p2 ≤ v} for all s1 ∈ {Op, SD}. Set b(p) equal to
b(p) = AC({p2 ≤ v}) ∧ (v + δ) = AC(q2(s1(p, b(p), b(p)),p)) ∧ (v + δ) > 0
to complete the proof.
Sub Claim: If p2 < p1, then b1(p) = b2(p) = b(p) defined in previous sub claim together
with IC ((qm(s−m,p))m≤2, s(p,b)) in Γ(I,p,b) constitute an SPNE.
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Proof. Suppose p2 ≤ v. The previous sub claim and its proof implies q2(s1,p) = 1 for all
s1 ∈ {Op, SD}. Also, b(p) = AC(1) ∧ (v + δ). Finally, p2 < p1 also implies q1(s2,p) = 0 if
s2 = Operate. Now, if
- AC(1) < p2, then AC(1) < p2 ≤ v implies b(p) = AC(1) < v. The usual FPA argument
from Corollary 2.9.1 shows b1(p) = b2(p) = b(p) is the unique NE outcome in the bidding
game between suppliers. So sub claim holds when AC(1) < p2 ≤ v.
- p2 ≤ AC(1), then b1(p) = b2(p) = b(p) = AC(1) ∧ (v + δ) ≥ p2 ∧ (v + δ) > p2. Hence,
s2(p,b(p)) = SD
because s2(p,b) is IC and q2(s1,p) = 1 for all s1. It follows that q1(s2(p,b(p)),p) = {p1 ≤
v}, and that the suppliers’ profits are
πS1 = (1− β1)(p1 − AC(1)) ∨ 0 + T21 − F πS2 = 0
when bidding b(p). Consider a deivation by supplier 2. Bidding b2 > p2 implies it loses the
auction while bidding b2 ≤ p2 implies
b1 ∧ b2 ≤ p2 ≤ AC(1)⇒ πS2 = {s2(p,b(p)) = 2}(b2 − AC(1)) ≤ 0
where the final equality recognizes q2(s1,p) = 1 for all s1 when p2 < p1. Consider a deviation
by supplier 1. Bidding b1 > p2 implies it loses the auction, and its profit is thus bounded
from above by
(1− β1)(p1 − AC(1)) ∨ 0 + T21 − F,
its profit from only supplying manufacturer 1 when q1(s2(p,b(p)),p) = 1. Biding b1 ≤ p2
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implies b1 ≤ AC(1). Hence supplier 1’s profit equals
πS1 = {s2(p,b(p)) = 1}(b1 − AC(1))
+ {s2(p,b(p)) = SD}(1− β1)(p1 − AC(1)) ∨ 0 + T21 − F
≤ (1− β1)(p1 − AC(1)) ∨ 0 + T21 − F.
So supplier 1 has no incentive to defect either. So the sub claim holds when p2 ≤ AC(1)∧ v.
Suppose p2 > v. Observe then v < p2 < p1 implying
q1(s2,p) = q2(s1,p) = 0 ∀s ∈ {Op, SD} × {1, 2, SD}.
So neither supplier makes any variable profit when submitting any bid
b ∈ R2≥0 ⇒ (πS1 , πS2 ) = (T21 − F, 0),
and b1(p) = b2(p) = b(p) does not violate IC for either supplier. So the sub claim holds when
p2 > v.
The remaining sub claims address the case when p1 = p2. Recall q(s,p) denotes (qm(s−m,p))m≤2.
Sub Claim: If p1 = p2, then ∀δ > 0,q ∈ ∆, ∃ IC (q(s,p), s(p,b)) such that a solution
b(p) to (2.33) exists, constitutes an NE of the suppliers’ bidding game, and satisfies
AC(1) ≤ p1 = p2 ≤ v ⇒ q(s(p,b(p)),p) = q (2.35)
p1 = p2 > v ⇒ q(s(p,b(p)),p) = 0 (2.36)
with (q(s,p), s(p,b)).
Proof. In keeping with previously used notation, let b(p) denote the solution to (2.33). Let p
denote the common value of p.
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Observe we can set s2(p,b) according to (2.30) for all b ∈ R2≥0 when p1 = p2 without
violating manufacturer 2’s IC constraint. Under (2.30), notice when b1 = b2, neither supplier
alters s2(p, b1, b2) ∈ {Op, SD} and thus, q1(s2(p,b(p)),p) by raising its bid. Observe we can
also set q2(s1,p) according to (2.31) without violating any consumers’ IC constraint either,
since p1 = p2. Finally, we can set q1(s2,p) according to (2.32) without violating any consumers’
IC constraint when p1 = p2.
Suppose v < p. Then q1(s2,p) = q2(s1,p) = 0 for all s ∈ {Op, SD} × {1, 2, SD} regardless
of whether (2.31) or (2.32) holds. So both suppliers are indifferent between any bid bs ∈ R≥0.
Therefore
b1(p) = b2(p) = b(p) ≡ AC(0) ∧ (v + δ)
is an NE of the suppliers’ bidding game and (2.33) and (2.36) both hold; regardless of whether
(2.30) and (2.31), or (2.30) and (2.32) hold.
Suppose p ≤ v.
a) Consider the case where q = (0, 1). Assume (2.30) and (2.31) hold. Observe b(p) = AC(1)∧
(v + δ) satisfies (2.33) by (2.31). Moreover, b1(p) = b2(p) = b(p) is an NE too.
Suppose AC(1) ≤ v + δ. I proceed to show bidding b(p) is indeed an NE for the suppliers’
bidding game. There are two possibilities.
First, assume AC(1) ≤ p. Then
b1 = b2 = b(p) = AC(1) ≤ p⇒ s2(p,b) = 1 (via (2.30))
⇒ q(s(p,b),p) = (0, 1) (via (2.31) and p ≤ v)
⇒ πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0
when both suppliers bid b(p). Suppliers make zero variable profit along the proposed equilib-
rium’s path. Neither supplier will deviate from b1(p) = b2(p) = b(p) when (2.30) and (2.31)
hold:
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- If supplier 1 increases its bid, manufacturer 2 still operates. So q1(s2(p,b(p)),p) = 0.
Supplier 1 loses the auction without any gain in sales to manufacturer 1.
- If supplier 1 reduces its bid, manufacturer 2 still chooses supplier 1, and supplier 1’s profit
is reduced by AC(1)− b1.
- If supplier 2 increases its bid, it loses the auction and makes no profit as before.
- If supplier 2 shades its bid, manufacturer 2 chooses supplier 2, implying a loss for supplier
2 equal to b2 − AC(1) < 0.
Second, assume p < AC(1). Observe
p < AC(1), p ≤ v ⇒ p < AC(1) ∧ (v + δ)
⇒ p2 < b1(p) = b2(p)⇒ s2(p,b(p)) = SD. (via (2.30))
p < AC(1)⇒ p1 < AC(1) = AC(q1(SD,p)) (via (2.31))
⇒ s1(p,b) = SD ∀b ∈ R2≥0.
Hence the suppliers’ variable profits are zero
πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0
as when AC(1) ≤ p. Hence, neither supplier will deviate under (2.30) and (2.31):
- If supplier 1 increases its bid, manufacturer 2 still shuts down since b1 > AC(1) = b(p)
implies s2(p, b1, b(p)) = SD = s2(p, b(p), b(p)). Moreover, p < AC(1)⇒ s1(p, b1, b(p)) =
SD as explained above. So supplier 1 cannot increase its sales to manufacturer 1, and
doesn’t win the auction to supply manufacturer 2.
- If supplier 1 reduces its bid, defecting to b1 > p implies no change in its profit since
169
s2(p, b1, b(p)) = SD = s2(p, b(p), b(p)). Defecting to b1 ≤ p weakly decreases its profit:
b1 ≤ p⇒ s2(p, b1, b(p)) = 1 (via (2.30))
⇒ q(s(p, b1, b(p)),p) = (0, 1) (via (2.31))
⇒ πS1 = b1 − AC(1) + T21 − F ≤ T21 − F.
- If supplier 2 increases its bid, it loses the auction and earns no profit.
- If supplier 2 decreases its bid, reducing its bid to b2 > p, it still loses the auction. Cutting
its bid to b2 ≤ p implies it wins the auction but at a loss:
b2 ≤ p⇒ s2(p, b(p), b2) = 2 (via (2.30))
⇒ q(s(p, b(p), b2),p) = (0, 1) (via (2.31))
⇒ πS2 = b2 − AC(1) ≤ 0.
So b(p) = b(p)(1, 1) = AC(1)(1, 1) is an NE when AC(1) ≤ v + δ.
Suppose v + δ < AC(1) instead. Then p ≤ v implies
p1 = p2 < v + δ < AC(1)⇒ p2 < v + δ = b(p)
⇒ s2(p, b(p), b(p)) = SD (via (2.30))
⇒ q1(s2(p, b(p), b(p)),p) = 1 (via (2.31))
⇒ p1 < A(1) = AC(q1(s2(p, b(p), b(p)),p))
⇒ s1(p, b(p), b(p)) = SD (via IC).
It follows that neither manufacturer operates and neither supplier makes any variable profit
πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0
under b = b(p). Neither supplier will deviate:
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- If supplier 1 defects to b1 > p2, manufacturer 2 continues to shut down
s2(p, b1, b(p)) = SD = s2(p, b(p), b(p)) (via (2.30))
and supplier 1’s profit is unchanged.
- If supplier 1 defects to b1 ≤ p2, manufacturer 2 chooses supplier 1:
s2(p, b1, b2(p)) = 1 6= SD = s2(p,b(p)).
Hence, supplier 1’s profit is decreased:
q(s(p, b1, b2(p)),p) = (0, 1)⇒ πS1 = b1 − AC(1) + T21 − F
≤ p2 − AC(1) + T21 − F ≤ T21 − F.
- If supplier 2 defects to b2 > p2, its bid remains rejected and its profit is still 0.
- If supplier 2 defects to b2 ≤ p2, its bid is accepted and
q2(s1(p, b1, b2(p)),p) = 1⇒ πS2 = b2 − AC(1) < 0.
So b = b(p) is an NE in the bidding game.
So b(p) = (v + δ)(1, 1) are NE strategies when (v + δ) ≤ AC(1). Now observe that if
AC(1) ≤ p is assumed in addition to p ≤ v:
AC(1) ≤ p⇒ b1(p) = b2(p) = AC(1) ∧ (v + δ)
= AC(1) (∵ AC(1) ≤ p ≤ v)
≤ p = p2
⇒ s2(p,b(p)) = Op.
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Hence (2.31) implies (2.35) holds.
b) Suppose q = (1, 0) instead. Assume (2.29), (2.30) and (2.32) hold. Observe the cost of
supplying manufacturer 1 equals
{s2(p,b) = 1}∆C(q1(Op,p), q2(Op,p)) + {s2(p,b) = 2}AC(q1(Op,p))
+ {s2(p,b) = SD}AC(q1(SD,p))
= {s2(p,b) = 1}∆C(1, 0) + {s2(p,b) 6= 1}AC(1) = AC(1).
by (2.32). So (2.29) doesn’t violate manufacturer 1’s IC constraints.
Suppose AC(1) ≤ p. Then s2(p,b) = Op by (2.29), and
AC(0) ∧ (v + δ) = AC(q2(Op,p)) ∧ (v + δ) (by (2.32))
= AC(q2(s1(p, b, b),p)) ∧ (v + δ) = b
is solved by b = AC(0) ∧ (v + δ). So (2.33) holds. Moreover,
s1(p,b) = Op⇒ q2(s1(p,b),p) = 0
s2(p,b) = Op⇒ q1(s2(p,b),p) = {p ≤ v} = 1
by (2.32) and p ≤ v being hypothesized. So (2.35) holds. Also
πS1 = (1− β1)(p1 − AC(1)) + T21 − F πS2 = 0
for all b ∈ R2≥0. So both suppliers are indifferent between any bid bs ≥ 0, implying b =
b(p)(1, 1) is an NE for the suppliers’ bidding game.
172
Suppose p < AC(1) instead. Then s1(p,b(p)) = SD by (2.29). Moreover,
AC(1) ∧ (v + δ) = AC(q2(SD,p)) ∧ (v + δ) (by (2.32))
= AC(q2(s1(p, b, b),p)) ∧ (v + δ) (by (2.29) and p < AC(1)).
Setting the above quantity to b(p) shows (2.33) holds. Moreover,
s1(p,b(p)) = SD ⇒ q1(s(p,b(p)),p) = 1
s1(p,b(p)) = SD, (2.32) ⇒ q2(s1(p,b(p)),p) = 1
since p ≤ v. The above implications and p < AC(1) thus imply
s1(p,b(p)) = SD, q(s(p,b(p)),p) = (0, {s2(p,b(p)) 6= SD}).
But observe
AC(1) ≤ v + δ ⇒ p < AC(1) = b(p)
⇒ s2(p,b(p)) = SD (by (2.30))
⇒ q(s(p,b(p)),p) = 0.
So neither supplier makes any variable profit from b = b(p). Observe neither supplier has
incentives to defect:
– If supplier 1 defects to b1 > p1, then manufacturer 2 still shuts down and supplier 1 loses
the auction without gaining from selling more inputs to manufacturer 1:
s2(p, b1, b(p)) = SD = s2(p,b(p)) (by (2.30))
⇒ q(s(p,b(p)),p) = 0.
173
– If supplier 1 defects to b1 ≤ p1, then manufacturer 2 accepts its bid,
s2(p, b1, b(p)) = 1 6= SD = s2(p,b(p)) (by (2.30))
⇒ q(s(p,b(p)),p) = (0, {p ≤ v})
⇒ πS2 = {p ≤ v}(b1 − AC(1)) + T21 − F < T21 − F.
– If supplier 2 defects to b2 ≤ p, then manufacturer 2 still shuts down and supplier 2 makes
no profit.
– If supplier 2 defects to b2 < p, then its bid is accepted. Moreover, since p < AC(1),
s1(p, b(p), b2) = SD ⇒ q2(s1(p, b(p), b2),p) = 1
⇒ πS2 = {p ≤ v}(b2 − AC(1)) + T21 − F < T21 − F.
It follows b = b(p)(1, 1) is an NE for the suppliers’ bidding game.
When p1 = p2 > v, the previous sub claim’s proof makes clear q(s,p) and thus q(s,p) equal
zero. Also, observe how the expressions for b(p) in (2.34) collapse into (2.33). The previous
sub claim thus implies first two lines of (2.33) hold too. It remains to show its third line holds.
Sub Claim: When AC(1) ≤ p1 = p2 ≤ v, then the IC q(s,p), s(b,p) and b(p) constructed
to satisfy the previous sub claim also satisfies q(s(b(p),p),p) = q.
Proof. Suppose that q = (0, 1). Then (q(s,p), s(b,p)) satisfy (2.30) and (2.31). Also, the
previous sub claim implies
q(s(p,b(p)),p) = q = (0, 1)⇒ q2(s1(p,b(p)),p) = 1
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(when p = p(1, 1)). The previous sub claim also implies
b1(p) = b2(p) = AC(q2(s1(p,b(p)),p)) ∧ (v + δ) = AC(1) ∧ (v + δ) = AC(1) ≤ p
since AC(1) ≤ p ≤ v < v + δ. It follows s2(p,b(p)) = 1 by (2.30). Thus,
q2(s(p,b(p)),p) = q2(s1(p,b(p)),p) = 1 ⇒ q1(s(p,b(p)),p) = 0.
The implication above recognizes q1 + q2 ∈ [0, 1] on the equilibrium path.
Suppose that q = (1, 0) instead. Then q(s,p) and s(p,b) satisfy (2.29), (2.30) and (2.32)
instead. Also, the previous sub claim implies
q(s(p,b(p)),p) = q = (1, 0)⇒ q2(s1(p,b(p)),p) = 0
and
b1(p) = b2(p) = AC(q2(s1(p,b(p)),p)) ∧ (v + δ) = AC(0) ∧ (v + δ).
From (2.29),
s1(p(1, 1), b(p)(1, 1)) =

Op if p ≥ AC(1)
SD if otherwise
= Op
since AC(1) ≤ p ≤ v by hypothesis. Hence
q1(s(p,b(p)),p) = q1(s2(p,b(p)),p) = 1
q2(s(p,b(p)),p) = 0⇒ q2(s1(p,b(p)),p) = 0,
completing the proof when q = (1, 0).
Claim: Suppose AC(1) < v. For any q∗ ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)} there exists a SPNE σI in Γ(I)
175
such that p∗1 = p
∗
2 = AC(1) and q(s(p
∗,b(p∗)),p∗) = q∗.
Proof. Sub Claim: p∗1 = p
∗
2 = AC(1) < v implies ∃ an SPNE (b(p∗), s(p∗,b), c(s,p∗)) in
Γ(I,p∗) satisfying q(s(p∗,b(p∗)),p∗) = q∗ and b(p∗) = AC(q∗2) ∧ (v + δ).
Proof. See previous main claim.
Sub Claim: Suppose p∗1 = p
∗
2 = AC(1) and q
∗ ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)}. The previous sub claim’s
SPNE (b(p∗), s(p∗,b), c(s,p∗)) implies πM1 = 0 and π
M
2 = −T21 on the equilibrium path.
Proof. Suppose q∗ = (0, 1). Then previous sub claim implies b∗1 ∧ b∗2 = AC(1) < v + δ for some





1 − {s∗2 = 1}∆C(q∗)− {s∗2 6= 1}AC(q∗1)) = 0 πM2 + T21 = q∗2(p∗2 − b∗1 ∧ b∗2) = 0.
Suppose q∗ = (1, 0). Then rather trivially, πM1 = 0 and π
M
2 = −T21.
Sub Claim: Suppose p1 6= p2. Then ∃ SPNE (b(p), s(p,b), c(s,p)) such that b1(p) =
b2(p), (2.33) holds,
s1(p,b) = Op if p1 = {s2(p,b) = 1}∆C(q1(Op, s2(p,b),p), q2(Op,Op,p))
+ {s2(p,b) 6= 1}AC(q1(Op, s2(p,b),p))
(2.37)
and
s2(p,b) ∈ argmins≤2bs if argmins≤2bs = p2. (2.38)
Proof. Previous main claims shows ∀ SPNE (s(p,b), c(s,p)) in Γ(I,p,b), can find b(p) sat-
isfying b1(p) = b2(p), and (2.33). It thus remains to show the requirements (2.37), (2.38) on
s(p,b) are IC.
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(2.37) is IC for manufacturer 1, who is indifferent between operating or shutting down when
p1 = {s2(p,b) = 1}∆C(q1(Op, s2(p,b),p), q2(Op,Op,p)) + {s2(p,b) 6= 1}AC(q1(Op, s2(p,b),p))
Price Average Cost
given s2(p,b), regardless of q(b,p).
(2.38) is completely consistent with incentive compatibility since manufacturer 2 is indiffer-
ent between operating through its cheapest supplier or shutting down when
p2 = b1 ∧ b2
Price Average Cost
regardless of s1(p,b) and q(s,b).
Let (b(p), s(p,b), c(s,p)) satisfy the conditions stated in first and third sub claims above.
These sub claims imply the former constitutes a SPNE in Γ(I,p) for all p ∈ R2≥0. Sub claim
2’s proof also shows manufacturers make no variable profit when p1 = p2 < v. It remains to
show neither manufacturer can improve its profit by defecting to pm 6= p∗m.
Sub Claim: Neither manufacturerm ≤ 2 can strictly increase payoffs from setting pm > p∗m.
Proof. Let m = 1. Then since consumers consume when indifferent and AC(1) ≤ v:
p1 > p
∗
2 ⇒ q2(s1, p1, p∗2) = 1 ∀s1 ∈ {Op, SD}.
The 3rd sub claim in this main claim’s proof implies
b1(p1, p
∗
2) = b2(p1, p
∗






2)) = AC(1) ∧ (v + δ) = AC(1) = p∗2.
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2)) ∈ {1, 2} ⇒ q1(s2(p1, p∗2,b(p1, p∗2)), p1, p∗2) = 0
⇒ q1(s(p1, p∗2,b(p1, p∗2)), p1, p∗2) = 0
and manufacturer 1’s profit is still zero.
Let m = 2. Then
p2 > p
∗
1 ⇒ q1(s2, p∗1, p2) = 1 ∀s2 ∈ {1, 2, SD}.
Hence,







p∗1 = AC(1) = ∆C(1, 0) = ∆C(q(Op,Op, p
∗
1, p2)) (∵ q1(s2, p
∗
1, p2) = 1 ∀s2 ∈ {1, 2, SD}).





1, p2)) = Op⇒ q2(s(p∗1, p2,b(p∗1, p2)), p∗1, p2) = 0.
Manufacturer 2’s profit post defection is −T21, the same as before.
Sub Claim: Neither manufacturer m ≤ 2 can strictly increase its profit by setting pm < p∗m
when p∗m = AC(1) under (b(p), s(p,b), c(s,p)) for all m ≤ 2.
Proof. If m = 1, observe
p1 < p
∗
1 = AC(1) = p
∗
2 ⇒ q1(s2, p1, p∗2) = 1 ∀s2 ∈ {1, 2, SD}
⇒ p1 < AC(1) = AC(q1(s2(p1, p∗2,b(p1, p∗2)), p1, p∗2))
⇒ s1(p1, p∗2,b(p1, p∗2)) = SD.
So manufacturer 1’s profit is still zero.
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1 ⇒ q2(s1, p∗1, p2) = 1 ∀s1 ∈ {Op, SD}
⇒ p2 < AC(1) = AC(q2(s1(p∗1, p2,b(p∗1, p2)), p∗1, p2)) ∧ (v + δ).
So the 3rd sub claim implies
b1(p
∗
1, p2) = b2(p
∗












1, p2)) = SD. Manufacturer 2’s profit is still equal to −T21 when it defects.
2.9.2 Proofs for Results under Assumption 2.2.2
The following results apply to the social planner’s allocation described in Subsection 2.2.3.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.1. The planner’s allocation can be expressed as instructions to each







< v1∧v2. Then the gain in total surplus from sharing suppliers must equal
the reduction in the cost of making inputs 2C(1
2
) − C(1), since both manufacturers operate
regardless of whether they share suppliers in the socially optimal allocation. The planner thus
instructs supplier sharing when its gain is smaller than its cost, the cost of forming a new






− C(1) = F̂ .
179
The planner avoids supplier sharing when the inequality holds in reverse. The planner is
indifferent when both sides of the inequality equal.





≤ v1 ∨ v2. There are two possibilities.
1. Suppose qargmax(v) > 0 in the planner’s instructed strategies, when a 6= I or equivalently
when supplier sharing doesn’t occur. There are two sub cases to consider.






. Also the gain in total surplus from sharing suppliers is 2C(1
2
)−C(1). So supplier







The planner avoids supplier sharing when the inequality holds in reverse, and is indifferent
when both sides of the inequality equal.
- Suppose qargmin(v) = 0 when supplier sharing doesn’t occur. The gain in total surplus
from sharing suppliers is v1∧v2
2
− C(1) + C(1
2










The planner avoids supplier sharing when the inequality holds in reverse, and is indifferent
when both sides of the inequality equal.
















avoids supplier sharing when the inequality holds in reverse, and is indifferent when both
sides of the inequality equal.






v1 ∨ v2. Moreover, supplier sharing occurs via the following rules.
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, and the gain in total surplus from sharing suppliers is C(1)− C(1
2
) and supplier










The planner avoids supplier sharing when the inequality holds in reverse, and is indifferent
when both sides of the inequality equal.
- Suppose qargmin(v) = 0 when supplier sharing doesn’t occur. The gain in total surplus
from sharing suppliers is v1+v2
2





The planner avoids supplier sharing when the inequality holds in reverse, and is indifferent
when both sides of the inequality equal.





, both inequalities displayed above equal each other. So the





avoids supplier sharing when the inequality holds in reverse, and is indifferent when both
sides of the inequality equal.





. The planner thus










avoids supplier sharing if the above inequality is reversed, and is indifferent when both sides of
the inequality equal.
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. Then both manufacturers operate only when supplier sharing
occurs by the planner’s instructions. The planner instructs supplier sharing if the gain from
doing so v1+v2
2




− C(1) = F̂ ,
avoids supplier sharing if the inequality above is reversed, and is indifferent if both sides equal.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.2. Let π denote the firms’ profits when a 6= I and p = v. These






























for m ≤ 2. It

































































































































for both m ≤ 2.
The following results concern the game’s (Bayes Nash) equilibria. The equilibria of the
game are analyzed using backward induction as in Subsection 2.2.2.
Stage 6: The restrictions imposed on the consumers’ strategies imply each manufacturer’s





The manufacturers’ demand schedules thus depend only on their own output prices. In partic-
ular, demand for their products conditional on entry simplifies to
qm(s−m,p) = qm(pm) =
1
2
{pm ≤ vm} ∀m ≤ 2.
Stage 5: Manufacturer 1 operates when (non-negative) surplus is created by converting its
affiliated supplier’s inputs into output sold at price p1 to its consumers:
s1 =

Operate if p1 ≥ {s2 = 1}∆C(q1(p1), q2(p2)) + {s2 6= 1}AC(q1(p1))
Shut Down if p1 < {s2 = 1}∆C(q1(p1), q2(p2)) + {s2 6= 1}AC(q1(p1))
. (2.41)
183
Manufacturer 2’s chosen supplier or shut down decision satisfies
s2 ∈

argminsbs if b1 ∧ b2 < p2, q1(p2) > 0
Shut Down if b1 ∧ b2 > p2
{argminsbs, Shut Down} if otherwise
. (2.42)
Note when qm(pm) = 0, manufacturer m effectively shuts down, regardless of sm’s value.
Stage 4: Suppose a 6= I so that the relationship network is disconnected. Then Nash






+ (1− βm)pm ∀m ≤ 2,





≤ pm ≤ vm. Each manufacturer’s profit when












∨ 0 if pm ≤ v
0 if otherwise
.
Notice each manufacturer’s profit does not depend on it’s downstream rival’s output price.
Suppose a = I so that the relationship network is connected. Then Nash bargaining between
















+ (1− β1)p1 (2.43)
whenever there is non-negative surplus to split between both firms or equivalently, if the ex-
pression for t1 above is non-negative and p1 ≤ v1.
The input price paid by manufacturer 2 - when it operates - depends on bids b submitted by
the suppliers. In equilibrium, these bids in turn, depend on output prices p and the suppliers’
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common cost structure. However, by analyzing the suppliers’ payoffs as functions of b and p,
one can enumerate the Nash equilibria bids b(p) for each possible configuration of p. One thus
learns how manufacturer 2’s input price and consequentially, profit, depends on p. Doing so
obtains the following lemma, applicable in the subgame Γ(I,p).














∨ 0. Suppose assumptions 2.2.2






























∨ 0− T21 if p2 ≤ v2
−T21 if otherwise
where s2 = s2(p,b(p)). Manufacturer 2’s supplier-or-shut down decision satisfies
s2(p,b(p)) =
























when p1 ≤ v1.
Proof of lemma 2.9.5. Nash bargaining between manufacturer 1 and supplier 1 implies (2.43)
when there is surplus to split between both firms:











; s2 = s2(p,b).
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∨ 0 if p1 ≤ v1
0 if otherwise.
where s2 = s2(p,b(p)), verifying the first identity of Lemma 2.9.5.
Each supplier’s profit (and hence its optimal bid) depends on p. There are two cases two





(b2 − AC(12)) + {s = 1}(T21 − F ) if s2 = s, p2 ≤ v2
{s = 1}(T21 − F ) if otherwise.
(2.44)
The outcomes of NEs in b and s(p,b) are easy to enumerate.
1. Suppose v2 < p2. Then each supplier s ≤ 2 is indifferent between any bid bs ≥ 0 since






< p2 ≤ v2. The situation facing bidders is analogous to a FPA. By (2.41),
both suppliers bid their unit cost





while manufacturer 2 chooses either supplier on the equilibrium path - s2(p,b) ∈ {1, 2} in the







= p2 ≤ v2. There are two possible classes of NEs.
- At least one supplier submitting the only bid that is simultaneously acceptable while
covering its own cost






is an NE for any choice by manufacturer 2 over its suppliers and shutting down s2(p,b) ∈
{1, 2, SD} on the equilibrium path. Manufacturer 2 makes zero variable profit in these
equilibria.
- Neither supplier submitting an acceptable bid





with manufacturer 2 shutting down on the equilibrium path, is also an NE. This yields
the same payoffs to manufacturers as in the first NE class.





, p2 ≤ v2. Clearly, neither supplier wishes to win the auction since
doing so incurs a loss. It follows b1 ∧ b2 ≥ p2 in any NE.
- Observe any bids that cover each supplier’s average cost





is an NE. Manufacturer 2 shuts down on the equilibrium path and makes no variable







- When either supplier submits a bid smaller than its average cost but exceeding the effective
reserve bid p2, so that





(and manufacturer 2 shuts down on the equiibirum path when p2 < b1 ∧ b2), then the
bids and consequential manufacturers’ decisions under (2.41) and (2.42), are an NE too.










, these NEs do not satisfy





. However, irrespetive of whether Assumption
2.2.3 is satisfied, manufacturer 2’s payoff remain the same as in the first NE class.
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∨ 0− T21 if p2 ≤ v2
−T21 if otherwise.
So the second identity of Lemma 2.9.5 holds when p1 > v1.









































∨ 0 if s2 = 1, p2 ≤ v2
0 if otherwise.
(2.45)
One can hence enumerate the NE bids b in the subgame Γ(I,p) for varying p satisfying p1 ≤ v1.
(2.41) and (2.42) already pin down s(p,b) in any such NE when b1 6= b2. Moreover, observe
when (2.41) doesn’t define s1(p,b), manufacturer 1 is indifferent between operating and shutting
down, and makes no profit either way. Likewise, when b1 ∧ b2 = p2, manufacturer 2 makes no
profit regardless of how s2(p,b) is defined. Thus, all that remains is to enumerate NE bids b
and manufacturer 2’s supplier-or-quit decision s2(p,b) when b1 = b2.
1. Suppose v2 < p2. Then each supplier is indifferent between any bid bs ≥ 0 while q2 =
q2(p2) = 0 by (2.42).
2. Suppose AC(1
2
) < p2 ≤ v2.
- Observe the intuitive solution where both suppliers bid the less efficient unit cost b1 = b2 =
AC(1
2









⇒ s2 = 1,
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is an NE outcome of Γ(I,p). It satisfies Assumption 2.2.3.





− H(p1) ≤ b ≤ AC(12), both suppliers bidding
b1 = b2 = b, and manufacturer 2 choosing supplier 1 s2 = 1 when that occurs, is also (part

































It is increasing in b2. So supplier 1 cannot increase its profit by defecting to b2 ≤ b. It is
non-negative at b2 = b. So supplier 1 finds it weakly profitable to supply both suppliers
vis-a-vis defecting to b2 > b. Likewise, by (2.42), supplier 2 makes zero variable profit and
cannot increase it by defecting. Finally, note these NEs do not satisfy Assumption 2.2.3.












−H(p1) ≤ b1 = p2 ∧ b2
for supplier 1’s bid to be IC, and for manufacturer 2 to choose supplier 1 on the equilibrium
path. But since b2 < p2 implies b2 < AC(
1
2
), the NE does not satisfy Assumption 2.2.3






−H(p1) ≤ b1 = p2 ≤ b2.
Manufacturer 2 thus makes no variable profit from operating in these equilibria.








































for this to occur - neither supplier makes a positive profit from supplying manufacturer 2,
which makes zero variable profit.
- Consider NEs where neither supplier supplies manufacturer 2. Then b1 ∧ b2 ≥ p2 for





− H(p1) for both






≤ b2 so that supplier 2’s bid is not weakly dominated by
bidding its own unit cost. Again, manufacturer 2 makes zero variable profit.











∨ 0− T21 if p2 ≤ v2
−T21 if otherwise.
So the second identity of Lemma 2.9.5 holds when p1 ≤ v1. Moreover, the exhaustive analysis
of all possible NE production networks above implies
s2(p,b(p)) =
























when p1 ≤ v1.
Stage 3: Suppose a 6= I so that the relationship network is disconnected. Each manufac-
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So each manufacturer m ≤ 2 sets the monopolist’s price
pm = vm






, and is indifferent between any price if otherwise.










∨ 0 ∀m ≤ 2. (2.46)
In contrast to the no product differentiation environment, the manufacturers’ profit margins










∨ 0 ∀s ≤ 2. (2.47)
Product differentiation thus enlarges the suppliers’ profit too.
Suppose a = I so that the relationship network is connected instead. Observe each con-
figuration of output prices p implies a distinct set of suppliers’ bids b(p) prescribed by the
equilibrium strategies σ|p,I. However, by analyzing the manufacturers’ Stage 3 payoff functions
derived above, one can enumerate the set of equilibrium p. The next set of lemmas apply in
Γ(I).
Lemma 2.9.6. Suppose assumptions 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 hold, and define H(v) as in Lemma 2.9.5.
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+ T21 − F πS2 = 0
in any equilibrium of the subgame initiated when Stage 2 investment decisions a equal I.



















manufacturer 2’s BR is to set p1 = v1. It follows π satisfy their stated expressions in the lemma.
Notice neither manufacturer has an incentive to alter its price after Stage 5. Assumption 2.2.6
thus holds. Since the NE is unique, Assumptions 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 also hold. Lemma 2.9.5 also
implies s2 = 1 since H(v1) > 0 and pm = vm for m ≤ 2.





< v1 and assumptions 2.2.2 to 2.2.3 hold. Then the firms’
Nash equilibria payoffs for the subgame initiated by a = I under Assumption 2.2.4, coincide
with those obtained under assumptions 2.2.5 to 2.2.6. Moreover,



































+ T21 − F πS2 = 0




















+ T21 − F πS2 = 0
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from any of these equilibria’s paths, where H(v) is defined as in Lemma 2.9.5.












< v1, manufacturer 1 sets the monopolist’s
price in any NE
p1 = v1 s1(p,b(p)) = Op (⇒ H(p1) 6= 0).














- In one NE, manufacturer 2 operates and sets the monopolist price:













, manufacturer 2 is supplied by supplier 1 (on the equilibrium
path):







, b2 = p2 = v2
)
.



































+ T21 − F πS2 = 0.

























is the maximal possible joint surplus manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 can possibly realize
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across all (p,b, s) (by (2.44), (2.45) and πM2 as described in Section 2.2), it is pareto
efficient amongst SPNEs for Γ(I). So Assumption 2.2.4 holds. Assumption 2.2.5 also
holds. Finally, since prices equal v, Assumption 2.2.6 also holds.
- In an alternate class of NEs, manufacturer 2 operates but doesn’t set the monopolist’s
price. It’s price is sufficiently high to allow a supplier (supplier 1) to submit an acceptable
bid while covering its own cost:





−H(v1) ≤ p2 ≤ v2.













, b2 = p2
)



































+ T21 − F πS2 = 0
in equilibrium. Unfortunately, p2 < v2 implies manufacturer 2 strictly improves its payoff
by setting p2 = v2 in Stage 5. These NEs thus do not satisfy Assumption 2.2.6. Moreover,
manufacturer 2 and supplier 1’s joint payoff is pareto dominated by the previous NE’s
payoff. Assumption 2.2.4 is thus violated too.
- In a final class of NEs, manufacturer 2 effectively shuts down by setting a price too low for
supplier 1 to supply it or too high for consumers to frequent it, without incurring losses.
More specifically,









∪ (v2, ∞) .
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Manufacturer 2 either shuts down formally in Stage 5, or shuts down implicitly by setting






−H(v1)⇒ s2(p,b(p)) = SD, p2 > v2 ⇒ q2(p2) = 0.




















+ T21 − F πS2 = 0.
Since F > 0, either supplier 1 or manufacturer 2 suffers a loss as compared to when it
doesn’t invest. The NE described is thus inconsistent with Assumption 2.2.5. The NE
also yields a pareto inefficient outcome to manufacturer 2 and supplier 1, compared to the
1st NE. Assumption 2.2.4 is thus violated.
The above cases exhaust the possibilities for p2’s value.





−H(v1). So long as p2 ≤ v2, supplier 1 cannot submit an acceptable
bid without incurring a loss from winning the right to supply manufacturer 2. Manufacturer
2 thus shuts down in any of this subgame’s NEs. Its price is either too low for supplier 1 to
profitably supply it, or too high for its consumers to benefit from purchasing its product:








Manufacturer 2 either shuts down formally in Stage 5, or shuts down implicitly on the
equilibrium path:
p2 ≤ v2 ⇒ s2(p,b(p)) = SD, p2 > v2 ⇒ q2(p2) = 0.
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+ T21 − F πS2 = 0.






− H(v1), Assumption 2.2.4 is satisfied. Since no other NE (yielding pareto
superior outcomes for manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 compared to when they don’t invest)
exists, Assumption 2.2.5 holds. To verify which of these NEs satisfy Assumption 2.2.6,
recognize either p2 > v2 or s2 = SD on the equilibrium paths.
i) If p2 > v2 and b1 ∧ b2 < v2, than a profitable deviation for manufacturer 2 does exist in
Stage 5 - by defecting to p2 = v2. Assumption 2.2.6 is violated.
ii) When p2 > v2 and b1 ∧ b2 ≥ v2, manufacturer 2 cannot make a strict profit by operating
even if granted the ability to do so after Stage 5. The NEs thus satisfy Assumption 2.2.6.
iii) If s2(p,b(p)) = SD, its input price is not defined. The NEs thus satisfy Assumption
2.2.6.
So NEs satisfying all three assumptions exist in Γ(I) under this configuration of parameters.
Whilst the set of NEs under Assumption 2.2.4 don’t coincide with those under assumption
2.2.5 and 2.2.6, their equilibrium path firm payoffs do, and equal the expressions stated in the
lemma. Moreover, s2 = 1 if s2 6= SD.
Lemma 2.9.8. Suppose v1 ≤ AC(12) < v2 and assumptions 2.2.2 to 2.2.3 hold. Then the firms’
Nash equilibria of the subgame initiated when a = I obtained under Assumption 2.2.4, coincide





































∨ 0 + T21 − F πS2 = 0.







in these paths. For any such
equilibrium featuring q2 > 0, s2 = 2 on its path, there exists another implying q2 > 0, s2 = 1.





, manufacturer 2 always sets the monopolist’s price
p2 = v2, s2(p,b(p)) 6= SD
in any NE. By Lemma 2.9.5, whether manufacturer 1 operates (produces positive market share)












, which in turn,








≤ v1. Then the NEs are as follows:
- In one NE, both manufacturers operate by setting the monopolist’s price
pm = vm ∀m ≤ 2.


















, implying supplier 1 can
undercut its rival’s bid and strictly profit. Hence
s2(p,b(p)) = 1
(










































+ T21 − F πS2 = 0
in equilibrium. Since either manufacturer sets the monopolist’s price, neither has an
incentive to defect after Stage 5. Assumption 2.2.6 holds. πS1 + π
M
2 cannot be possibly
larger for alternate values of (p,b) (by (2.44), (2.45) and πM2 descibed in Section 2.2). So








= v1, alternate NEs where only manufacturer 2 operates exists. Man-
ufacturer 2 sets the monopolist’s price while manufacturer 1 is indifferent between any
price:
p1 ≥ 0 p2 = v2.
Since AC(1
2
) < p2, both suppliers must bid the average cost, rendering manufacturer 2


































, when it is indifferent between operating and shutting down:
s1(p,b(p)) = SD.
Clearly an NE exists where s2 = 1. The same is true for s2 = 2. Moreover, each firm’s
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equilibrium profit is always












πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0,








turer 2 and supplier 1’s profits are pareto efficient across all possible p,b. Their payoffs
are actually a special case of those of the previous NE class. Hence, assumptions 2.2.4
and 2.2.5 hold. Neither manufacturer has an incentive to adjust prices after Stage 5. So
Assumption 2.2.6 also holds.







. Then πM1 (p) from Lemma 2.9.5 implies manufacturer 1 never
operates (produces positive market share) in any NE. Manufacturer 2 sets the monopolist’s
price, while manufacturer 1 is indifferent between any price:
p1 ≥ 0 p2 = v2
(






Manufacturer 1 explicitly shuts down or implicitly does so by setting p1 > v1. Since both
suppliers have symmetric cost structures, manufacturer 2 operates, but is indifferent between
either supplier:











So there exists an NE where s1 = 1 occurs. Likewise, there exists an NE where s2 = 2. Also,
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the firms’ profits are












πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0.
(and q2 > 0) in any NE. Since these are the unique NE payoffs, Assumption 2.2.5 is trivially
satisfied. Moreover, the pareto efficient joint payoff for manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 is
actually attained over all b,p. Assumption 2.2.4 holds. Finally, neither manufacturer has
an incentive to defect in Stage 5 - manufacturer 1 and supplier 1 cannot feasibly produce
inputs and assemble output while manufacturer 2 is already setting the monopolist’s price.
So Assumption 2.2.6 holds.















, there exists NEs satisfying all
three assumptions where q2 > 0, s2 = 1 or q2 > 0, s2 = 2 occurs.





and assumptions 2.2.2 to 2.2.3 hold. Then the firms’
Nash equilibria payoffs for the subgame initiated when a = I under Assumption 2.2.4, coincide









































+ T21 − F πS2 = 0












and manufacturer 2 produces
nothing q2 = 0, while profits equal
πM1 = 0 π
S
1 = T21 − F πM2 = −T21 πS2 = 0
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on the equilibria paths, where H(v) is defined as in Lemma 2.9.5. For any such equilibrium
featuring q2 > 0, s2 = 2 on its path, there exists another where q2 > 0, s2 = 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.9.9. Whether both manufacturers operate, share a single supplier in an NE
depends on whether supplier 1 can supply both firms at a profit. When





−H(p1) ≤ p2 ≤ v2,






−H(v1) < v2. Then the NEs can be categorized as follows:
- Consider any NE where both manufacturers operate (produce positive market share) and




















So manufacturer 1 always sets the monopolist’s price in any such NE.
i) Suppose both manufacturers set monopolists’ prices
p1 = v1, p2 = v2.
Equilibrium bids (satisfying Assumption (2.2.3)) are thus





to ensure supplier 1 is chosen while neither supplier defects. On the equilibrium path,
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+ T21 − F πS2 = 0.
Observe πS1 +π
M
2 is maximized over all p,b (by (2.45) and π
M
2 described in Section 2.2).
So assumptions 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 hold. Moreover, neither manufacturer has any incentive
to alter its price. So Assumption 2.2.6 holds too.
ii) Suppose only manufacturer 1 sets the monopolist’s price:
p1 = v1, p2 < v2.
Bids on the equilibrium path thus satisfy








































+ T21 − F πS2 = 0.
Observe Assumption 2.2.4 is violated, since πS1 is strictly smaller than in Case i), while
πM1 is the same. Also, because b1 = p2 < v2, Assumption 2.2.6 is violated.
- Consider any NE in which both manufacturers operate, but use different suppliers. Man-
ufacturers’ prices are thus











to ensure each supplier s can supply manufacturer m = s without incurring a loss. More-


























a contradiction to the hypothesis assumed. It follows no such an NE exists.
- Consider any NE in which only one manufacturer - manufacturer 1 - operates. Profit
maximization by manufacturer 1 and supplier 1 implies










−H(v1) or p2 > v2.
The equilibrium path bids (satisfying Asumption 2.2.3) thus satisfy






















πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0.
Notice (πS1 , π
M
2 ) is pareto dominated by those of the first NE class, so Assumption 2.2.4
does not hold. The NE is also inconsistent with Assumption 2.2.5, since either manufac-
turer 2 or supplier 1 can improve its payoff by not investing, unlike in the 1st equilibria
class.













































Hence no such NE exists.
- Consider any NE in which neither manufacturer operates. For supplier 1 to have no
profitable deviations, downstream prices satisfy





−H(p1) or p2 > v2.






, b1 ≥ 0, b1 ≥ p2 if p2 ≤ v2
on the equilibrium path. Each thus makes no variable profit
πM1 = 0 π
M
2 = −T21
πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0
in equilibrium. Observe (πS1 , π
M
2 ) are pareto dominated by those of the first NE class. So
Assumption 2.2.4 is violated. Moreover, Assumption 2.2.5 is also violated, since at least
one of manufacturer 2 or supplier 1 can strictly increase its payoff from not investing,
whereas the same argument doesn’t apply to first NE class.
We see that manufacturer 2 always operates and chooses s2 = 1.
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- Consider any NE whereby both manufacturers operate. If both manufacturers operate us-
ing different suppliers, then incentive compatibility for manufacturer 1, and loss avoidance
by manufacturer 2 and supplier 2 requires































a contradiction. So both manufacturers must use supplier 1 on the equilibrium path.
Hence, profit maximization implies










and H(v1) = 0.
By Assumption 2.2.3, suppliers submit bids satisfying



















= 0 πM2 = −T21
πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0.
(And as stated above, s2 = 1 on the NE path.)
47 It follows from the profit expressions that
47. To see why πM1 = 0, observe






























manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 attain their maximal possible payoffs over p,b. Assumption
2.2.4 thus holds. Assumption 2.2.5 also holds, since no alternate NE with a superior payoff
to one of manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 exists. Assumption 2.2.6 also holds, since neither
manufacturer has an incentive to alter its price.
- Consider any NE in which only manufacturer 1 operates. Profit maximization by manu-
facturer 1 and incentive compatibility for supplier 1 implies










−H(v1) or p2 > v2,
which are equivalent to











−H(v1). Each supplier submits an unacceptable bid, with supplier 2
bidding above unit cost to satisfy Assumption 2.2.3:











and q2 = 0:
πM1 = 0 π
M
2 = −T21
πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0.
As with the 1st class of NEs, assumptions 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 must hold. Whether Assumption
2.2.6 holds depends on b:
i) For p2 ≤ b1 ∧ b2, the NE satisfies Assumption 2.2.6.
ii) For p2 > v2 > b1 ∧ b2 and s2(p,b) 6= SD, the NE does not satisfy Assumption 2.2.6 -











for manufacturer 1 to not incur losses and violate IC.
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Importantly, NEs satisfying all three assumptions exist. The payoffs of supplier 2 and
manufacturer 1 are identical to those for the 1st NE class.












to ensure manufacturer 1 shuts down (implicitly or explicitly) while manufacturer 2’s































on the equilibrium path. Manufacturer 2 either chooses s2 = 1 or s2 = 2. Each firm’s
equilibrium variable profit is thus zero
πM1 = 0 π
M
2 = −T21
πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0.
Notice manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 are attaining pareto efficient payoffs over all p,b.
Assumptions 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 hold. Moreover, neither manufacturer has an incentive to
adjust its price after Stage 5 since b1 ∧ b2 = v2. So Assumption 2.2.6 holds.











−H(p1) or p2 > v2.
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These conditions are equivalent to p ≥ 0. Equilibrium path bids must satisfy





(with s2(p,b) = SD if b1 = p1).
by Assumption 2.2.3. So each firm makes zero variable profit:
πM1 = 0 π
M
2 = −T21
πS1 = T21 − F πS2 = 0
in equilibrium. Manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 are attaining pareto efficient payoffs over all
p,b. Assumptions 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 hold. Moreover, neither manufacturer has an incentive
to adjust its price after Stage 5 since b1 ∧ b2 = v2. So Assumption 2.2.6 holds.
We see that π are the same across all NEs. Also, when manufacturer 2 operates, either







, q1 = 0.
Whilst the set of NEs under Assumption 2.2.4 do not coincide with those under assumption















≥ v1, whenever there exists NEs
satisfying all three assumptions where q2 > 0, s2 = 1, the same is true for q2 > 0, s2 = 2.
Corrollary 2.9.2. Consider any BNE satisfying assumptions 2.2.2 and 2.2.4, or 2.2.2, 2.2.5
and 2.2.6.
i) Consider the subgame Γ(I). Suppose manufacturer 2 produces a positive quantity (q2 > 0)
and chooses supplier 2 (s2 = 2) in equilibrium. Then there exists another NE where q2 > 0
but s2 = 1.
ii) Suppose the willingness-to-pay for manufacturer 1’s product strictly exceeds the cost of pro-







< v1) and q2 > 0. Then s2 = 1 iff supplier 1 and
manufacturer 2 invests in a new relationship (a = I).
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and q >> 0. Then s2 = 1 iff a = I.
Suppose q >> 0. Then manufacturers share suppliers in the production network iff a = I.








q2 > 0 implies s2 = 1 under Γ(I). When a 6= I, manufacturer 2 never chooses supplier 1. This







, Lemmas 2.9.8 and 2.9.9 imply equilibria featuring q2 >
0, s2 = 2 exist only when equilibria featuring s2 = 1 occur, across all parameter configurations.







and q >> 0. Then πM1 (p)
from Lemma 2.9.5 implies manufacturer 1 can weakly profit (avoid a strict loss) iff it shares a
supplier with manufacturer 2 and manufacturer 2 produces a positive quantity of output48. So
manufacturer 1 and 2 share suppliers when a = I. Conversely, if neither manufacturer operates,
then no supplier sharing can occur in the production network. This establishes iii).















< v1. Then q >> 0 implies q2 > 0. So ii) implies statement holds.
Stage 2 & 1: Equation (2.6) implies manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 invests iff
πM2 + π
S
1 + F ≤ πM2 (I,σ|I) + πS1 (I,σ|I), (2.48)
or their joint return to their investment is positive.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.3. The claim is proved in two parts. The first step establishes a = I
48. To see this more formally, observe when manufacturer 2 doesn’t share a supplier with manufacturer 1 or































(according the expressions for πM1 when a 6= I described in the main text).
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Claim: a = I iff (2.49) holds.
Proof. Manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 invests iff (2.48) holds. (2.46) and (2.47) define πS1 + π
M
2
for all possible parameter configurations. Lemmas 2.9.6 to 2.9.8 similarly define πS1 + π
M
2 for
all parameter values. Hence, whether the relationship network is connected does not depend
on whether Assumption 2.2.4 or assumptions 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 are imposed.






Proof. Lemmas 2.9.6 and 2.9.9 imply both manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 invest iff








































− H(v1) ≤ v2. The RHS
of the expression above collapses to (2.49)’s RHS. Lemma 2.9.9 implies πS1 + π
M
2 = −F when










− H(v1) > v2. Hence investment never










































< 0 ≤ F .
So investment never occurs (with positive probability) under the proposition too.







Proof. Lemma 2.9.7 implies manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 invests iff































< v1 to show the above holds iff (2.49) holds.






Proof. Lemma 2.9.8 implies manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 invests iff

























< v2, the above holds iff (2.49) holds.






Proof. Lemma 2.9.9 implies manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 invests iff

























, the above holds iff (2.49) holds.
(2.49) thus holds whenever a = I.
Observe the relationship network is connected and features supplier sharing occurs iff a =
I.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.4. Let φ = (v, 1 − β1, 1 − β2,−c). Let SS be the event that two
manufacturers operate, share a supplier, and produce strictly positive quantities. Formally,
SS = {q >> 0, s2 = 1} = {q(s(p,b(p(I))),p(I)) >> 0, s2(p(I),b(p(I))) = 1, a = I}.
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where s,b,p should be understood as being part of σ|I in the the final term. Observe when
a 6= I, SS never occurs. Hence SS ⊆ {a = I}, as the expression above makes clear.
Let F (σ|I) denote the threshold for investment occurring a = I and the manufacturers
sharing suppliers in the relationship network. That is, as defined in (2.49) or equivalently,
Proposition 2.2.3. Observe this threshold is also a function of φ, whose form doesn’t depend on
the equilibria σ|I played. Write F (σ|I) = F (φ). Notice F (φ) is weakly increasing in φ. The
result is proved in parts.





+ c < v1 ∧ v2, and PSS = G(F (φ)).





< v1 ∧ v2, Lemma 2.9.6 implies s2 = 1 on the equilibrium
path. Moreover, its stated expression for πM (or the lemma’s proof) implies q >> 0 (in
equilibrium). So supplier sharing between positive market share manufacturers occur whenever
a = I. So PSS = G(F (φ)), which is weakly increasing in φ, and G when the latter is ordered
via FOSD.
Write H(v1) = H(φ) in what follows. Observe





















is weakly increasing in each entry of φ. In what follows, the following inequality is useful:





− c < 0. (2.50)
To interpret this condition, note the above occurs when supplier 1 cannot avoid losses from
supplying both manufacturers with positive quantities of inputs when p = v, for all bids b.





+ c < v1. PSS = 0 when (2.50) holds,
PSS = G(F (φ)) if otherwise.





+ c ≤ H(φ) + v2, then Lemma 2.9.7
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implies s2 = 1 on the equilibrium path when a = I, while its stated expression for π
M
1 implies





+ c > H(φ) + v2. Then Lemma 2.9.7 implies
manufacturer 1 never produces a positive quantity of output. Hence, PSS = 0.
It follows PSS equals 0 when (2.50) holds. When (2.50) doesn’t hold (weak inequality in
reverse direction), PSS = G(F (φ)). Now (2.50)’s LHS is weakly increasing in φ. Moreover,
G(F (φ)) is obviously weakly increasing in φ. So for any entry in φ, PSS is constant as that





+ c < v2 is violated. In the
case where (2.50) binds, PSS = G(F (φ)) is weakly increasing in that entry. Moreover, holding
φ constant, PSS is obviously weakly increasing in G via FOSD ordering.




















+ c, and PSS ∈ {0, G(F (φ))} if otherwise.






















+ c. Under Case i), manufacturer 1 clearly cannot profitably
produce positive market share, even when sharing suppliers. (Lemma 2.9.8’s proof makes this
clear.). So PSS = 0. Under Case ii), at least two equilibria classes can exist whenever a = I,
from the lemma’s statment or proof. Equilibria in which both manufacturers operate, produce
positive quanitities and share suppliers exist alongside equilibria where manufacturer 1 shuts
down. So PSS ∈ {G(F (φ)), 0}. In Case iii), the payoffs for manufacturer 1 in the lemma or its
proof shows both manufacturers share suppliers and produce positive market share whenever
a = I.
So as any entry in φ increases, PSS initially equals 0, before jumping discontinuously to
G(F (φ)), whereupon it is weakly increasing in that entry. Likewise, holding φ constant, PSS
is obviously weakly increasing in G via FOSD.





+ c. PSS = 0 when the inequality in
(2.50) holds or binds, P(SS) = G(F (φ)) if otherwise.
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Proof. When (2.50) holds or binds, Lemma 2.9.9 shows each firm’s variable profit is zero.
Supplier 1 and manufacturer 2 thus never invest, and PSS = 0. When the inequality in (2.50)














− c > 0. (2.51)
So the expression for πM1 in Lemma 2.9.9, or the lemma’s proof shows manufacturer 1 must be
producing a positive quantity, and sharing a supplier with manufacturer 2. So PSS = G(F (φ)).
So PSS is initially constant in zero as each entry in φ increases, until (2.50) binds, whereupon
it equals G(F (φ)) thereafter. PSS is thus always weakly increasing in that entry. Likewise,
holding φ constant, PSS is obviously weakly increasing in G via FOSD.
Each of the prior claims addresses what happens to PSS when φ is increased to φ′, in four,
mutually exclusive parameter configuration sets. It remains to show that when we compare
PSS across φ that cross the boundaries of these four separate cases in an increasing direction,
the desired result also holds. Any northeastern movement from a φ located in the last three
claim cases, to φ′ the first claim case, must result in either a discontinuous jump from 0 to
PSS = G(F (φ′)), or a change from PSS = G(F (φ)) to G(F (φ′)) where φ ≤ φ′. PSS is clearly
weakly increasing in this change.
This leaves northeast movements from a φ located in the last claim case, to a φ′ in claim
2 or 3 case. Suppose φ′ lies in Claim 2’s case. Suppose for contradiction, PSS(φ′) < PSS(φ).
Then
0 = PSS(φ′) < PSS(φ) = G(F (φ))











The implication hold by the proofs of the 4th and 2nd claims above. The final row is a
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contradiction to (2.50)’s LHS being non-increasing in its arguments, since φ < φ′.
Suppose φ′ lies in Claim 3’s case. Suppose for contradiction, PSS(φ′) < PSS(φ). Then




















− c ≤ H(φ).
The first implication holds by the proofs of the 4th and 3rd claims above. The final inequality





+ c. The final row is a contradiction to (2.50)’s
LHS being non-increasing in its arguments, since φ < φ′.
Corrollary 2.9.3. Suppose assumptions 2.2.2 to 2.2.4 or assumptions 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.5 and
2.2.6 hold. The probabilities of both manufacturers producing strictly positive quantities and
sharing suppliers conditional on particular manufacturers producing strictly positive output
P(q >> 0, s2 = 1|q >> 0) P(q >> 0, s2 = 1|q1 > 0) P(q >> 0, s2 = 1|q2 > 0),











Proof of Corollary 2.9.3. Let SS denote the event of both manufacturers producing positive





. Then q >> 0
a.s. and
PSS = P(SS|q >> 0) = P(SS|q1 > 0) = P(SS|q2 > 0).
Moreover, since q >> 0, so SS occurs when a = I, or when the relationship network is





. Neither manufacturer can operate without sharing a
supplier with a rival manufacturer producing positive quantity. The conditional probabilities
thus all equal 1.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2.5. The proposition asserts similar properties for the equilibria and
social planner’s relationship and production networks. I prove the relevant properties hold for
the relationship networks first.
Observe manufacturer 2 and supplier 1 invests in equilibrium when they don’t under the
social planner’s model if
F̂ < F < πM2 (I,σ|I)− πM2 + πS1 (I,σ|I)− πS1 (2.52)
where F̂ is defined by Proposition 2.2.1. When one of the inequalities in (2.52) holds only weakly,
the equilibrium relationship network is either over connected or socially optimal. Investment
doesn’t occur when it should if
πM2 (I,σ|I)− πM2 + πS1 (I,σ|I)− πS1 < F < F̂ . (2.53)
When one of the inequalities in (2.53) holds weakly, the relationship network is either under
connected or socially optimal. Hence, the relationship network is either excessively connected
relative to the planner’s network with positive probability, or under connected with positive


































































iff (2.53) occurs w.p.p.
Claim: Proposition holds for the relationship network.
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while (2.53) occurs w.p.p. iff the inequality displayed above is reversed. But the above is





. Likewise, the reverse inequality is equivalent to
(2.55).





























































while (2.53) occurs w.p.p. iff the inequality displayed above holds is reversed. But the above is





< v1. Likewise, the reverse inequality is equivalent to
(2.55). Notice in this situation, (2.52) never occurs and investment is always suboptimal, due
to strict concavity of C(Q).



























































while (2.53) occurs w.p.p. iff the inequality displayed above holds is reversed. But the above is





< v2. Likewise, the reverse inequality is equivalent to
(2.55).





. Proposition 2.2.3 implies (2.52) occurs (with one in-
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while (2.53) occurs w.p.p. iff the inequality displayed above is reversed. But the above is





. Likewise, the reverse inequality is equivalent to
(2.55). Again, (2.52) clearly never occurs with positive probability and investment is always
suboptimal.
Claim: Fix F ∈ [F , F ]. When the equilibrium and social planner’s relationship networks
coincide, the equilibrium and planner’s production networks coincide too.
Proof. Suppose both relationship networks are disconnected. The production network likewise
coincides with its socially optimal counterpart, since Nash bargaining implies manufacturer m








< vm, q2 = 0 otherwise. Suppose


















Corollary 2.9.2 implies s2 = 1 whenever q2 > 0. By Lemma 2.9.5, π
M
1 is strictly increasing in
p1 ∈ [0, v1] when s2 = 1, q2 > 0. So by Assumption 2.2.6, p1 = v1 and manufacturer 1 produces
positive market share whenever manufacturer 2 also does so. So if q2 > 0, the production
network coincides with its planner’s counterpart. Suppose q2 = 0. Then (2.44) and (2.45)



















+ T21 − F,
smaller than when a 6= I. Obviously, q2 = 0 implies πM2 = −T21. It follows that a 6= I on the
218
equilibrium path, and the relationship network was never connected to begin with.
Notice this claim proves the proposition’s final statement. When both sides of the proposi-
tion’s inequalities equal, a = I occurs whenever it is socially optimal. The relationship network
is thus socially optimal a.s. Hence the production network is socially optimal a.s. too.
Claim: Proposition holds for the equilibrium production network.
Proof. Suppose
F̂ < πM2 (I,σ|I)− πM2 + πS1 (I,σ|I)− πS1 (2.56)
holds. I claim the production network (graph of positive market share manufacturers with their
suppliers and relationships) is weakly over-connected (over or equally connected) or socially op-
timal. Fix a value of F . Assume (2.52) holds. Then the the (equilibrium) relationship network
is connected and the social planner’s network is disconnected. It follows that the planner’s
production network is either i) disconnected, consisting of two (strictly) positive market share
manufacturers connected to two separate suppliers ii) disconnected and empty or iii) connected
but consisting of only one positive market share manufacturer connected to a single supplier.
Now the relationship network is connected. Suppose for contradiction that the production net-
work was disconnected. As with the planner’s production network, the possibilities are it is i)
disconnected, consisting of two positive market share manufacturers connected to two separate
suppliers ii) disconnected and empty. If the production network were empty, each firm makes
no variable profit. Thus a 6= I and the relationship network was disconnected in equilibrium
to begin with. The production network is thus properly disconnected - it has two positive
market share manufacturers, connected to two separate suppliers. But Corollary 2.9.2 implies
that when q >> 0, supplier sharing occurs in Γ(I), a contradiction. So the production network
is connected, whereas its planner’s counterpart is either connected or disconnected. Assume
(2.52) doesn’t hold. Then the equilibrium relationship network coincides with its socially op-
timal counterpart. Thus the equilibrium production network is socially optimal too, by the
previous claim.
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Suppose (2.56) holds in reverse instead (strict reverse inequality). I claim the production
network is weakly under connected or socially optimal. Fix a value of F . Assume (2.53) holds.
Then the relationship network is disconnected when its planner’s counterpart is connected.
The planner never instructs investment in new relationships unless instructing supplier sharing
between positive market share manufacturers too. So the planner’s production network must
feature supplier sharing between two positive market share manufacturers. The planner’s net-
work can only be connected, while in comparison the equilibrium production is either connected
or disconnected. Moreover (as an aside), the possibilities are that the equilibrium production
network is i) disconnected and consisting of two unlinked operating manufacturers, ii) discon-
nected and empty, or iii) is connected, with only one manufacturer producing positive market
share. Assume (2.53) doesn’t hold. The equilibrium relationship network thus coincides with
its socially optimal counterpart. Thus the equilibrium production network is socially optimal
too, by the previous claim.























One can plug in the expressions for π from (2.46), (2.47), and π(I,σ|I) from lemmas 2.9.6 to
2.9.8 into the expression above and differentiate, to verify the proposition. Alternatively, by








∫ F=πS1 (I,σ|I)−πS1 +πM2 (I,σ|I)−πM2
F=F

















is the surplus achieved under the planner’s allocation, and
F ≤ F (σ|I) ≡ πS1 (I,σ|I)− πS1 + πM2 (I,σ|I)− πM2
is manufacturer 2 and supplier 1’s threshold for the network being connected ((2.49) defines this
in terms of the model’s primitives). By propositions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, F̂ and T̂ S are differentiable





(1, 1). Also, Proposition 2.2.3 or (2.49) establishes F (σ|I)’s












. Hence, by (2.57),












. This verifies the
proposition’s final statement.
Then taking derivatives on (2.57) and applying Proposition 2.2.2 obtains
∂TS
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, manufacturer 1 operates iff it
shares a supplier. This establishes the proposition’s first identity. Applying the same sequence
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, manufacturer 2 operates iff it















by Proposition 2.2.2. Observe q̂S has been used in place of qS in the proposition to denote
the suppliers’ market shares under the planner’s allocation. Then since a manufacturer whose








































































































































































, manufacturer m operates only when sharing suppliers.
Finally, by absolute continuity of G on support [F , F ],
θ = g(F (σ|I))(F̂ − F (σ|I)) < 0 ⇒ F̂ ∨ F < F (σ|I)− ε < F (σ|I) ≤ F̂
for ε > 0 sufficiently small. So (2.52) holds w.p.p. Given the definitions of F̂ and F (σ|I) in (2.7)
and (2.8) as thresholds for supplier sharing under the planner’s and equilibrium relationship
networks, θ < 0 implies the relationship network is inefficiently over connected with positive
probability. So by Proposition 2.2.5, the relationship and production networks are not under
connected compared to their planner’s counterparts w.p.p. Likewise,
θ = g(F (σ|I))(F̂ − F (σ|I)) > 0 ⇒ F ≤ F (σ|I) < F (σ|I) + ε < F̂ ∧ F
for ε > 0 sufficiently small. So (2.53) holds w.p.p. So θ < 0 implies the relationship network
is under connected with positive probability. So by Proposition 2.2.5, the relationship and
production networks are not over connected compared to their planner’s counterparts w.p.p.





































. Also, F (σ|I)



















































(1− β1)G (F (σ|I))
2
≥ 0












. (2.58) also inherits continuity of π and
F (σ|I) in v1. This completes the argument for EπM2 being weakly increasing in v1. Moreover,


















G (F (σ|I)) > 0. G(F (σ|I)) is the probability of supplier sharing in the relationship network







) when supplier sharing
occurs w.p.p. under the relationship network.
Proposition 2.2.3 also means one can write




where h(σ|I) is the additional profit manufacturer 1 makes when a = I. πM1 is clearly constant
in v2. (2.59) also implies EπM1 is weakly increasing in F (σ|I) and h(σ|I). F (σ|I) is weakly
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∨0, depending on on v1’s value. So EπM1 is weakly increasing in v2. EπM1












wherever h(σ|I) and F (σ|I) are likewise differentiable. Using (2.49) and (2.60), the first term




















































































− H(v1), or G(F (σ|I)) = 0.
The second term is undefined (or equals ∞) if otherwise. So EπM1 is strictly increasing in v2 iff


















, and G(F (σ|I)) > 0 (via effects from the second term).





(1, 1) and F < F (σ|I) <
F . But F < F (σ|I) < F holds when supplier sharing both occurs and doesn’t under the
relationship network w.p.p. This establishes the corollary’s final statement.
2.9.3 Auxilliary Statistics
Model-specific Attributes: Figure 2.19 shows automobiles have not been changing in size,
but are getting taller. The LHS of Figure 2.20 also reveals models becoming increasingly pow-
erful. These properties hold regardless of the models’ import statuses or brands. Hence, they
likely reflect technological improvements made by auto manufacturers in increasing their prod-
ucts’ desirability. In contrast, the middle years (2000-2008) of the sample show a reduction
in fuel efficiency as measured by MPD. The right panel however, suggests this might be due
to soaring fuel prices over the same timeframe, rather than regression in the vehicles’ charac-
teristics. In sum, cross-period variation in automobile size, volume, power, fuel efficiency and
import status appears driven by separate factors, weakening their temporal correlation with
each other. This suggests these attributes are also unlikely to strongly correlate with other,
unobserved automobile demand determinants.
Annual Demographics: The right panel of Figure 2.20 plots the cost of gasoline. Observe
this correlates with MPD on the left of Figure 2.20, and thus affects demand for automobiles.
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Figure 2.19: Size and Volume over 1994-2016
Figure 2.20: Horsepower, Mile per Dollar, Fuel and Crude Oil Prices over 1994-2016
The remaining lines on Figure 2.20’s RHS plot the price indices for crude oil sold at various
locations. These lines also correlate with the price of gasoline, and affect automobile manufac-
turing costs.
Figure 2.21 plots manufacturing wages for relevant sectors in the left panel49, and relevant
input prices on the right. As illustrated by the LHS plot, average wages paid by auto manufac-
49. with annual household income measured in 1992 US$ per hour by calibrating working hours to 2087, the
US Office of Personnel Management’s recommended number, available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/pay-leave/pay-administration/fact-sheets/how-to-compute-rates-of-pay/
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turers declined over 1994-2016, even as their national counterparts soared. This is consistent
with the oft portrayed narrative of US auto worker unions accepting pay cuts, so as to keep their
employers competitive vis-a-vis foreign manufacturers and financially sound. The wages paid
by auto suppliers track their auto manufacturing counterparts well. However, auto supplier
employees are consistently paid less than their downstream peers. Differences in the nature
of tasks faced by workers making inputs and employees assembling output, might explain this
discrepancy.
Figure 2.21’s RHS plots price indices of various inputs into auto production, alongside CPI.
Each index has been normalized to equal 1 in 1992. Relative to consumables, crude oil (average
petroleum spot price), shipping (deep sea freight), steel (cold rolled strips/sheets) and plastics
(plastic material and resins) became more expensive over 1999-2008, and cheaper during 2015-
16. The increase in pre-GFC shipping prices is particularly surprising, since it coincides with
the proliferation of imported models over the same timeframe (Figure 2.9, RHS, blue). The
first order effect of lower transportation costs should be to increase international trade. A pos-
sible explanation for this contradiction involves foreign manufacturers needing to ship inputs
from foreign suppliers, even when assembling models in the US. Such needs arise when manu-
facturers and suppliers develop significant relationship-specific capital from working together.
Another explanation considers lower tariffs offsetting rising shipping prices. China’s entry into
the World Trade Organization in 2001 exemplifies this hypothesis. A plot of recent assembly
plant locations however, reveals that they mainly still lie in Germany and Japan (Figure 2.12,
pink and red).
Supplier Popularity: Figure 2.22 summarizes the number of customers across main sup-
pliers for each contract category. The left panel shows suppliers of all categories exist in their
sample’s upper tertile when ranked by customer popularity. Although suppliers in the lower
tertile often sell only one type of input, the right panel also illustrates the numerosity of lower
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Figure 2.21: Income, Wages and Input Price Indices over 1994-2016
tertile suppliers per type. Finally, within each panel or tertile, suppliers attract more customers
per contract type as their popularity across all types increases.
Figure 2.22: Distribution of 2008-16 Models across Suppliers by Contract Type
Supplier Sharing: Figure 2.23 breaks down supplier sharing by assembly location. As with
the previous figures, total supplier sharing by models trends upwards regardless of whether the
models were imported. When attention is focused on GM and Chrysler models, one can check
from the data that total supplier sharing also oscillates up, albeit at a slower rate. These
trajectories possibly reflect the increasing number of imports relative to GM and Chrysler
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models depicted on the RHS of Figure 2.9. When supplier sharing is averaged across operating
models, one finds a sharper trend for GM and Chrysler models relative to their rivals, mirror-
ing the post-GFC growth in their sales vis-a-vis imported output, depicted on Figure 2.9’s LHS.
Figure 2.24 breaks down supplier sharing by contract type. Its LHS panel illustrates how
total supplier sharing is typically increasing across all but two categories. While each plotted
line exhibits the same sideways-S shape, the lines corresponding to electrical and chassis con-
tracts trend down. This contradiction with Proposition 2.2.4 probably reflects factors specific
to electrical or chassis producers unaccounted for in Section 2, emphasizing the simplicity of
Section 2’s analysis. The RHS panel illustrates how average supplier sharing across each con-
tract type track their counterparts on the left, albeit with flatter trajectories. In particular,
average supplier sharing is still increasing for the powertrain, exterior and interior categories,
but at slower rates.
Figure 2.23: Supplier Sharing by Assembly Location over 2008-16
2.9.4 Identifying Assumptions
Let g graph the collection of model-supplier production relationships, across all models in some
population M and suppliers in S. Let go denote the production network for an earlier period
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Figure 2.24: Total Supplier Sharing by Autopart/Contract Type over 2008-16
whose vertices equalMo ∪S. Finally, let N =M−Mo denote the set of model entrants, and
Fo the previous period’s producership structure. In what follows, s(m) denotes the suppliers
of model m ∈ M under the production network g, while m(s) denotes supplier s’s model-
customers.
When T , |Mt| and |St| are large across periods t ∈ N, the data allows the distribution of
D = (p,q, g,F ,x,w, a, e, go,Fo), (conditional on M,S) to be approximated. FD is thus as-
sumed to be known. Additional variables (ξ,ω, t,κ) are unobserved. Let I denote (D, ξ,ω,κ).
FI is thus unknown.
As in Subsection 2.5.1 or Berry & Haile (2014), this framework eschews explicit modeling of
entry and exit. Relatedly, the underlying population of models is time invariant. Assuming the
researcher samples time-varying attributes of the same models with sufficient frequency is prob-
lematic. However, as Section 2.6’s estimation procedure shows, imposing symmetric functional
form restrictions across models partially address this issue. Moreover, associating each model
with a previous period predecessor, so that a 2010 Camry is equated with its 2008 edition, also
addresses this concern.
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As explained in Subsection 2.5.2, the aim is to empirically approximate incentives facing
firms when they form new relationships with other firms, and their distortions due to ineffi-
ciencies highlighted by the simpler model. These estimands are identified under the following
assumptions. First, demand is well-behaved and identified.
Assumption 2.9.1. [Identified & Smooth Demand] Output equals demand qt = q(pt,xt, ξt,hht)
for all periods t ≤ T , where hht are the variables in at affecting demand. The demand function





on (p,x, ξ,hh)’s support.
The distribution of ξ|D is degenerate on D’s support and is identified. q(p,x, ξ,hh) is also
identified on the same support.
In the context of the microfounded model, Example 2.5.2 satisfies Assumption 2.9.1. Berry
& Haile (2014) produce more general conditions under which q(p,x, ξ,hh) is identified.
Next, manufacturers and suppliers operate smooth, product specific production technology.
Assumption 2.9.2. [Smooth Costs] For each model-supplier pair (m, s) ∈M×S and quantity
q > 0, let Cs(q) = C(q, es) denote supplier s’s expected cost of making inputs for q units of
output, conditional on its attributes es, and c
m(q) = c(q,wm) equal m’s expected cost of
assembling inputs into q output units, given wm. These functions are C
∞ in q ∈ R>0 for all
(m, s) ∈M× S.
Examples 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 satisfy Assumption 2.9.2. Since any continuous function on [0, 1] is
uniformly approximable by (infinitely differentiable) polynomials, the assumption is less oner-
ous than it appears.
Finally, downstream market prices are profit maximizing. The remaining assumptions spec-
ify how each manufacturer’s profit relates to the primitives of a model economy. First,













[Cs(Qs)− Cs (Qs −Qsf )] ,
where Qsf =
∑
m∈m(s)∩f qm is the quantity supplied by supplier s to f , nb(f) ⊆ ∪m∈fs(m) is an
identified set of suppliers satisfying nb(f)∩s(m) = s(m) if m ∈M−N , and au(f) = S−nb(f).
When the data is generated by the microfounded model and
nb(f) = nb(f,g) = ∪m∈f{s ∈ s(m, g) : ∃n ∈ f o (s, n) ∈ go},
au(f) = au(f,g) = S − nb(f,g),
(2.61)
one can show each manufacturer’s profit is affine in Assumption 2.9.3’s maximand50. Intuitively,
Nash bargaining between manufacturer f and its suppliers in nb(f,g) under the micro-founded
model, allows the firms to redivide their combined profit according to fixed bargaining param-
eters, for any vector of prices pf chosen by f . Prices thus maximize revenues less expected
production costs incurred by m and nb(f), residual costs ωf,nb(f)qf incurred when f ’s models
are matched to suppliers in nb(f), and payments for inputs tf,au(f) made to suppliers outside
nb(f).
Second,
Assumption 2.9.4. [Payment Rule] Manufacturer f ∈ F pays tms to supplier s ∈ au(f) in
exchange for inputs used to assemble q units of model m ∈ f , where au(f) is defined as in
Assumption 2.9.3. The payments satisfy tms = κmsq for all (m, s) ∈ f × au(f) and q ∈ R≥0.
Observe the objective in Assumption 2.9.3 clarifies how (tms)s∈au(f) constitute payments by
manufacturer f and its “Nash bargaining set” of suppliers nb(f), to suppliers in au(f). Under
50. The slope coefficient is τf (g) =
τf





SCf . Assumption 2.9.3 thus holds when supp(p) ⊆ RM>0, even when τ and SC change over periods.
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(2.61), au(f) is simply the complement of nb(f). Hence, it would be sensible to interpret these
payments as determined by competitive procurement auctions, rather than bilateral bargaining.
However, since the payments depend on endogenously chosen bids, they potentially depend
on the quantities supplied by all suppliers to all models, in addition to information specific to
each payment’s model and supplier. This is problematic because when manufacturers set prices
taking the dependencies into account, their optimization problems become forbiddingly com-
plicated. Such complications hinder use of their first-order conditions to recover the suppliers’
marginal costs from downstream market data.
Assumption 2.9.4 addresses this issue by assuming the payments are linear in own-model
output. Because their slopes κ can still correlate with rival model output, the payments are po-
tentially statistically related to rival output, even if they functionally depend only on own-model
quantities when manufacturers set prices. These requirements are satisfied when suppliers are
chosen via first-price auctions where bidders quote piece rate prices, prior to downstream market
pricing, as in the microfounded model. Setting κms = {s ∈ s(m)}bsm(I) in the model obtains
tms = κmsqm. Model m’s production cost due to tm is thus linear in qm. However, because
bidding precedes downstream pricing, κms can still depend on supplier s’s beliefs regarding its
overall output Qs, in addition to qm.
Third,
Assumption 2.9.5. [Exclusion Restriction] ωms in Assumption 2.9.3 is a shock to the cost of
producing output for model m ∈M using inputs from supplier s ∈ S where m ∈ f ∈ F . There
exists instrumental variables zcm ⊆ (x,w−m, a) satisfying
E[ωms|zcm, go,m ∈M−N ] = 0
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a.s. for all (m, s) ∈M× S.
The objective in Assumption 2.9.3 highlights how (ωms)s∈s(m) constitute the residual portion
of modelm’s marginal cost, after its assembly and input production costs (cm(qm), {Cs(qm)}s∈nb(f))
have been taken into account. The residuals’ indices clarify their idiosyncrasy across all possible
model-supplier matches induced by the production network.
When these residuals are independent of prices, the subset of incumbent model marginal
costs can be used to estimate cost parameters governing c(q,wm) and C(Q, es) respectively.
This is because the cost of producing such models m ∈M−N , depend only on the cost of as-
sembling them cm(qm), producing inputs for their manufacturer {Cs(Qs)−Cs(Qs−Qsf )}s∈nb(f),
and the residuals (ωms)s∈nb(f) themselves. In particular, since the models inherit past suppliers,
their marginal costs do not contain payments κ determined via procurement auctions, that
likely correlate with quantities determining cm(qm) and {Cs(Qs) − Cs(Qs − Qsf )}s∈nb(f), and
the attributes (x,w) of all models.
Obviously, since prices are chosen by manufacturers with ω in mind, ω is likely correlated
with prices and thus quantities. However, when model attributes (x,w) and past production
relationships go are mean independent of residual costs, these variables can serve as instru-
ments for estimating c(q,wm) and C(Q, es). Assumption 2.9.5 stipulates the existence of
such an instrument set. In principle, the variety of models in each period means there are
at least (|M| − 1) × dim(xm ∪ wm) candidates for zcm. Recognition that the reduced form
of q is symmetric across competing models explains why (xf(m)−m,x−f(m),wf(m)−m,w−f(m))
is typically used as instruments in the BLP literature. When supplier-level data is avail-
able however, the reduced-form symmetries may fail to hold51. This suggests basing zcm on
((xs)s∈s(m,go), (xs)s 6∈s(m,go), (ws,−m)s∈s(m,go), (ws)s 6∈s(m,go)) instead
52, yielding a larger number of
51. In particular, it is no longer trivially true that each product’s cost depends only on own-cost covariates.
It’s dependence on rival product attributes depends on its suppliers.

















denote the model’s cost-shifting variables, where nb(f) is as defined in Assumption 2.9.3, Qsf is
the quantity supplier s sells to f , and Qs,−f = Qs−Qsf is the quantity s sells to f ’s rivals. Let
s(Dm) = {D∗m : ∃D ∈ supp(D), Dm = D∗m} denote the set of possible Dm values. For any map
C : s(Dm) → R, E[C(Dm)|zcm] = 0 a.s. implies C = 0, where zcm is defined as in Assumption
2.9.5.
The previous assumption and the comments that follow, clarify why instruments zcm are
needed to identify any feature of assembly or input production costs. Clearly, for such identifi-
cation to occur, the endogenous determinants of marginal costs must vary with the instruments
as per a rank condition. Assumption 2.9.6 is the equivalent condition in the context of this pa-
per. In particular, it mirrors the completeness criterion introduced by Newey & Powell (2003),
for identifying triangular systems of equations in endogenous variables. The endogenous vari-
ables in question are encoded by Dm. These include the market shares qf associated with
a given manufacturer, the market shares of the manufacturer’s retained suppliers Qnb(f), and








. The twist here is that Dm does not have constant dimension unless
nb(f) is conditioned upon. Assumption 2.9.6 has thus been written in a way to reflect this.
unspecified under Fp,q,g,F,x,w,a,e,go,Fo .
53. One can obviously incude variables in xm excluded from wm, and household demographic information hh
in the instrument set too.
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Unfortunately, because the dimension of Dm grows with |nb(f)|, Assumption 2.9.6 is un-
likely to hold when |nb(f)| is large but dim(zcm) is small. Fortunately, the previously suggested
network-based instrument set produces more instrumental variables. Alternatively, functional
form restrictions along the lines of examples 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 can also be imposed.
Finally, three assumptions of more technical nature are needed. First,
Assumption 2.9.7. [Dense-in-itself Support] For any model m ∈ M produced by manufac-
turer f ∈ F , the set of its possible prices {p∗m : ∃D∗, (p∗m,D∗ − p∗m) ∈ supp(D)} contains no
isolated points. DefineDm as in Assumption 2.9.6. Supposem’s cost-shifters equalD∗m ∈ s(Dm).










The set of possible values for the chosen cost-shifter {dm : (dm,D∗m − d∗m) ∈ s(Dm)} contains
no isolated points too.
Assumption 2.9.7 basically requires each point in the support of Dm to be approximated
by a sequence of alternate possible values of Dm, in each direction corresponding to Dm’s con-
tinuous variables. This allows derivatives of marginal revenues with respect to the continuous
entries of Dm to be defined and identified on Dm’s support.
Next,
Assumption 2.9.8. [Product Lineup Persistence] Suppose there exists a realization for the
data D in its support such that m is a new model
m ∈ N ∩ f, f ∈ F .
Let s(m)∗ denote m’s suppliers, w∗m denote m’s attributes, and e
∗ denote the suppliers’ at-
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tributes under this realization. Then there exist another realization D′ in the data’s support,
where m is an older model
m ∈M∩ f −N , f ∈ F ,
whose suppliers and attributes are still s(m)∗ and w∗m respectively. Moreover, when f ’s Nash
bargaining set of suppliers under D′ are nb(f)′, their attributes are e∗nb(f)′ .
Assumption 2.9.8 basically requires each new model introduced in a given period, to appear
as an older model in the following periods. Once models with insignificant market shares are
removed from the sample, virtually zero models in the data are sold only in a single year. The
assumption allows marginal costs for incumbent models to be extrapolated to newer models,
thus identifying the newer models’ assembly and input production cost structures.
Last,
Assumption 2.9.9. [Product Predecessors] For any possible realization of old and new models
(Mo,N ), letN o denote a subset of new models satisfying the following. For any model m ∈ N o,
there exists a preceding model mo ∈Mo such that
P{m ∈ N o} > 0⇒ P{mo ∈M−N} > 0, (2.62)
and
(c(q,wm)− c(0,wm))− (c(q,wmo)− c(0,wmo)) (2.63)
is known to the researcher for all q > 0.
The set N o introduced by Assumption 2.9.9, should be interpreted as the subset of new
models m ∈ N with a previous edition or predecessor mo, in the data. Hence if m represents
the 2008 edition of a Toyota Camry, mo equals the Camry’s 2007 version. (2.62) thus implies
that each model’s predecessor is sampled with positive probability. This condition is trivially
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satisfied when N o is appropriately defined with respect to the data54.
Assumption 2.9.9’s second condition dictates that the researcher knows the difference-in-
difference in assembly costs (2.63), across a model and its predecessor for a given quantity.
This is an easily satisfiable high-level restriction. For example, when wm,t in the data consists
only of model-specific (instead of model-year specific) dummies, then wm,t = wmo,t−1. Thus,
(2.63) collapses to zero. Alternatively, suppose wm is continuously distributed and c(q,wm) is









for each k ∈ N. Basic manipulation of the manufacturers’ first-order conditions reveal the
integrand above is identified from the derivatives of marginal revenue with respect to wm.
2.9.5 Proofs of Results in Subsection 2.5.2
In what follows, let












CQ(Qs, es)− CsQ(Qs −Qsf , es)
) (2.64)










(κms − ωms) + ωm (2.65)
54. For example, when each new model in a given period t cannot be linked to a preceding model in past
periods, while satisfying Assumption 2.9.9’s conditions, one can simply set m(Nt,Mot )) = ∅
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qf + pf =



























a.s. on the support of the data variables D.
As outlined in Subsection 2.5.2, the initial focus of this paper’s identification strategy is on
identifying features of production costs associated with old models inM−N . This allows one
to learn about profits created from producing these models. The following results explain this.
Lemma 2.9.10. Suppose assumptions 2.9.1 to 2.9.7 hold. Then mr(Dm) is identified on {D∗m :
∃D ∈ supp(D|m ∈ M − N ), Dm = D∗m}. Moreover, ωm is degenerate and identified on the
same set.
Proof. Suppose ∃ an alternate mapping mralt(.) not equal to mr(.), and ωaltm ∈ RS satisfying
the model. Observe
ωm +mr(Dm) = mrm = ωaltm +mralt(Dm).
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E[ωms|zcm, go] = 0 =
∑
s∈s(m,go)
E[ωaltms|zcm, go] = E[ωaltm |zcm, go]
a.s. under Assumption 2.9.5. Hence,
E[(mr −mralt)(Dm)|zcm] = E[E[(mr −mralt)(Dm)|zcm, go]|zcm] = 0.




SC(qm,wm,Qs(m), es(m)) = c(qm,wm) +
∑
s∈s(m)
[C(Qs, es)− C(Qs − qm, es)] (2.68)
equal the ex-ante social cost of producing model m’s output given Dm. Let
smc(q, qm,wm,Qs(m), es(m)) = cq(q,wm) +
∑
s∈s(m)
CQ(Qs − qm + q, es) (2.69)
equal the (ex-ante) social marginal cost of producing q units of model m given Dm.
Lemma 2.9.11. Suppose assumptions 2.9.1 to 2.9.7 hold. Then
cqq(q,wm) CQQ(Q, es) SC(qm,wm,Qs(m), es(m)) smc(q, qm,wm,Qs(m), es(m))
are identified for all (q,Q) ∈ R2>0 on the support of D, conditional on m ∈M∩f−N , s ∈ nb(f)
and f ∈ F .
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under Assumption 2.9.2. By Lemma 2.9.10 and Assumption 2.9.7, these derivatives are identi-
fied on supp(D|m ∈M∩ f −N , s ∈ nb(f), f ∈ F).
The 1st and 3rd rows of (2.70) imply cqq(qm,wm) and CQQ(Qs, es) are identified on supp(D|m ∈
M∩ f −N , s ∈ nb(f), f ∈ F). Assumptions 2.9.2 and 2.9.7 imply higher order derivatives of
these functions with respect to qm and Qs are also identified on the same support.
Hence, by Taylor’s theorem,






















on the same support. Hence by Assumption 2.9.2 and Taylor’s theorem,






























is also identified on the same support.
Proposition 2.9.1. Suppose assumptions 2.9.1 to 2.9.7 hold. Consider any D in its support





are identified for all q,Q > 0. The unobserved cost shock ωm and the joint variable profit shared
by m with its suppliers
πjm = pmqm − cm(qm) + cm(0)−
∑
s∈s(m)




are degenerate given D and identified too.
Proof. Lemma 2.9.11 implies cqq(q,wm) is identified. Observe s(m) ⊆ nb(f) when m ∈ M ∩
f − N . So the same lemma implies CQQ(Q, es) is identified too. Identification of ωm follows
from Lemma 2.9.10. Identification of πjm then follows from
πjm = pmqm − SC(qm,wm,Qs(m), es(m))− ωmqm
and Lemma 2.9.11.
The previous results identify assembly and input cost curvatures for incumbent models in
M−N . The new two results apply to new models.
Lemma 2.9.12. Suppose assumptions 2.9.1 to 2.9.8 hold. Then
cqq(q,wm) CQQ(Q, es) SC(qm,wm,Qs(m), es(m)) smc(q, qm,wm,Qs(m), es(m))
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is degenerate and identified a.s. on supp(D|m ∈ N ∩ f, f ∈ F).
Proof. For the rest of the proof, fix a value for D in its support such that m ∈ N ∩ f and
f ∈ F .
Suppose s(m) = s(m)′, wm = w
′
m and e = e
′. Assumption 2.9.8 implies ∃D′ in its support
where m ∈ M ∩ f − N occurs. Moreover, s(m) = s(m)′, wm = w′m and enb(f)′ = e′nb(f)′ also
occur, where nb(f)′ denotes f ’s Nash bargaining set of suppliers under D′. So Lemma 2.9.11
implies CQQ(Q, es) = CQQ(Q, e
′
s) is identified on [0, 1] for all s ∈ nb(f)′. Since m ∈M∩ f −N
implies s(m)′ ⊆ nb(f)′, so CQQ(Q, es) = CQQ(Q, e′s) is identified on [0, 1] for all s ∈ s(m)′ too.
Consider any supplier s ∈ nb(f) such that s ∈ s(n) for some n ∈ M ∩ f − N . Lemma
2.9.11 implies CQQ(Q, es) is identified for all Q > 0. Consider any supplier s ∈ nb(f) such that
s ∈ s(n) for some n ∈ N ∩ f . Suppose s(n) = s(n)′′, wn = w′′n and e = e′′. Assumption 2.9.8
implies ∃D′′ in its support where m ∈ M∩ f − N occurs. Moreover, s(n) = s(n)′′, wn = w′′n
and enb(f)′′ = e
′′
nb(f)′′ occur too, where nb(f)
′′ denotes f ’s Nash bargaining set of suppliers under
D′′. Because s ∈ s(n)′′ ⊆ nb(f)′′, Lemma 2.9.11 implies CQQ(Q, es) = CQQ(Q, e′′s) is identified
on [0, 1].
Now observe (2.67) implies m’s marginal revenue equals




κms − CsQ(Qs)− ωms
]
+ ωm.
Assumption 2.9.8 implies there exists D′ in the data’s support, where m is an old incumbent
model produced by f , whose attributes and suppliers equal those in D, and whose Nash bargain-
ing set of suppliers are nb(f)′. Assumption 2.9.8 implies the suppliers in nb(f)′ have identical
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denote the marginal cost shifting variables for model m in D′. Then




is identified. Observe Assumption 2.9.2 and Taylor’s theorem implies




























































































































































The argument in the first two paragraphs of the proof identify CsQQ(Q) for each s ∈ nb(f) and
s ∈ nb(f)′. So each term on the RHS is identified by Assumption 2.9.7. Hence, mr(Dm) is
identified on supp(D|m ∈ N ∩ f, f ∈ F).















































is likewise identified on supp(D|m ∈ N ∩ f, f ∈ F).
Finally, because mr(Dm) is identified on supp(D|m ∈ N ∩ f, f ∈ F), so by (2.70) and the
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same arguments used to prove Lemma 2.9.11,



























are likewise identified on supp(D|m ∈ N ∩ f, f ∈ F).
Proposition 2.9.2. Suppose assumptions 2.9.1 to 2.9.8 hold. Consider any D in its support





are identified for all q,Q > 0. When m is assembled by f ∈ F , m’s joint profit with the suppliers








and the portion of these profits lost to suppliers through auctions or to cost shocks
πms + ωmqm =
∑
s∈s(m)∩au(f)




are degenerate given D and identified too.
247




s∈s(m)∩au(f) πms + ωmqm. Also
πjm = pmqm − cm(qm) + cm(0)−
∑
s∈s(m)




[κmsqm − Cs(Qs) + Cs(Qs − qm)− ωmsqm]








The following results apply to both incumbent and new models.
Lemma 2.9.13. Suppose assumptions 2.9.1 to 2.9.8 hold. For any I ∈ N, fix s ∈ SI . Then for
all (q,Us) ∈ RI+1>0 , SC(q,wm,Us, es) is identified a.s. on supp(D|m ∈M∩f, s(m) = s, f ∈ F).
Proof. Fix m ∈M∩ f , f ∈ F , s(m) = s, and (q,Us) ∈ RI+1>0 . Let SCm = SC(qm,wm,Qs, es).
When m ∈M−N , Lemma 2.9.11 implies SCm is degenerate and identified. When m ∈ N ,
Lemma 2.9.12 implies SCm is degenerate and identified. Hence, SCm is identified regardless of
whether m is old or new under D.
Now Assumption 2.9.2 and Taylor’s theorem implies



















− Cs(Qs − qm)




55. Alternatively, permute the models’ indices so that m = max{n ∈ f} in Lemma 2.9.14. This identifies πjm.
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CsQQ(v − qm + u)
∣∣
u=qm,v=Qs













CsQQ(Qs − qm + u+ v)
∣∣
u=0,v=Qs
















 (q − qm)k−j(Us −Qs)j
k!
.
Assumption 2.9.7, together with lemmas 2.9.11 and 2.9.12, imply the above is identified on
supp(D|m ∈ M ∩ f, s(m) = s, f ∈ F). Hence SC(q,wm,Us, es) is likewise identified on the
same support.
Observe for each (s,m, f) ∈ S ×M×F , one can define




as the amount supplied by supplier s to models owned manufacturer f , indexed by integers
smaller or equal to m.
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Lemma 2.9.14. Suppose assumptions 2.9.1 to 2.9.8 hold. Then





[Cs(Qs,f≤m)− Cs(Qs,f≤m − qm)]− κmqm
is degenerate and identified a.s. on supp(D|m ∈M∩ f, f ∈ F).
Proof. Fix D in its support. Suppose m ∈ f ∈ F . Setting
s = s(m), q = qm, Us = Qs,f≤m
in Lemma 2.9.13 identifies SC(qm,wm,Qs(m),f≤m, es(m)).
When m ∈M−N under D,





[Cs(Qs,f≤m)− Cs(Qs,f≤m − qm) + ωmsqm]
= pmqm − SC(qm,wm,Qs(m),f≤m, es(m))− ωmqm.
Lemma 2.9.10 identifies ωm. So the argument in the first paragraph completes the proof of the
RHS being identified.
When m ∈ N , assumptions 2.9.2 and 2.9.7, together with Lemma 2.9.12 imply
∑
s∈s(m)∩au(f)




























s∈s(m)∩au(f) πms+ωmqm are identified. Hence, the first paragraph completes the argument
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establishing









[κmsqm − Cs(Qs,f≤m) + Cs(Qs,f≤m − qm)− ωmsqm]







[Cs(Qs)− Cs(Qs − qm)− Cs(Qs,f≤m) + Cs(Qs,f≤m − qm)]
is identified.
Proposition 2.9.3. Suppose assumptions 2.9.1 to 2.9.8 hold. The variable profit manufacturer




[pmqm − cm(qm) + cm(0)− κmqm]−
∑
s∈nb(f)
[Cs(Qs)− Cs (Qs −Qsf )] ,
is degenerate given D and identified on D’s support.




m,f≤m. The result follows from Lemma 2.9.14.
In what follows, let gc = (g−m + g
o
m, g
o) be the current and past production networks,
under the counterfactual where model m’s manufacturer retains m’s past production network
suppliers instead of switching to m’s equilibrium ones.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.1. Fix τf to a known value in (0, 1). Then τ
f (g) and τ f (gc) are known,
since g and go are known. Proposition 2.9.3 implies πnbf is also identified given D. Hence, the
distortion of ∆πaf,m due to f bilaterally bargaining with fewer suppliers under g versus gc,
(τ f (g)− τ f (gc))πnbf , is identified on D’s support.
Also, Proposition 2.9.2 implies πms +
∑
s∈s(m) ωmsqm is identified on D’s support. Lemma
2.9.13 identfies SC(qm,wm,Qs(m), es(m)) on the same support. The lemma and the first part
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of Assumption 2.9.9 imply SC(qm,wmo ,Qs(mo,go) + {s 6∈ s(m)}qm, es(mo,go)) is identified too.
Hence, the second part of Assumption 2.9.9 identifies SC(qm,wm,Qs(mo,go)+{s 6∈ s(m)}qm, es(mo,go))
too. It follows each term in the decomposition (2.17), except for
∑
s∈s(mo,go) ωmsqm, is identi-
fied on D’s support. ∆πaf,m − τ f (gc)
∑
s∈s(mo,go) ωmsqm is thus likewise identified on the same
support.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.2. Fix τ to known values in (0, 1)F . Then τ f (g) and τ ls(g) are known,
since g is known.
Proposition 2.9.2 implies πms +
∑
s∈s(m) ωmsqm is identified on D’s support. Assumption
2.9.2 implies






CsQQ(Qs −Qsl − qm + q +Q)dqdQ
for each s ∈ S. Assumption 2.9.7 combined with propositions 2.9.1 and 2.9.2 imply the above
















s∈s(m) ωmsqm is identified on the same support.
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